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The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution & the Reversal of Worker's Power in China - 1971
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- 17 August 2023 1346 hits
from PL Magazine, Vol. 8, No. 3, November, 1971
The accepted view among Marxist-Leninists is that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GCPR) was a struggle of the masses, led by Chairman Mao, to defeat the bourgeois rightists within the Party and thereby prevent their influence from growing to the point where they could reverse the proletarian dictatorship. The "16-point" Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Concerning the GCPR (Aug. 8, 1966) defines the struggle in this way:
Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavor to stage a come-back. The proletariat must do just the opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie, in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and such those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.
The basic assumption is that the GPCR takes place under conditions of proletarian dictatorship, i.e. that the working class holds state power and has successfully carried through the socialist transformation of the material base. A Red Flag editorial of Feb., 1967 made the goals more concrete and defined the enemy:
Proletarian revolutionaries are united to seize power from the handful of persons within the party who are in authority and taking the capitalist road....Adequate attention must be paid to the role of revolutionary cadres in the struggle to seize power....The can become the backbone of the struggle to seize power and can become leaders in this struggle....A clear distinction must be drawn between those in authority who belong to the proletariat and those who belong to the bourgeoisie....
The overwhelming majority of the ordinary cadres in the Party and government organizations, enterprises and undertakings are good and want to make revolution.
The official documents of the GPCR state that 95% of the cadre are revolutionary, that only a "small handful of capitalist-roaders" have "wormed their way" into the party and that even leading cadres who have made serious mistakes can be re-educated by the masses and allowed to remain in their posts. Thus the GPCR is seen as a struggle between the Left, led by the proletarian headquarters of Mao, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai et. al. and the Right, led by the "black gang": Liu Shao Ch'i, Teng Hsaio-p'ing, P'eng Chen and Tao Chu. Victory went to the Left, preserving and consolidating socialism in China.
But this picture is confused by a third force on the scene. Mao and official CCP statements refer often to "extreme-leftists" who attack all the leading cadre, engage in "bitter armed struggle", deny the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a supporter of the Left, despise Chou En-lai and the other bureaucrats of the State Council and launch indiscriminate attacks against China's nationalist allies. What do we know about this "extreme-left" and what was its program?
Many of the large mass organizations of students and workers formed to overthrow the "capitalist-roaders" espoused "extreme-Leftist" views. In Hunan province, the "Sheng-Wu-Lien", a coalition of 20 Red Guard and rebel-worker groups, claimed 2 to 3 million followers. In Kwangsi, the "April 22 Rebel Grand Army" was one of the two largest mass organizations and came repeatedly into conflict with the PLA and the Central Authorities. In Peking, "extreme-Leftists" were strong in the Red Guard Congresses of Tsinghua and other universities. In Canton, the "Red Flag" was an "extreme-Leftist" group which was for a time the largest organization in the city and the major antagonist of the Military Region Command which ruled the city. Another important "extreme-Leftist" group was the "Red Guard Army", known in Canton as the "August 1 Combat Corps", which was made up of de-mobilized veterans of the PLA and several times resisted orders to disband. Similar organizations existed in urban areas. The consensus of Red Guard sources and western scholars who have studied the question is that somewhere between 30-40 million people followed these organizations.
Moreover, these local organizations, based in factories, schools, cities and regions began to develop an extensive network of connections. Red Guards traveled frequently to congresses where experiences and ideas were exchanged; liaison stations were established in many cities by important local groups, e.g., the Chingkangshang Rebel Red Guard group of Peking University had representatives in Canton, Wuhan and Shanghai. These congresses and stations were the beginning of a movement toward political and ideological unification of the "extreme-Left" which proceeded rapidly until smashed by the government and the Army between Sept. 1967 and July 1968.
These facts make it clear that we are dealing here with a political movement quite different from the isolated sectarian groups whom Lenin had attacked as "ultra-left" after World War I. This is a mass movement which frequently put forward positions in contradiction to Mao/Lin/Chou and came into sharp conflict with the PLA under their leadership.
An article in a Shanghai periodical in late July, 1967 characterized the politics of the "extreme-Left" in this way:
Recently, a sort of so-called 'new trend of thought' prevails in society. Its principal content is to distort the major contradiction of socialist society into one between the so-called 'power-holders', i.e., the 'privileged persons' who hold 'property and power' and the masses of the people. It demands an incessant 'redistribution' of the social property and political power under the proletarian dictatorship. The new trend of thought has equated the current GPCR with a conflict for wealth and power 'within a reactionary ruling class'. It has equated the headquarters of Mao/Lin with that of Liu/Teng/Tao. It has branded all leading cadres as privileged persons and thrust them all into the position of objects of revolution. (CNS, No. 188)
The "extreme-Left" held that China was already in the hands of a bourgeois ruling class at the time the GPCR began, that the vast majority (90%) of the leading cadres were part of that oppressor class, that the PLA was its tool to smash the real Left and maintain power, that the new "red" bourgeoisie had emerged during the 17 years from 1949-66 from the ranks of the revolutionaries themselves and, therefore, that the GPCR was not, as Mao said, a struggle to consolidate proletarian rule, but the first revolution in history to attempt to take power back from the revisionists. This basis analysis led the "extreme-Left" groups to carry out the following political campaigns.
- They demanded the ouster of Chou En-lai as the chief representative of China's "red" capitalists, along with the high-ranking economic and administrative ministers he was sheltering.
- They demanded that the GPCR be carried into the Army Officer Corps, which they saw a part of the new ruling class. They engaged in arms seizures from the PLA, raiding depots and arms trains, on the principle that a revolution to overthrow the bourgeoisie had to be an armed struggle of the masses.
- They looked to the Paris Commune as the model of the institutions of the proletarian state and fought to establish the commune-type of state throughout China (abolition of the standing army, worker's wages for officials, election and right of recall of all officials).
- The opposed China's foreign policies of alliance with secondary imperialists (France, etc.) and bourgeois nationalist regimes (Indonesia, Pakistan, etc.). To carry this through they seized foreign ships in the harbors, burned the British consulate in Aug. 1967, launched a liberation struggle in Hong Kong, seized Soviet arms going to Vietnam over China's railroad lines and opposed China's nuclear development program.
- They began to discuss and implement the formation of a new Marxist-Leninist Communist party, given their assumption that the CCP had become the party of the bourgeois apparatus which was restoring capitalism under the ideological cover of Marxism-Leninism.
The "extreme-Left" presented a view of what was going on in the GPCR which was contradictory to the official views of the CCP under Mao. ("95% of the cadres are good" vs. "90% of the political cadres must step aside".) If their analysis of the political situation in China was correct, if China was at that time ruled by a "red" bourgeoisie, then the "extreme-Left" is, in fact, the Left and Mao and his allies are the principal section of the "red bourgeoisie". The attack on Liu Shao-ch'i and a tiny minority of high officials was therefore a struggle within this bourgeois class between those who wanted to develop China through dependence on the Soviet Union and those who wanted an independent path. Mao and Lin Piao attempted to mobilize the masses to their side by appropriating many of the ideas and slogans of the Left and presenting them in watered-down versions. We are not arguing that this was, in every case, a conscious process of deception; but that the ideology of new-democracy/Mao Tse-tung Thought objectively led the proletarian and peasant masses into an alliance with a part of the bourgeoisie (the 95% of "good cadres") allowing this part to consolidate its power at the expense of the masses and sacrificing only an especially discredited group of officials as scape-goats.
It is necessary, therefore, to make an objective historical analysis of the developments of socialism in China, in order to determine whether the position of the "extreme-Left" in the GPCR was correct.
Throughout the period of revolutionary struggle in the countryside, (1927-1949) the line of the CCP contained two contradictory aspects: on the one hand there was a "poor-peasant" class struggle line directed against both the landlords and the capitalist rich-peasants and calling for collective forms of landholding; on the other hand, there was "rich-peasant" new-democratic class collaborationist line directed solely against the most important landlords and the Japanese imperialists and advocating partial reliance on local capitalists. These two lines were in constant struggle, giving CCP policy and practice a vacillating and inconsistent character. The class-struggle aspect was primary during the period of civil war against the Kuomintang (1946-1949) and led to victory and proletarian dictatorship. But the new-democratic line became primary right after the seizure of power.
This new-democratic political line anticipated a transition period during which capitalism was to be allowed to develop further, although under close regulation, so as to create the material and ideological conditions for making the transition to socialism gradually and without further armed struggle. The CCP had promised the people immediate benefits from the elimination of the landlords and the imperialists and the opening up of new opportunities for individual and collective enrichment. On the eve of victory, Mao defined the party's task:
If we know nothing about production and do not mast it quickly, if we cannot restore and develop production as speedily as possible and achieve solid successes so that the livelihood of the workers, first of all, and that of the people in general is improved, we shall be unable to sustain our political power, we shall be unable to stand on our feet, we shall fail...
In this period, all capitalist elements in the cities and countryside which are not harmful but beneficial to the national economy should be allowed to exist and expand...But the existence and expansion of capitalism in China will b restricted from several directions...Restriction versus opposition to restriction will be the main form of class struggle in the new-democratic state. (Report to 2nd Plenum of 7th Central Committee CC).)
"RED" CARPET FOR SUDANESE BUTCHER
On August 6, Major-General Gaafar Mohamed Nimeri (P.S.C.), President of the Revolution Command Council, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Sudan, and the Sudanese Friendship Delegation led by him arrived in Peking by special plane on a state visit at the invitation of the Chinese Government. Several hundred thousand revolutionary people lined the main thoroughfare of the capital to extend a grand and warm welcome to the distinguished Sudanese guests from the Arab anti-imperialist front.
A grand ceremony was held at the airport where the national flags of China and the Sudan were fluttering. The band played the nation anthems of the Sudan and China. Accompanied by Premier Chou En-lai and Chief of the General Staff Huang Yung-sheng and others, President Nimeri and the other distinguished guests reviewed a guard of honour made up of men of the three services of the P.L.A., militiamen and Red Guards, and walked round to meet the newcomers.
Peking Review, August 14, 1971
CAIRO, July 22 -- The Sudanese leader who was deposed in a coup d'état Monday reclaimed power today after neighboring Libya ordered a plane carrying two his rivals down and then took them into custody. According to broadcasts from the Sudan, Maj. Gen. Gafaar al-Nimery was restored to the premiership by loyal officers and troops who staged a countercoup. The general went on the radio tonight and called on the Sudanese people to seize all Communists and turn them over to the police or the army.
New York Times
There was only one way to bring about an immediate restoration and growth of the national economy: rely on the former ruling class which had learned the methods and skills required to keep the economy functioning. This meant, in particular, enlisting into the service of the new state the large body of technicians, managers, engineers, government administrators and intellectuals who had served the old regime. According to An Tzu-Wen (NCNA, Sept. 30, 1952), the cadre force had quadrupled between '49-'52, from 720,000 to 2, 750,000. The bulk of these were the so-called "retained cadres", capitalist managers and ex-Kuomintang civil servants. Some were peasants and workers who had distinguished themselves in various political campaigns, especially the land reform; but the CCP was mistrustful of the many rural activists who had tendencies during land reform to commit "Leftist" errors, meaning that they had carried expropriation into the ranks of the rich peasants, whom Mao wished to preserve as a source of increased production. Another group consisted of recent graduates of colleges and special cadre training schools.
The ideological commitment of the bulk of cadres was thus not to socialism, as a system of social relations among men, but to national economic development, which they would ten, as a result of class background and education, to conceive in capitalist terms. The CCP tried to counter this situation by intensive political education of the new cadres and mass campaigns in which the workers were encouraged to criticize all elements of personal corruption, bureaucratic style of work, etc. that they found in the cadres. But these steps could not in any short period alter the basic ideological orientation of the bulk of the new cadres.
Moreover, many of the cadres were taken into the party, in order to subject them to its discipline and facilitate their ideological re-molding. Party membership rose from 3,000,000 in mid-1948 to 5,800,000 in mid-1951. (Official CCP figures in Schurmann, p. 129.) It was inevitable, given the new-democratic line, that the CCP would attract many whose primary commitment was not to socialism but to the protection and advancement of the interests of the bourgeoisie. The repeated anti-Rightist struggles of the next decade (1954-55, 1957, 1959) testify to the existence of this element within the Party.
The "retained" cadres, as well as the newly trained college graduates, were paid the wages which they were accustomed to receiving. Given their primarily bourgeois orientation, only material reward commensurate with the privileged position of managers and administrators within capitalists society would induce them to serve the new state power. This created a contradiction with the system under which the Communist cadres had lived before liberation, the so-called "supply-system". All cadres, whatever their responsibilities and positions, from the rank-and-file on up to top leadership were provided with the basic necessities of life in kind, plus a little pocket money for incidentals. This created an egalitarian and democratic style of work. It was a concrete application of communist principle of distribution: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need." Those who were committed to serving the people by destroying the system of exploitation and creating a new system of socialism should be willing to do the work they were capable of without special material reward. This corresponded to the lesson Marx, Engels and Lenin had drawn from the experience of the Paris Commune, that fundamental principle of proletarian dictatorship must be that work for the state be performed at average workers' wages.
After Liberation, the supply-system for Communist cadres contradicted the wage system under which new cadres were paid, a wage system which necessarily contained large differentials between high and low levels, it being a basic idea of bourgeois society that the mental work of administration and management is superior to manual work and ought to be rewarded correspondingly. The CCP leadership then made the choice to eliminate the supply-system and bring all the cadre, both Party and non-Party, both pre-Liberation and post-Liberation, under a unified wage-grade system. This was completed by a State Council Order of Aug. 31, 1955:
for the purpose of putting into effect the principle of to 'each according to his work' and 'equal pay for equal work', the supply system now applicable to a section of government employees is to be changed into a wage system of pay and allowance for governmental employees and facilitate the building of socialism. (NCNA, Sept. 14, 1955. Transl. in SCMP, 1134, 1, 12.)
At the same time, the cadre wage system was consolidated into a 30-grade scale with the following monthly wages: (from Barnett, p. 191)
REPRESENTATIVE GRADE WAGE: POSITION (in yuan/month)
Premier, Head of State, etc. 1 600
Deputy Premier, CC member, etc. 2 - 5 400-500
Central Minister 6 400
Bureau Chief (Central) 9 - 12 200-250
Division Chief (Central) 13 - 15 150-200
County-level Magistrate 13 - 15 130-160
Section Chief (Central) 16 - 17 100-135
County-level section member 18 - 23 50-90
Clerical staff 24 - 27 30-45
General Service personnel 28 - 30 23-29
For purposes of comparison, here are some representative wage figures for workers and managers: (from Chao Kuo-chun, Vol. 2, p. 73-74 -- figures for 1956)
Plant director--263, Chief Engineer 223, Chief Designer--135, Engineer--118-191, Technician--103-166, Chief Accountant--74-126, Bookkeeper--45-78, File Clerk--41-66, Worker in heavy industry--69-106, Worker in light industry--56, Worker in construction--31-51, misc. worker--23-34. At the same time peasant incomes ran about 8-15.
It is clear from these highly-differentiated wage scales that the principle of the Paris Commune was not being applied. The payments were thought to reflect correctly the principle of distribution under the first stage of socialism--'to each according to his work'. The official editorials explaining the change presented the following view:
The supply system was a system of treatment of government employees adopted at a time of the revolutionary war when the financial and economic situation was rather acute. It was built on the premise that the revolutionary workers possessed a high degree of political consciousness. Its special features were: On the basis of the minimum subsistence requirements of revolutionary workers, the state was to supply them with a definite quantity of the essential articles of livelihood...There was thus little difference between the treatment accorded to cadres at higher levels and the general rank-and-file government workers, insofar as their personal requirement were concerned. It may be described as a measure in keeping with the military communist way of life.
If the supply system has played an important role in ensuring the final victory of the revolution, why should it be replaced now in its entirety by the wage system?....this is because the supply system is contradictory to the principles of 'to each according to his work' and 'equal pay for equal work'. (Tu Shao-po & Wang I-cheng in Shih Shih Shou Ts'e, Sept. 25, 1955. Transl. in ECMM, no. 19, p. 27)
...He who performs better labor and does better work gets a better pay, and equal work will earn equal pay. In this way, one can be caused to interest himself, from the standpoint of material interests, in the results of his labor and to link up his personal interests with the overall interest of the state...(Renmin Ribao, Sept. 14, 1955. Transl. in SCMP, no. 1134, p. 13)
The CCP leadership thus saw the supply-system not as a desirable application of the communist principle of distribution but as an expedient adaptation to the conditions of extreme material deprivation which prevailed before Liberation. The coming of socialism, with greater abundance of products, would eliminate the necessity for this kind of egalitarian sharing of difficulties. In this view, Socialism, the first stage in the development of the new society, is separated from communism by a long period of development of the productive forces. Only when there is general abundance, the ability to satisfy the material needs of all the people, could the transition to communism begin. During the first stage, material incentive still played a powerful role, along with other aspects of bourgeois thinking, and had to be harnessed to the needs of socialist development. The supply-system was therefore "utopian" and a violation of the stage-by-stage development toward communism.
The opposing argument was put forward by Left forces during the Great Leap (1958) and again during the GPCR. It acknowledged that distribution according to need for the whole population and for all products could only be introduced gradually but saw the ideological consciousness of the masses, not the level of development of the material forces of productions, as the main limitation on the rapidity of transition to communism. To the extent that people were won to the idea of "serve the people", as against bourgeois individualism, communism could be introduced in part, even if at a lower level of shared subsistence than would be possible with the further development of the economy. In particular, the Party members, as the ideological vanguard of the working class, and especially the Party leaders should be willing to apply communist distribution to themselves even if the masses as a whole continued to cling, in part, to material incentive.
It was, in fact, the bourgeois road that prevailed. Rather than winning the bourgeois intellectuals to communism, the Party was won to material incentive. This was a consequence of the new-democratic line. Having taken power without a mass force of workers and peasants won ideologically to communism and having committed itself to satisfying the immediate material aspirations of the masses, the party had to rely on the bourgeois technicians to manage affairs of state and economy. If the masses had been won to a greater degree to socialism, a totally different course would have been possible--the creation of new organs of power and administration putting management directly into the hands of the people, under the leadership of the party. This might have meant, temporarily, more "disorder" and stagnation of production as the people learned to fashion and run these new socialist forms, but it would have avoided reliance on bourgeois forces and ideas and eventual reversal of the revolution. Moreover, the new-democratic line welcomed into the Party, during the anti-Japanese War, many forces whose primary commitment was to nationalism and bourgeois land reform. These forces within the Party were strong enough to bring about the elimination of the supply-system and the merging of Party cadres into the privileged stratum of officials. The new wage-grade system provided a framework of material privilege within which a new bourgeoisie could slowly form and become conscious of its class interest in opposition to further development toward communism.
THE QUESTION OF A STANDING ARMY
In summarizing the lessons of the Paris Commune, Marx had pointed also to its abolition of the standing army and replacement by the arming of the workers, the proletarian militia. In the third of his Letters From Afar (March 11, 1917) Lenin had explained:
We need a state, but not the kind other bourgeoisie needs, with organs of government in the shape of a police force, an army and a bureaucracy (officialdom) separate from and opposed to the people. All bourgeois revolutions merely perfected this state machine, merely transferred it from the hands of one party to those of another.
The proletariat on the other hand....must "smash", to use Marx's expression, this "ready-made" state machine and substitute a new one for it by merging the police force, the army and the bureaucracy with the entire armed people...the proletariat must organize and arm all the poor, exploited sections of the population in order that they themselves should take the organs of state power directly into their own hands, in order that they themselves should constitute these organs of state power. (Coll. Works, Vol. 23, pp. 325-326)
The Chinese revolution was made by the armed masses of workers and peasants. After victory was achieved, the decision was made to disarm the masses and concentrate weapons in the hands of a standing army which lived in barracks separate from the masses. At the same time there began an intensive program of modernization, both technical and administrative, of the PLA which put increased emphasis on knowledge of military science, on sophisticated weaponry and on professionalism. All of these developments led, in the early 1950s, to significant moves away from the democratic-egalitarian traditions of the PLA. They culminated in the State Council order of Feb. 1955 setting up a system of ranks within the PLA and eliminating the supply-system for military personnel. This was followed in October by the conferring of the title of Marshal on the ten top leaders of the PLA, the wearing of shoulder badges and insignia showing rank, and the creation and award of several types of military decorations. A Renmin Ribao editorial of Sept. 28, 1955 gave arguments for the new rank system:
Why must the PLA adopt the system of military ranks at present? This is because with the application of the Military Service Law (conscription), the modern equipment of the armed forces requires that the training and activities of the servicemen should follow strict systems and regulations. The ranking and interrelation of the officers should be clearly defined, and the organization and discipline of the armed forces should be consolidated...all officers must wear shoulder badges and insignias of their ranks so that there will be clear distinction between officers and other ranks, between the various branches of the armed forces....Only in this way would the units of the armed forces be able to carry out successfully their task of defending the country in a changing situation and under the new conditions of complex equipment, speed of movement and joint action of the different branches.
After the adoption of the military ranks, there will be clear distinction between the officer and the men...Will this affect the close unity of the officers and the men and of the officers of the upper and lower ranks? The answer is no...there is no clash of class interests between the officers and men...their interests being the same. The officer and the men would struggle together to defend the country, protect the interest of the people, and safeguard the cause of Socialism. There fore the holding of military ranks...implies that the officers are entrusted with an even greater responsibility and should be even more concerned with the men and take better care of them...The military ranking system will also ensure the equality of officers as required by national defense. The modern revolutionary fighting forces require of the officers not only their loyalty to the country and the people but also accomplishment in the knowledge of military science as well as proficiency in modern military techniques....The conferment of titles is determined on the basis of responsibility, political qualities, abilities, terms of service and contribution to the revolution (Trans. in SCMP, no. 1147, pp. 3-5)
The new system of ranks also included a wage scale for payment of men and officers, extending the principle "to each according to his work" to the people's army. Our best information on these wages comes from Edgar Snow who visited an army camp in his trip of 1961-62 and was given the following pay figures (The Other Side of the River, p. 289. These figures are in $U.S./month. Snow calculated the monetary exchange himself.)
Private -- 2.50
Corporal -- 4
2nd Lt. -- 20
1st. Lt. -- 24
Captain -- 29-33
Major -- 39-44
Lt. Colonel -- 51-60
Colonel -- 62-64
Senior Colonel -- 74-84
Lt. General -- 144-160
General -- 192-236
Marshal -- 360-400
Why was the principle of the proletarian militia not carried through? In the first place, it requires a high level of ideological commitment of the masses to the long-term goal of the party--communism. Only if that ideological understanding exists will the Party feel that it can rely on the masses to defeat the class enemy during the sharp class struggle which continues under proletarian dictatorship. If, as in the case of the CCP, the Party has won the support of the masses by leading a national liberation struggle with an alliance with the national bourgeoisie, then the concentration of armed force in a standing army directly under the control of the Party (all officers are Party members) is seen as a guarantee against the situation where the Party loses, temporarily or permanently, the support of the masses.
In the second place, the CCP never broke away from the bourgeois concepts of war and did not carry through the revolutionary idea of people's war. While on a number of occasions Mao put forward the idea that men are primary over weapons in warfare, he did not mean by this to deny the role of modern weaponry but only to attempt to control its use by political criteria. In practice, the CCP invested heavily in modern weapons, going all the way to atomic weapons in the 1960s. The logic of positional war with modern weapons corresponds to the kind of professionalism which came to dominate the officer corps of the PLA.
This does not mean that a proletarian militia is totally unable to use weapons beyond small arms. But it would adopt them only to the extent that its organization remained socialist and not elitist. The militia would train in the factories and neighborhoods. Those with technical knowledge would act as teachers but without becoming administratively separate fro the masses, nor would this knowledge be kept as a monopoly of the few; rather all the people would attempt to master the more advanced weapons. Military work would be an aspect of political work and leadership would not become professional, separate, institutionalized. Such a people's militia, moreover, would have a powerful weapon only rarely used in the past, the appeal to proletarian class interests of the soldiers of the imperialists. A people's war is as much agitational as military in the narrow sense. And even if defeated temporarily by an army equipped with superior fire-power, the militia would have maintained the ideological consciousness of the masses and prepared them to continue to struggle against al their class enemies, while the standing army under socialism in China became one of the most important breeding-grounds for the new bourgeoisie and eventually became a tool of that class.
Arming of the people requires that the Party be willing to share power with the masses, that the dictatorship of the proletariat be seen as a system of worker's rule with party leadership, a version of Left-center coalition under new conditions, rather than as a system in which the party monopolizes all positions of power because it is not willing to trust in the masses and their desire to fight for and defend socialism. This in turn requires that the party win power, leading masses of people who are consciously fighting for socialism, not just more material goods or land or peace. And it is precisely this element that the Bolshevik and Chinese revolutions lacked. And the reason that they maintained a standing army under Party control.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECONOMY
So far we have seen some of the effects of the exercise of state power of the bourgeois aspect that advocated reliance on the capitalist class as a progressive force in the first-stage of the revolution. But this line, insofar as it was Marxist-Leninist, also had a proletarian aspect, the intention of moving to socialism in a second-stage and the mobilization of the masses of workers and peasants to destroy the power of their class enemies. In 1953, the CCP proclaimed the General Line of the construction of Socialism, sketching out the Party's plan to gradually expropriate all private capital and lead the peasants through a number of stages to collective production. Serious disagreements developed within the CCP around the question of how rapidly and comprehensively to move toward socialism. Liu and others had foreseen a much longer period of new-democracy and ascribed a much greater progressiveness to capitalism. They exerted their influence throughout the fifties to slow down and distort the elimination of the bourgeoisie. The Left in the party, made up primarily of worker and peasant cadres taken in during the sharp class struggles of 1947-52, fought constantly to move to higher stages of socialism.
If the Soviet Union wouldn't do (point the way), then he would place his hopes on the American people. The United States alone had a population of more than 200 million. Industrial production was already higher than in any other country and education was universal. He would be happy to see a party emerge there to lead a revolution, although he was not expecting that in the near future.
In the meantime, he said, the foreign ministry was studying the matter of admitting Americans from the left, middle and right to visit China. Should rightists like Nixon, who represented the monopoly capitalists, be permitted to come? He should be welcomed because, Mao explained, at present the problems between China and the U.S.A. would have to be solved with Nixon. Mao would be happy to talk with him, either as a tourist or as President.
I, unfortunately, could not represent the United States, he said; I was not a monopoly capitalist. Could I settle the Taiwan question? Why continue such a stalemate? Chiang Kai-shek had not died yet. But what had Taiwan to do with Nixon? That question was created by Truman and Acheson.
--Edgar Snow, "A Conversation with Mao Tse-Tung." Life Magazine, April 30, 1971, pages 46 - 48.
According to Mao, U.S. bosses are doing fine (high production) and workers poorly (no revolutions on the horizon). U.S. workers and PLP will shoot his theories to hell.
Mao and his close supporters, applying the new-democratic line, swung back-and-forth periodically between these two groups and, most importantly, refused to break decisively with the Right. This created a complex pattern of economic struggle with distinct stages: 1) a sharp advance by the Left with which Mao associates himself, 2) an attempt by the leadership to restrain the advances and prevent it from passing beyond the new-democratic framework to a decisive break with bourgeois ideas, and 3) counter-attack and victory by the Right putting an end to the advance and often retreating to an earlier position. This pattern characterizes all the major episodes; Land reform (1947-1950), Collectivization (1955-56), Communization (1958-59), and the GPCR (1966-68).
The first step was Land Reform, initiated as early as 1947 in the old Liberated areas and completed in 1950-51 in the Southern areas. The property of landlords was taken over and distributed to the peasants. In the early stages, Leftist cadres and poor peasants had tended to carry the struggle past the landlords to the rich peasants who owned sufficient amounts of land to required the employment of hired labor. These rich peasants were rural capitalists and often had industrial or commercial interests in addition to land. The CCP leadership quickly put a stop to these "excesses" and Mao summarized the new line in June, 1950:
Carry forward the work of agrarian reform step by step and in an orderly manner. The war has been fundamentally ended on the mainland; the situation is entirely different from that between 1946 and 1948, when the PLA was locked in a life and death struggle with the KMT reactionaries and the issue had not yet been decided. Now the government is able to help the poor peasants solve their difficulties by means of loans to balance up the disadvantage of having less land. Therefore, there should be a change in our policy towards the rich peasants, a change from the policy of requisitioning the surplus land and property of the rich peasants to one of preserving a rich peasant economy, in order to help the early restoration of production in the rural areas. This change is also favorable for isolating the landlords and protecting the middle peasants and small "renters out" of land. (Report at CC meeting, June 6, 1950. Transl. in CB, supplement no. 1, p. 3)
The same new-democratic line, with its prime emphasis on quantity of production, which required the use of bourgeois "experts" in the factories and state organs, required that the rural capitalists be allowed to flourish, at least for a time. The CCP was well aware, from observing the history of the Soviet countryside in the twenties, that the small-producer economy created by land reform was subject to internal instability; control of draft animals and implements by the richer peasants would progressively lead to impoverishment of the "new-middle" peasants and their return to the status of wage-earners, i.e.,, that a petty-property commodity-producing economy generated capitalism rapidly and inexorably. It attempted to counter this development by encouraging, both ideologically and financially, the formation of mutual-aid teams, arrangements in which peasants would use their privately-owned implements to help each other by planning collectively the application of those resources. By late 1952, 40% of rural households were members of such teams, which generally included 7-10 families. In addition, genuine co-operatives, in which land and larger tools were pooled and used collectively, although payment was still made for the property contribution of each family as well as its labor contribution, were formed in many of the areas where land reform had taken place earliest.
But the policy of preserving the rich peasants left them free to use their political influence and economic power to enter the mutual-aid teams and co-ops, turning them into instruments of their individual enrichment, or to destroy them from without. Mao reported in 1955 that there had been "large scale dissolution of co-ops in 1953" as rich peasants convinced the other peasants that the road of individual enterprise was superior to the socialist road of the co-ops. Rich peasants entered the mutual-aid teams in order to share in the government loans and technical assistance which the teams qualified for. They then usually managed to get the lion's share of the benefits for themselves. Thus by 1954-55, the class struggle in China had reached a fateful turning point. If no further mass movement toward socialism could be made, then the countryside would revert to capitalism and the proletarian dictatorship would certainly be undermined.
But a profound ideological process had been percolating among the peasants in the preceding years. They had begun to grasp Marxism-Leninism under the leadership of the Leftist rural cadres. These cadres had not shared in the privileges of the senior cadres in the cities and lived among and at roughly the level of the peasants. The peasants initiated in 1955-56 a mass movement to form co-operatives. Leadership was taken by the poor peasants and the new "lower-middle peasants", former poor peasants who had received insufficient land and implements from the agrarian reform to be able to survive without continuing, often in disguised and illegal forms, to hire themselves out to the rich capitalist peasants, or go deeper into debt to them. By May, 1956, 91.2% of rural families were members of agricultural producers' co-operatives (APCs). By the end of 1956, 88% were in advanced APCs, in which payment to the individual family was based only on labor contributed, while property contributed was not compensated beyond the initial payment for its value. This was a tremendous victory for the Chinese proletariat and demonstrated concretely that peasants could be won ideologically to fight for socialism.
While the move along the "socialist road" was the primary aspect of this rural struggle, the Right forces in the CCP were strong enough to enforce certain limitations on the movement, to concede certain positions to the bourgeoisie.
The rich peasants were not compelled to enter the APCs, but had to be convinced that is was in their interest to do so. So, many remained separate, often with the best land and implements and continued to act as a source of temptation to the upper-middle peasants who had often reluctantly agreed to enter the APCs. Moreover, the prices set for subsidiary crops on the free markets were highly favorable and tempted the peasant to divert his labor and fertilizer from the collective endeavor to his private plot.
The principle of income distribution within the advanced APC was payment according to labor performed. Material incentive, transferred now from the level of the individual family to that of the small group, was still the cardinal point. Co-ops with different ratios of labor power to mouths-to-feed or different qualities of land received therefore very different per-capita incomes. The party fought vigorously against the tendency of the poorer peasants to demand more egalitarian distribution in favor of labor-poor families. A complex system of calculating work-points according to the job performed, the quality of the work, etc., was introduced, the equivalent of the piece-rate system then being introduced in industry. This kind of system, beginning from a situation where the APCs are unequally endowed with labor power and land, would lead to progressively widening disparities in living standards between poor and rich APCs. A kind of "collective" exploitation of poorer co-ops by the richer could eventually result. It was this tendency which led, as we shall see, to the mass movement among the poor and lower-middle peasants to form the people's communes in 1958.
At the time of our 1965 colloquy, Mao continued, a great deal of power-over propaganda work within the provincial and local party committees, and especially within the Peking Party Committee--had been out of his control. That was why he had then stated that there was need for more personality cult, in order to stimulate the masses to dismantle the anti-Mao party bureaucracy. Of course the personality cult had bee overdone. Today, things were different...In the past few years there had been need for some personality cult. Now there was no such need and there should be a cooling down.
[PHOTO, FOUR YOUNG RED GUARDS HOLDING THE LITTLE RED BOOK SINGING IN FRONT OF LARGE PICTURE OF MAO]
Picture, from Life magazine, shows cult of Mao is alive and well. Mao reveals how cult, like all individualism, is tool of the bourgeois class in maintaining power.
Developments in industry had been very similar. In 1949-50 the state had seized the property of those capitalists who were intimately involved with the imperialists and politically supported the Kuomintang. This had brought a large part of Chinese industry into the hands of the state. In 1955-56 the government moved to convert all remaining bourgeois industrial property into jointly owned state-private enterprise. The state had complete control over the use of the property and ownership of its output while the former capitalist owners were compensated for their property in government bonds paying a fixed rate of interest. Many of the capitalists, in addition to these fixed-income payments, stayed on as plant directors and staff at the high money salaries prevailing in these positions and, through the combination of these sources of income, were able to continue living in a way that was far above that of the average worker and a constant source of corruption of the government cadres.
The system of management used in both state and joint enterprises was known as "one-man management" and had been quite consciously borrowed from contemporary Soviet practice. Its essence was the absolute authority of the manager over day-to-day operations, hiring and firing, use of available resources. This system was modified in 1956 to give a much greater advisory and supervisory role to the Party committee in the factory, made up of the most politically advanced workers, but the managers retained great power.
In June, 1956, the great variety of wage payment schemes which the CCP had inherited from pre-Liberation factories were unified and rationalized in a systematic wage reform. This set up a basic wage scale with eight grades, with the wage in the highest (most skilled) grade being approximately three times the lowest. Roughly 80% of wages was to be base pay, calculated by hours worked according to skill grade, with the remaining 20% being used to spur extra output through piecework or bonus remuneration. Material incentives were the basic technique driving production, as is shown in an important article commenting on wage reform:
This revision will effectively eradicate equalitarianism and the state of unreasonableness and confusion obtaining in the current wage system and serve as a powerful material factor setting into motion the extensive masses of workers and office employees to strive for fulfillment of the First Five Year Plan ahead of schedule. (Chin Lin, in Lao-tung (Labor), no. 3, March 6, 1956. Transl. in ECMM, no. 35, pp. 32-35)
A Renmin Ribao editorial of June, 1956, emphasized that piece rates are the most effective way of tying income directly to the individual quantity and quality of work performed and advocated their extensive development in the wake of the wage reform. By 1957, about 42% of all workers in state-operated factories and mines were covered by some sort of piece-rate system. Beginning in 1954, workers were given special monetary rewards for invention and innovation. Workers were given special bonuses of up to 15% of the standard monthly wage for achieving cost reductions or over fulfilling output quotas. In addition, the State Council, in 1955, set down regulations establishing monetary rewards for scientific contributions aimed at "inspiring the positive and creative talents of scientific research workers....for serving the construction of the country." Monetary rewards to scientists represented multiples of the average worker's yearly income, ranging from 2,000 yuan to 10,000 yuan.
It is fair to say, therefore, that material incentive was the primary idea affecting the ideology of the Chinese working-class through 1957. This kind of reliance on bourgeois thought and habits could only weaken the working class ideologically and prevent it from developing the communist consciousness necessary to enable it to prevent restoration of the state power of the bourgeoisie. The Party led mass campaigns for ideological re-molding of the thought of workers and cadres. But these were vitiated by the inconsistency of the party line and could not change the strong bourgeois ideas constantly being generated by the material conditions under which people worked. Moreover, Mao's reluctance to deal self-critically with the theory of new-democracy which allowed and encouraged the Party's Rightists to devise these schemes, prevented him from breaking the unity of the Party. He compromised repeatedly with Liu and the other Rightists on the most fundamental questions.
The Rightist trend of 1956 also extended to the ideological sphere. Initial Chinese reaction to Khruschev's speech to the 20th CPSU Party Congress was quite favorable. At the first session of the 8th National Congress of the CCP (Sept., 1956) Liu gave a political report, as Head of State of the People's Republic, which included the following points:
....The fact that our bourgeoisie has heralded its acceptance of socialist transformation with a fanfare of gongs and drums is something of a miracle. What this miracle shows is precisely the great strength of the correct leadership of the proletariat and the absolute need for the dictatorship of the proletariat.
....During the past few years, the national bourgeoisie has taken part in the rehabilitation of the national economy...In the course of socialist transformation, the alliance of the working class with the national bourgeoisie has played a positive role in educating and remolding the bourgeois elements. In the future, we can continue our work of uniting, educating and remolding them so that they may place their knowledge in the service of socialist construction. Thus, it can be readily seen that it is wrong to consider this alliance as a useless burden.
In another speech to the Congress, reported years later in a Red Guard tabloid, Liu is reported to have said, "The question of who will win in the struggle between capitalism and socialism in our country has now been decided" and he criticized "some members of our Party who hold that everything should absolutely be 'of one color' "--(i.e., the Left).
THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD AND THE RURAL PEOPLE'S COMMUNES (RPCs)
The Great Leap period of 1958-59 is very complex because all the conflicting class forces in society and within the Party participated and put forward very different ideas and goals for the movement. For the Left, it was an attack on all the aspects of "bourgeois right" that had been primary up to that time in Chinese institutions; it put into question and often eliminated material incentives, piece-rates, managerial authority, high pay differentials, etc. It challenged the existence of the standing army and the wage system for cadres. For the Left, the large-scale RPCs, amalgamating the former APCs into units often containing 5,000 to 6,000 households and changing the existing system of income distribution, were the organizational means for beginning the transition to communism. The system of free supply of grain was introduced into the RPCs along with communal mess halls, nurseries, laundries, etc., so that the principle of distribution "to each according to his needs" was no longer a distant goal separated from the present by a long process of economic development, but a living reality. The commune eliminated the private plots of land and raised the socialization of property to a new level. The income earned by any individual household was determined not, as previously, by its own individual performance or that of the small work team of which it was a part, but as a share, based on a political calculation of needs, of the total output of the commune. Working for the commune, rather that for oneself, became, at least in part, a living principle.
It is useful here to quote extensively from some of the Left writings of the period, to show the kind of thinking which lay behind the mass movement of the summer and fall of 1958.
An article which stimulated a lengthy discussion was "Break Away From the Ideas of Bourgeois Rights", by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao (whom we will meet again as a participant in the Shanghai Cultural Revolution in 1967):
To support the PLA, thousands of militiamen followed the Army in their march to the South. They led the same life of military communism as the Army. They did not aim at becoming officials or getting rich. No idea of wages, let alone "piece-wages" entered their minds....After the nation-wide liberation, this life of military communism marked by "supply-system" was still very popular.... Comrades who were inured to the life of supply system did not covet the wage system....but shortly afterwards this system of life was subjected to the impact of the bourgeois idea of right. The idea of bourgeois right has its kernel in hierarchy. In the view of persons imbued with the idea of bourgeois right, the supply system was undesirable....There was nothing strange in such arguments brought forth by the bourgeoisie. But soon a number of party cadres were subjected to the impact of this idea. Among them were heard more criticism of the drawbacks of supply system while more talks were heard about the merits of the wage system...In a word, the communist supply system which ensured victory of the Chinese revolution, was condemned by some people as a serious offense which must be punished.
The main argument against the supply system is that it cannot stimulate production enthusiasm. Its theoretical basis is the "principle of material interests" stressed by economists. It is said that as survivals of the old division of labor still exist under the socialist system, i.e., some distinctions still exist between mental labor and physical labor, between workers and peasants. and between skilled and unskilled labor, the principle of "developing production through the material interests of workers" is represented as a wonderful principle.
....The arguments seem to be very convincing but reduced to the popular language it is the same as the old saying: "money talks". If high wages are used to "stimulate", then socialism and communism can be bought like a piece of candy.
What do we have to say about such a theory? It is precisely the workers, who, according to the above-mentioned economists, are the most concerned with the wage levels, who express fundamentally contrary views. Shanghai's workers....pointed out that advocates of this theory want to "let money instead of politics assume command." These words hit the bull's eye. Of course, we do not deny....that the inequality in "bourgeois right" cannot be done away with at once....but did Marx tell us that bourgeois right and bourgeois hierarchy of inequality must not be destroyed but should be systematized and developed? Did he not say that the principle of "material interests" should only be partially stressed and that communist education should be intensified politically, ideologically and morally in order to break down the bourgeois right?...
....As a result of the attack on the supply system, the living standard which did not show much difference in the past has changed among out party cadre and some who were not inured to hardship have rapidly learned manners of gentlemen, high-class Chinese and old Mr. Chan (a snobby character in Lu Hsun's Story of Ah Q). some cadres feel displeased when they are not addressed as "heads". This indeed stimulates something. but it does not stimulate production enthusiasm but enthusiasm in fighting for fame and wealth....It stimulates estrangement from the masses. Some elements soon degenerate into bourgeois rightists....Some cadres expect extra pay when they work for only one extra hour. (Transl. in CB, no. 537, pp. 3-5)
Another article of the same period, "Let us Begin Our Discussion with the Supply System", by Hu Sheng, put forward the idea that, while it was not possible to introduce communist distribution "according to needs" generally and completely until the productive forces of society had developed further, it was necessary to fight for communist "aspects",
Does the enforcement of the supply system mean realization of communism? It is not yet the case. Many people's communes in the countryside now provide free meals; some even provide "three things" (meaning food, clothing, free housing), "five things" and even "seven things". It is not proper to represent this as communism.
But it should be said that it contains the communist factors. At a time when products are not so abundant, the communist "to each according to his needs" principle cannot be fully realized. By communist factors are meant a comparative uniformity for all and the "break-up" of the "to each according to his work" framework. Under the supply system, one will not set a big store by pay....(Transl. in CB, no 537, 33-36)
Under the free grain supply system described in these articles food was provided free of charge in communal mess halls. Often additional necessities of life were provided free by the commune. This meant that the poorer co-ops, who previously had difficulty in providing these necessities, were merged into the larger commune and benefited from the higher productivity of the more advanced co-ops. Conversely, it meant that the peasants in the more advanced op-ops, which often meant the ones which had incorporated a larger number of former rich peasants, had to be willing to share the fruits of their own labor with the less fortunate, i.e. to put the needs of the commune as a whole above their own small group material interest. This transformation was no automatic administrative matter; it was the result of a sharp class struggle led in the countryside by party cadres in which poor and lower-middle class peasants struggled for the formation of communes while rich and upper-middle peasants resisted them and tried to undermine the free supply aspects. The communization movement itself had been preceded in the fall of 1957 by a sharp anti-Rightist struggle within the Party in which some of the most prominent figures in economic affairs (such as Ch'en Yun) were demoted because of their opposition to the Great Leap.
The question about Nixon has been partly answered for us by Chairman Mao in my earlier report. He told me that Nixon, who represented the monopoly capitalists, should be welcomed simply because at present the problems between China and the U.S. would have to be solved with him. In the dialectical pattern of his thought Mao has often said that good can come out of bad and that bad people can be made good--by experience and right teaching. Yes, he said to me, he preferred men like Nixon to social democrats and revisionists, those who professed to be one thing but in power behaved quite otherwise.
Nixon might be deceitful, he went on, but perhaps a little bit less so than some others. Nixon resorted to tough tactics but he also used some soft tactics. Yes, Nixon could just get on a plane and come. It would not matter whether the talks would be successful. If he were willing to come, the chairman would be willing to talk to him and it would be all right. It would be all right, whether or not they quarreled, or whether Nixon came as a tourist or as President. He believed they would not quarrel. But of course he would offer criticism of Nixon. The hosts would also make self-criticism and talk about their own mistakes and shortcomings--for instance, their production level was lower than that of the United States.
Mao's phony "dialectics" is high-falutin' cover for sellout of world's workers and peasants. Genuine dialectical thought is based on distinguishing classes and being able to tell friends from enemies.
A second aspect of the Left view of the Great Leap was the change in the mode of economic planning and organization. Rather than professional managers dominating the factories, with an adversary Party committee, the Left advocated that the Party committee itself combine political direction with day-to-day management, i.e. putting politics in command. This new management system was introduced in a number of factories and generally accompanied the partial elimination of piece rates, narrowing of the pay differentials among the workers and an increase in the amount of political discussion and struggle within the enterprises. Control over the planning process was taken away from the central Ministries and given over to Provincial and county Party committees who were to involve the workers and peasants themselves much more closely in the process of drawing-up, reconciling and executing the plans. Overall co-ordination was to be maintained not by centralized bureaucratic determination of the details of output quotas and resource use (combing with much reliance on the price-market mechanism) but by de-centralized response by the masses and basic-level cadres to the general line put forward by the Party leadership. This kind of de-centralization was very different from that carried out in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, where more power to lower-level units meant more power to managers and technicians, not workers.
But there was a contradiction between the Left view of the RPCs as a new form of organization (with a new ideology) opening up the transition to communism, and the view of the Party leadership, which saw the Great Leap primarily as a production drive and the RPCs as a tool which could mobilize labor on a large scale and in a more specialized fashion to complete the industrialization of the country and catch up to the capitalist nations. The communes had been preceded by predictions of enormous increases in production, capital investment, and per/acre yields, both in agriculture and industry, for the years 1957-62. It was anticipated that Chinese steel production would "catch up to Britain in 15 years". As part of this plan, the CCP advocated the policy of "walking on two legs", supplementing the large-scale modern factories in the cities with a network of smaller-scale regional and local industries making use of the traditional skills of the workers and peasants and relying on locally-available resources. The communist aspects of the RPCs, especially rejection of material incentives and growth of free supply, were always evaluated by the CCP leadership in relation to their effect on production. This cautiousness can be seen in the official editorials which followed the Aug. 20, 1958 Communique of the CC giving approval to the communization movement:
....The establishment of people's communes is shaping up as a new irresistible tide of the mass movement on a nation-wide scale....The existing people's communes have shown ever greater superiority over the farm co-operatives in spurring the initiative of the masses in production, raising the rate of utilization of labor power and labor productivity, enlarging productive capital construction, accelerating the cultural and technical revolutions and in promoting public welfare.
....The Chinese peasants, having defeated capitalism economically, politically and ideologically and having overcome right conservatism in agricultural production, have carried out agricultural capital construction on an unprecedented scale, adopted advanced technical measures in farming and thereby are doubling farm yields or increasing them by several, a dozen or scores of times. At the same time, small and medium industrial enterprise are being rapidly developed in the countryside to promote the integration of industry and agriculture and to raise the standard of living of the rural population.
Of course, when the people's communes re established it is not immediately necessary to transform collective ownership into ownership by the whole people and it is even less appropriate to starting to advance from socialism, i.e., the primary phase of communism, to its higher phase. ("Greet the Upsurge in Forming People's Communes", Red Flag, no. 7, Sept. 1, 1958. Transl. in CB no 517, pp. 1-4)
CCP editorials and resolutions repeatedly stress that the free supply system should not be taken so far that "production enthusiasm" is affected. As time passed, it became clear that the new forms of social organization and the new communist ideas were leading to sharper class struggle in the countryside and that this struggle was likely to interfere with achievement of the ever more-grandiose production and productivity targets emanating from Peking. When the CC met for its 6th Plenary Session in Dec. 1958, it issued a set of "Resolutions on Questions Concerning People's Communes" which carried the retreat from Leftist views several steps further:
True, the free supply system adopted by the people's communes has in it the embryo of the communist principle of distribution according to needs; the policy of running industry and agriculture simultaneously and combining them carried out by the people's communes has opened up a way to reduce the differences between town and countryside and between worker and peasant; when the RPCs pass over from socialist collective ownership to socialist ownership by the whole people, these communist factors will grow further. All this must be acknowledged....
Nevertheless, every Marxist must soberly realize that the transition from socialism to communism is quite a long and complicated process of development and that throughout this entire process society is still socialist in nature. Socialist society and communist society are two different stages marked by different degrees of economic development.
....The communist system of distribution is more reasonable, but it can be put into practice only when there is a great abundance of social products. In the absence of this condition, any negation of the principle of "to each according to his work" will tend to dampen the labor enthusiasm of the people and is therefore disadvantageous to the development of production, to the increase of social products and hence to speeding the realization of communism. For this reason, in the income of commune members, that portion of the wage paid according to the work done must occupy an important place over a long period and will, during a certain period, take first place. In order to encourage the labor enthusiasm of commune members and also facilitate satisfaction of their complex daily needs, the communes must strive to increase the wages of their members gradually and, for a number of years to come, must increase them at a faster rate than that portion of income that comes under the heading of free supply....(Transl. in CB, no. 542, pp. 7-23) (our emphasis-PLP).
The bold words represent a major turning point in the development of the communes. Many of the more advanced had carried through the practice of giving half of income as free supply; and they had the perspective of gradually increasing that percentage as social productivity increased. But this resolution implied that this per cent was for it to decrease. As a result, free supply, in the bulk of the communes, fell to around 30% in the first months of 1959.
Another paragraph of the resolution altered previously held views on the degree of socialization of property:
....Some people think that the switch over to communes will call for a redistribution of existing personal consumer items. This is a misconception. IT should be publicized among the masses that the means of livelihood owned by members, (including houses, clothing, bedding and furniture) and their deposits in banks and credit cooperatives will remain their own property after they join the commune and will always belong to them....Members can retain individual trees around their houses and small farm tools, small instruments, small domestic animals and poultry; they can also continue to engage in some small domestic side occupations on condition that these do not hamper their taking part in collective labor. (Ibid.)
These may seem like very small concessions to private property, but they were the opening wedge in a retrogressive movement which was to lead, within a year, to the restoration of the private plots and the revival of private sideline occupations.
We have seen that the party leadership justified the new principles of organization as beneficial to achieving great production advances. During 1958 Mao made a trip to Moscow to negotiate the largest Sino-Soviet trade agreement ever, as part of a plan to exchange the increased agricultural surplus for heavy capital goods. Thus, the leadership in no way accepted another cardinal tenet of the Left: that a socialist state should strive for self-sufficiency and avoid becoming dependent on others, especially those whose ideological position has already been put into question. When the great production advances failed to materialize, the CCP (just like the Russians and western commentators) blamed the excessive "Leftism" of the communes and took steps to retreat from those measures. In fact, the production difficulties of 1959-1961 resulted from a combination of severe natural calamities, unrealistic output targets, and especially the incorrect over-emphasis on heavy industry which the CCP had taken over uncritically from the Soviet experience. The Party Right was able to use the production crisis to completely overwhelm the Left and begin to undo the accomplishments of the Great Leap. In 1961-62, as we shall describe in the next section, the retreat turned into a rout as the new ruling bourgeois forces took China rapidly along the capitalist road.
Before moving on, it is important to consider the following question: Was the People's Republic of China a proletarian dictatorship during the period 1949-1959? We have seen that it set up a number of arrangements which violated the teachings of Marx and Lenin on the condition of workers' rule (standing army, cadre income, etc.). Moreover, its foreign policy during those years was in no essential way different from the type of policy which our party criticizes today. China was the prime mover in the Bandung conference of non-aligned nations, strove at all times to establish diplomatic relations with bourgeois nationalist leaders, upheld unity with the revisionists by signing the Moscow declaration of 1957 and the 81 party statement of 1960, both of which acknowledged the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism, and, in general, put forward new-democracy as the universal strategy for revolution in the contemporary world. Throughout this period, bourgeois authorities dominated culture and education; and the former capitalist class continued to enjoy material privileges through its interest-income and high salaries.
But this is only one aspect. The other is the destruction of the landlord class, the expropriation of the property of the bourgeoisie (who, even if they retained some strong positions from which it engineer a comeback, had certainly become, for a time, subordinate to the workers and peasants), and the destruction of petty bourgeois property and ideas among a peasantry which had launched the commune movement. The most important lesson of the se years is that the poor and middle peasants can grasp Marxism-Leninism and fight for socialism and communism. Our party's line on the peasants is not an abstract prediction but is based on the accomplishments of the Chinese peasants and the ideological consciousness they reached. A great Left force of workers and peasants had been created which was to re-appear strongly during the GPCR in an attempt to resume the progress toward communism which had prevailed until 1959.
In the Leninist view, state power is an instrument of the class which holds it, used to transform the economic, political and ideological conditions of the society. The question of who holds state power cannot be answered by examining only forms (the Soviet Union, after all, has a Communist Party and state ownership of property) nor by taking ideological pronouncements at face value (the Soviet revisionists still occasionally proclaim their devotion to proletarian dictatorship) but only by determining which class is transforming society in the direction of its interests. There are only two forms of state power possible in the modern world: proletarian dictatorship or bourgeois dictatorship. All theories of third forms: new-democracy, joint dictatorship of revolutionary classes, democratic dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry, etc., are incorrect and correspond to no objective reality. In China between 1949 and 1959, the primary aspect of social change was in the direction of communism, despite the errors of line and policy which were to have such a devastating effect. No bourgeois dictatorship would have created the people's communes or free supply or thoroughly liquidated the landlord class or removed the capitalists from much of their power. In 1949 a workers' state came into existence in China and from its positive accomplishments we can learn much about what socialism is and will be.
THE RESTORATION OF BOURGEOIS RULE
The communes of 1958 has totally abolished private plots of land. It is important, therefor, to look at the available information for the period 1960-66 to see what changes had intervened. In 1964, a delegation of agriculturists and economists from Pakistan toured a sample of communes. Their observations were collected and used as the basis for the book: S. J. Burki, A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965. They found that in 1964 the 10 communes they surveyed, which included a large variety in terms of region and size, averaged 7.55% of the total land in private plots. For four communes which made more detailed information available, the following had been the change over time:
YEAR Per Cent of land under Private Ownership
1958 --
1959 1.39
1960 2.79
1961 4.24
1962 6.40
1963 7.61
1964 8.64
The private plots, however, played a larger part in the peasant's lives than these figures indicate because of the higher value of the crops grown on them. The top 10 communes showed the following income figures:
COMMUNE Private Plot Income as % of Total Family Income
1. 20.8
2. 30.2
3. 18.4
4. 22.9
5. 17.1
6. 16.9
7. 20.6
8. 19.4
9. 13.5
10. 8.8
average 19.3
Even this data under-estimates the revival of private agriculture and its role in rural livelihood. More detailed information comes from the Lien-chiang documents, a series of directives and reports concerning communes in Lien-chiang country in Fukien province on the east China coast. They cover the years 1962-63 and were seized during a Nationalist Chinese raid on the coast. (They are translated and annotated in Chen, C. S. (ed.), Rural People's Communes in Lien-chiang). We quote from the editor's summary of the statistics provided by the documents:
The area of private plots, by law, could note exceed five to seven per cent of a team's crop area. (A team, at that time, contained, on the average, 24 households and a brigade, 171 households.) Nevertheless, in the Hu-li brigade the private plots amounted to 9.5 per cent of its crop land. The situation varied from team to team in the brigade. At one extreme, the private plots in one team amounted to 11 per cent of its crop land and at the other, 7.6 per cent. In the Shan-K'ang brigade, the private plots in the individual teams ranged from 12.1 per cent to 15 per cent of the crop area, the average being 13.1 per cent. For the two brigades, the private plots averaged 11.3 per cent of their crop land, which was substantially higher than the limit set by the law.
Besides the private plots, team members might also hold reclaimed land and land for growing animal feed. In addition, some land collectively owned by the team was farmed out to the members for cultivation.
The reclaimed land in the county amounted to 40,000 mou, or 19.6 per cent of the crop area.
Farmed-out land was 4,178 mou, or 2.05 per cent of the country's crop area. Private plots (11.3 per cent), reclaimed land (19.6 per cent) and farmed-out land (2.05 per cent) together constituted the "Small Freedom" land, which amounted to more than 30 per cent of the crop area. In some teams the production was more than 50 per cent. Households were permitted to engage in such subsidiary domestic enterprises as embroidery, sewing, knitting and bee-keeping. The products, except for the kinds and quantities subject to state purchase, could be disposed of in the free market. A surprisingly large variety of private activities, which would be thought impossible under a socialist system, was pursued by members of the commune system. Many commune members engaged in peddling. Selling what was produced by oneself was permitted, but re-selling what one purchased from others (er pan shang) was generally viewed with approval. Some members did odd jobs ("rat work") outside their own commune units. Half the 106 member labor force of the Lien-teng brigade in the Ao-chiang commune worked outside: 31 in stonemasonry and earth-work, three in carpentry, 44 in peddling and 27 in miscellaneous jobs. The profits from peddling totalled 8,200 Yuan, averaging 196 Yuan per peddler (four of the peddlers made profits of more than 1,000 Yuan each). Members who worked outside the team would have to surrender their earnings to the team. Failing to do so, they would be given no ration and would have to buy food at high prices and be subjected to certain fines. Lending money at high interest was fairly prevalent. It was reported that in three communes....384 households engaged in lending at high interest, involving a total of 72,440 Yuan in principal. The rate of interest ranged from 1 to 1.5 per cent.
He calculates a breakdown of the peasants income sources:
Source of Income Value (Yuan)
Collective:
Rations 19.87
Retained fruits 4.50
Work-points 41.88
Income from collective system 66.25
Private:
Private plots 7.14
Reclaimed land 14.28
sub. dom. enterprise (unknown)
misc. private income (unknown)
Total Private Income 21.42
Total income per person/year 87.67
From this table it can be seen that private sources contributed about a quarter of total income, and this does not take into account the miscellaneous and illegal sources, which in some cases could be quite large. Moreover, the high prices paid for subsidiary products, such as livestock and vegetables, grown privately, presented the peasant with the constant temptation to divert his effort from the collective to the private sector. Many cases are reported of peasants attending to their private plots by day and making up by working the collective land at night.
Even more significant for ideological and political trends is the organization of the collective sector itself. A large-scale desocialization of the communes took place over the period 1959-62. By this is meant that property and control over its use were transferred downward from higher-level units to lower-level, from the commune to the brigade to the team, in order to bring about a closer relation between individual output and reward and restore the primary role of material incentive. The communes went through three distinct stages, depending on which level of organization was the "accounting unit". (An accounting unit, roughly defined, "carries on independent accounting, is responsible for its own profits and losses, organizes production, and distributes income."--Lien chiang, Document VII.) From Aug. 1958 to March 1959, the commune itself, with an average of 5,000 households, was the accounting unit. In March 1959, the CC decided to shift the accounting unit from commune to brigade. Then in Nov. 1969, it issued a directive establishing the team as the accounting unit. (In the meantime, the number of communes had been tripled and their average size reduced to 1622 households. A team had an average membership of 24 households in 1963.) This new arrangement was formalized in one of the most important documents of recent Chinese history, The Revised Draft Regulations Governing Rural People's Communes, promulgated in Sept. 1962.
The basic principles of ownership and income distribution are set forth in these regulations:
Article 21
Land within the scope of the production team is all owned by the production team. None of the land owned by he commune, including the members' private plots, private hills and housing may be rented out or bought or sold.
Labor power within the scope of the production team is all to be controlled by he production team. Transfer of labor power for use by the commune or the production brigade must be discussed with the mass of members. It may not be requisitioned without their agreement.
Large domestic animals and agricultural implements owned collectively by the production team may not be requisitioned by the commune or the brigade. Any agricultural implements, small scale agricultural machines and large domestic animals formerly owned by the communes or brigade which may be suitably owned by and utilized by the production team should revert to production team ownership....
Article 22
The production team has autonomy with regard to production operations and management and distribution of income....
Article 31
For convenience in organizing production, the production team may be divided into permanent or temporary work groups, each to be assigned a section of land to work on a short-term, seasonal or year-round basis.
Groups and individuals who are active in labor, responsible in management, noteworthy in achievements, or who overfulfill their obligations must be given suitable rewards. Those groups and individuals who are not active in labor, are irresponsible in management, and who do not fulfill their obligations must be given a suitable reduced payment for labor or other punishment.
Article 32
The production team should give reasonable payment for the labor of its members, it should avoid egalitarianism among the members in calculating payment for labor.
....Payment for labor requiring technical skills in agriculture or herding should be higher than that for common labor.
The over-all effect of these regulations was to bring back the situation where the peasant's view was limited to producing for the immediate small group of which he was a part. The beginnings of any aspects of communist distribution and communist morality (working for the sake of a larger and larger collective) were reversed completely. Along with this the experiments in free supply of grain on a commune-wide scale were wound up and income differentials between teams reappeared with full force.
These organizational changes were accompanied by an ideological campaign to justify the reversal of the original commune spirit. Private sideline occupations were said to be not only compatible with the collective economy but a necessary stimulus to it. Piece-rates, similar to those prevalent in industry, were encourages as the best way to tie reward to effort. And the motif, "this is the period of socialism; communism must wait until the full development of productive forces", was dominant once again. The argument was made that private plots and team-ownership did not represent movements toward capitalism for the following reasons: 1) The private plots are owned by the brigades and only assigned to members for use. They cannot be transferred or sold; 2) Collective labor takes up the majority of member's time. 3) Only the collective economy can provide the tools and raw materials necessary for sidelines production; and 4) The markets for private output are controlled by the state. It was also pointed out that individual production is not the same as capitalist production, since the latter required free purchase of means of production and existence of an expropriated proletariat. (Hsiao Liang, "Is Development of Family Side Occupations Likely to Aid Capitalist Spontaneity", transl. in CB, no. 677, pp. 14-17.)
But this is a typical revisionist argument. Nobody claimed that private plots, contracting of land by peddling, withholding effort from the collective, material incentive systems and all the other bourgeois tendencies characteristic of this period were already full-blown capitalism. The Left ideologists of the Great Leap had simply pointed out that the entire period of Socialism was a class struggle between capitalism and communism, that during this period a fierce and continuous struggle would take place between those who wanted to freeze the revolution at some particular stage and then reverse it. Those who advocate the compatibility of private and collective tendencies, rather than their fundamental contradiction, will end up objectively building bourgeois consciousness among the masses and creating the conditions, ideologically, for the restoration of capitalism. Any time the revolution ceases moving forward toward communism as its clear goal, it will immediately begin to turn around towards capitalism. There is no middle position. Because of their concern for quantitative levels of production (implicitly defining socialism as material improvement) the CCP leadership created organization and ideology in the countryside and weakened proletarian consciousness and weakened proletarian consciousness. A clear example of this position is provided by the following article.
As we know, the system of distribution of "to each according to his work" enforced in rural people's communes at the present stage represents a sort of material incentive and material guarantee in-so-far as the laborers are concerned. It plays an important part in stimulating the labor enthusiasm of commune members. But does this mean that material incentive is the only way to heightening one's production enthusiasm? No. It must be realized that only with politics assuming command is it possible for material incentive to play its part correctly.
....the party's policy is, on the one, hand, to make it clear to the masses that their most fundamental interest lie in speeding up socialist construction and, on the other hand, to take the greatest care f the immediate living conditions an material benefits of the masses. In h handling the relations between the state, the collective an the individual in people's communes, over-emphasis on the collective and long-range interests is unfavorable to the raising of the production enthusiasm of the masses....if the principle of "to each according to his work" is not adhered to, those commune members who have strong labor-power and do more work will feel they are put at a disadvantage. If one simply looks at the superiority of collective labor and collective economy and loses sight of the small freedom permitted within the big collective and the necessity of meeting the diversified needs of members at the same time as increasing social wealth, one is disregarding the present level of production and consciousness of the masses...thus, it is not proper to set political command against material incentive. Political command and material incentive are united; they may not be cut apart; nor one stressed to the neglect of the other. (Chao Hsu-kuang, from Kung-ren Ribao, Dec. 1, 1961. Transl. in CB, no. 677, pp. 23-25._
In articles like this and many others of the period the bourgeois principle of material incentive and the proletarian principle of politics taking command are not seen as waging a life and death struggle. Rather, in line with the new-democratic idea of utilizing the bourgeoisie constructing socialism, they are seen as each playing a useful role; their relation is primarily one of unity and only secondarily one of struggle. This reversal of the unity-contradiction relations is the essence of revisionism, seen from the standpoint of dialectics.
Nor was the revival of revisionist ideas and policies limited to the rural areas. Major changes took place in industrial management, economic planning and wage payments. The system that began during the Great Leap of transferring managerial control to the Party Committee at the factory level was ended and the managers returned with even greater power than before 1957. The manager is responsible for meeting certain financial targets set by the State Plan. The main ones are profit targets and cost reduction targets. In meeting these he has a great deal of discretion in determining what the enterprise shall produce, in placing orders with other factories ore retail agencies and in using advertising to solicit orders for his goods. Contracts between enterprises are widely used and are legally binding. There is a good deal of evidence that the State has surrendered allocational controls over many goods, allowing them to be exchanged through the market. Before 1957, all profits above the set targets were taken by the state, with a portion returned to the enterprise for bonuses. In that year, however, and continuing to the present, a profit-sharing scheme was worked out. Under this, the enterprise was allowed to retain a fixed percentage of all profits above the target. This can be used for bonuses to staff and workers as well as for expansion of the scale of the enterprise.
Closely connected with these changes in management and planning are the return to piece-rates and material incentives in the factories. In early 1961, enterprises were urged to cut down on employment, keeping only the best of their workers. Those retained would share more greatly in the excess profits of the enterprise. Piece-rates were advocated even more strenuously than before the Great Leap. A new device used was team piece-rates, which set groups of workers against one another in production competition.
These new policies were summarized in the so-called "70 Articles on Industrial Policy" reputedly authored by Liu Shao-ch'i and Po I-po in Dec. 1961. Here are excerpts from these:
Article 2. The task and target in industry from now on is "the market comes first."
Article 9. All industrial units which show a deficit in "economic accounting", with the exception of those designated, are henceforth to cease operating.
Article 21. The currently enforced eight hours of study and eight hours of meeting each week should be reduced as much as possible in order to avoid interfering with the rest time of the employees and workers.
Article 22. Henceforth no industrial unit is to summon its employees and workers again to engage in "bitter battles".
Article 25. Factories may calculate piece-work wages when feasible.
Article 26. When it is not feasible to calculate piece work, they may implement a collective piece-work system.
Article 52. Carry out the system of the factory manager bearing responsibility under the leadership of the party committee.
Article 65. Unions having 50 or more members are permitted to have a chairman who is half-removed from production. Those with 200 or more members may have a union chairman who is entirely removed from production. Those with over 500 men may have two men who are removed from production.
Special attention should be given to Article 9, which stipulates the domination of profits over production. (During this period Chinese economists began to write about "market socialism"; the content of their theories was in essence the same as that coming forth from Liberman in the Soviet Union, and revisionists like Sik and Brus in Eastern Europe.) The essential effect of a genuinely planned economy is that the production pattern which results, being determined by a social calculation of the people's needs, would differ from the pattern determined by a monetary calculation of costs and profits. This article enforces a market-determined pattern by eliminating enterprises which don't meet the monetary test.
Articles 21 and 22 register the leadership's opposition to the participation of the workers in struggles against managers and technicians and their concern that excessive political study and debate would reduce labor productivity.
What sort of man will the President see in Chou En-lai? Chou is clearly one of the world's ablest negotiators. Handsome and exuding charisma, he is now, in his 73rd year, tireless. In August 1967, Chou negotiated his way out of his most perilous moment in the Cultural Revolution. Though idolized by youth, he was, for more than two days and nights, surrounded in his offices in the Great Hall by a half a million ultra-leftist Red Guards. Their leaders--some later arrested as counter-revolutionaries--were seeking to seize the files of the Central Committee--and Chou himself. Mao and Lin Piao were both absent. By talking to small groups, day and night, Chou gradually persuaded the masses--so Chou called them in talking to me-- to disperse. It was only following that incident that Lin Piao brought thousands of troops into the capital, and the disarming and breakup of the Red Guards began in earnest--with heavy casualties.--Edgar Snow in Life
Chou tells it like it was: how Left Red Guards almost had his head. Use of Mao cult, backed up by armed forces, played on Left's weaknesses.
Another major bourgeois trend during 1960-66 was the system of temporary and contract labor which came into use. Under this, the number of workers permanently assigned to enterprises was reduced while the number who were temporarily employed when work was available and then let go was increased. In this way, enterprise managers had more flexible control over costs of production and could shift social insurance and public welfare costs on to the communes and the State.
It was the Right forces within the party which seized control after the Great Leap. Many of the young cadre who had led and supported the Great Leap were purged or demoted. The party, under the leadership of the Right, became the representative of the bourgeois forces which had been slowly developing and consolidating; the senior cadres, the officer corps, the professional managers and technicians; all those whom the concessions of new-democracy had put into privileged economic positions. Even the old capitalist remnants got a new lease on life when the Party, in 1962, decided to extend their fixed-interest payments for at least five more years.
The dictatorship of the proletariat is itself a form of continuous and sharp class struggle. New bourgeois forces are constantly emerging from the ranks of the people. If bourgeois ideology is not decisively combated, it is possible at any stage in the transition to communism for the movement to be reversed and the bourgeoisie to come back to power. This does not mean that the full economic and political structure of capitalism can quickly be restored; that requires a transition period during which the new bourgeois ruling class undermines and dismantles the socialist aspects of the economic base. What it does mean is that the power of the state is now being used to move the ideological consciousness of the people away from communism and toward capitalism. That kind of use of state power is the essential definition of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and that is what came to prevail in China in the period 196-1966.
THE ANTI-SOVIET REVISIONIST CAMPAIGN 1959-1966
One factor would seem to contradict the characterization of China, 1960-66, as a bourgeois dictatorship; the split in the international communist movement and the sharp anti-revisionist struggle waged by the CCP. Why would the new "red" bourgeoisie feel it necessary to defend the ideology of Marxism-Leninism against the changes the Russians were advocating. Two fundamental points can be made about this struggle.
1) At no time did the CCP question any of the tenets of Marxism-Leninism as it had always interpreted it, especially its compromises with nationalism and united-fronts against Soviet denials of its basic concepts: proletarian dictatorship vs. "state of the whole people" and armed struggle vs. peaceful transition. Major Chinese documents, such as the Proposal on the General Line, 1963, and Lin Piao's Long Live the Victory of People's War, 1965, reaffirmed the nationalism-based strategy that had brought the Chinese revolution to power. The practice of Chinese foreign policy did not alter significantly during the period of the anti-Soviet polemics; in fact, the Chinese re-doubled their efforts to put themselves at the head of an anti-U.S. imperialism coalition of nations. Chou En-Lai made an extensive tour through Africa in 1964, lauding such bourgeois regimes as that of Toure in Guinea and Nkrumah in Ghana. He especially went out of his way to make overtures to the Algerians and Egyptians. 1961-1965 saw the development of close relations between China and Indonesia. Liu Shao-ch'i visited Indonesia in 1963 and stated, "The Republic of Indonesia has become an important force opposing imperialism and colonialism and safeguarding the peace and security of Southeast Asia and Asia as a whole." (Peking Review, April 19, 1963). The Chinese line in Indonesia was to lead the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to the disaster of 1965 in which it was virtually destroyed.
Moreover, throughout the period of bitter back and forth polemics, the Chinese continued to maintain effective unity of action with the Soviet Union in delivering arms to Vietnam over the Chinese railroads. At no time did the Chinese engage in public polemics against the Soviet aid.
2) The immediate cause of the split was Russian refusal to provide the Chinese with atomic weapons or even the technical assistance and materials necessary to produce them. One of the purposes of Mao's Moscow trip in 1958 was to persuade Khruschev to make this available. The polemics heated up considerable shortly after his failure. The Chinese have given this explanation themselves?
In 1958 the leadership of the CPSU put forward unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control. These unreasonable demands were rightly and firmly rejected by the Chinese government. Not long afterwards, in June 1959, the Soviet government unilaterally tore up the agreement between China and the Soviet Union in October, 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture. (The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves. Peking, 1963, p. 26).
This was followed by Soviet refusal to support China in the Formosa straits, the proposed summit meeting of Khruschev and Eisenhower and Soviet support for India in her border dispute with China. What the Chinese objected to most strongly was Russian rapprochement with the U.S. and desertion of support of Chinese foreign policy goals.
What then is the real meaning of the dispute? The Russian bourgeoisie had seized power some years earlier and was already well along the way to restoring capitalism. Given the degree to which the Russian workers and peasants had lost confidence in Marxism-Leninism and given the long period during which nationalist ideas had been emphasized (from before WWII), the new Russian bourgeoisie could proceed to the renunciation of Marxism-Leninism without fear of popular reaction and begin to create a revisionist ideology more in correspondence to the new material conditions of bourgeois rule.
[PHOTOGRAPH OF RALLY OUTSIDE SOVIET EMBASSY IN PEKING]
caption: During height of GPCR, thousands of Chinese workers gathered to demonstrate outside Soviet embassy in Peking, showing their hatred of revisionist bosses.
The newly consolidated Chinese "red" bourgeoisie, however, was coming to state power at a time when hundreds of millions of Workers and Peasants still looked upon Marxism-Leninism as a correct guide to social practice. But analysis of the objective historical process has shown us that Marxism-Leninism in the particular version that characterized the line of the CCP and the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, contained a number of incorrect ideas which led inexorably to bourgeois restoration. No doubt the Chinese leaders consciously believed that they were defending genuinely revolutionary ideas against Soviet revisionism. The anti-Soviet polemics were necessary in order to defend that body of ideas which corresponded to the class interests of the bourgeois class. Had the Chinese leaders gone along with Khruschevite ideology they would have been exposed before the masses and would have lost the "Left" cover under which capitalist counter-revolution is most likely to succeed.
Moreover, the ideological imperative corresponded to the desire of the new Chinese bourgeois forces to free themselves from excessive economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union and create the material and scientific infrastructure for the development of their own atomic arsenal. The attempts by Soviet leaders to moderate the inter-imperialist rivalry with the U.S. opened up the possibility that the Chinese bourgeoisie could displace the USSR as the leader of a world wide united front of "oppressed nations" against U.S. imperialism (now joined by Soviet social-imperialism).
Nothing in these external struggles contradicts the view, derived from internal evidence, that the bourgeoisie had regained power in China in the early 1960s.
MORE ON THE GPCR
We began this report by summarizing the class forces in the cultural revolution. We then presented evidence to confirm the position of the so-called "extreme left" that most senior cadres and army officers had become a new bourgeoisie which was carrying out capitalist restoration. We can now look at some of the details of this great revolution in the light of that Left outlook.
The new element created by the GPCR was the existence of a great many mass organizations of students and workers. These tended to divide along political lines. Left groups, such as "Sheng-wu-Lien" in Hunan and "May 16 Corps" in Peking, took the leading role in the early days of the GPCR in attacking the high-level power-holders in the municipalities and provinces. These cadres, in turn, organized and supported mass organizations to defend their positions: these mass organizations waged protracted and then violent struggle with one another.
The mass organizations which favored "seizure of power" overthrew the existing senior cadre in many important provinces and municipalities in Dec. 1966 and Jan. 1967. In Peking, Shanghai and Taiyuan, the people moved in to set up organs of power modeled on the Paris Commune. The implication of the commune arrangement was that all the existing cadre should be removed and replaced by new leaders elected by the membership of the mass organizations. The students and workers who put forward this demand were quite sure that they had the support of Chairman Mao in proclaiming the commune-type state as their goal. On Feb. 5, 1967 the Shanghai commune was proclaimed and all the leading cadre of the Shanghai municipal Council were put on notice that they would be evaluated by the people. A new organ of power, the provisional committee for the Shanghai People's Commune, was established, with members drawn from a number of mass organizations which had participated in the power-structure. The most important leader of the commune was Chang Ch'un ch'iao, who had been a prominent Leftist during the Great Leap. Chang left for Peking on February 12 to consult with Mao.
When he returned on Feb. 24th, he reported to a mass rally that Chairman Mao opposed the name Shanghai People's Commune and preferred that it be called Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, on the model of the new organ of power which had been created in Heilkungkiang Province (Manchuria) in January. These are the reasons Chang gave:
On the 12th, Chairman Mao called us to Peking, and received us on the same day....
Chairman Mao said: "The present revolution is a revolution under proletarian dictatorship, one that has been organized and started by ourselves."....As we understand it Mao showed clearly here that for the past 17 years our country was under proletarian dictatorship and that is was Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, not the Liu-Teng line, that was in the ruling position. Why, then, did we need to carry out a revolution under proletarian dictatorship? Chairman Mao explained: "It is because some of the organs of proletarian dictatorship have been usurped.
....he noted that the slogan "Thoroughly Improve Proletarian Dictatorship" is a reactionary one....Speaking correctly, the proletarian dictatorship could only be improved partially.
Can we do without revolutionary leading cadres? No! A combat team cannot do without a responsible man. In seizing power now, we must also have cadres, that is, we must also have new as well as old cadres. Why do we need old cadres who have assumed leadership work before? The reason is very simple. For instance, some workers perform very well. They dare to break through and rebel; they are able and have made significant contributions to the cultural revolution. But if we turn over to them a city such as Shanghai or a province such as Kiangsu, then they would find it very difficult to manage it because of lack of experience. They may be more adept in the management of one workshop.
Chairman Mao says, "A university student cannot become a university president for he has not graduated yet and is not familiar with the whole university." As I see it, he is not even qualified to become a department head because he has no teaching experience and no experience of leading the work of the whole department. So we should ask a professor or assistant professor to lead the department.
Young comrades present at the forum, don't be discouraged. Chairman Mao also says that young people have made numerous contributions to this great cultural revolution, but they cannot be once be expected to take over the duties of the secretaries of the Provincial Party Committee or the Municipal Party Committee. I myself think so too. The "three-way-combination" provides very good training for the young people. If young people in their twenties follow the old revolutionary cadres and learn from them for seven, eight, or ten years, then they are still young when they become secretaries....
There are more than 600 cadres holding the rank of heads of the departments (bureaus) and more than 6,000 with the rank of section head in Shanghai. How can we fail to find candidates for the "three-way-combination" from among these?....And the great majority of these comrades are good.
The idea of "doubting all and overthrowing all" is a reactionary one. This is not an idea of us rebels, but it has an influence on us. When we are infuriated to see that many people are so stubborn, we can easily be taken in by the propaganda of others.
....Recently the State Council told us that the rebel headquarters of an organ of the municipal part committee issued an order to the State Council demanding the abolition of all posts of "chiefs". Many things said in it were wrong. For instance, it was stated that "for a long time the department heads control the section heads and the section heads control the section personnel". I think that the same will be true in the future also. "The chiefs have always ridden on the backs of the Party and the people." Comrade Lin Piao is Minister of National Defense, and does he ride on the backs of the Party and the people? If is reactionary to say that he does.
Chairman Mao explicitly stated: "We shall not be able to survive for a few days if we do away with even deputy section heads."
Chairman Mao said: ...."names should not be changed too frequently, because the form is only of secondary importance while the content is primary."
"The main thing is: which class is in power? For instance, the Soviet Union has changed, yet its name remains the same....
....Now the various provinces and municipalities are learning from Shanghai and calling themselves people's communes. What should the State Council be called? Should the national title be changed? If the state is changed into the Chinese People's Commune, then the chairman of the state would be called commune chairman or director. After the title is changed, there would still be the question of recognition by foreign countries. I think the Soviet Union would not "recognize it because to do so would be disadvantageous to herself."
"Let he Shanghai People's Commune be changed to Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee....Would you not feel isolated because yours is the only commune in the whole country? The Jen-min Jih-pao could not publish the news, for it if published it, all would follow suit, and the series of problems mentioned above would arise." (Transl. in SCMP, no. 4147, March 27, 1968, pp. 1-19).
Clearly, the Shanghai Committee didn't just have its name changed. The "three-way-alliance" which Chang brought from Mao as the organizing principle of the new Revolutionary Committee--an alliance of army cadre, leading cadre who were "making revolution" (i.e. were willing to denounce Liu), and hand-picked representatives of some of the mass organizations--was incompatible with the view of the Leftists among the students and workers. The Shanghai Commune itself, with Chang and Yao Wen-yuan in the leadership, had already excluded the "Red Revolutionaries", the most Left student group. On Jan. 27, the latter had tried to question several members of the Shanghai Writers Union who had been drafting diatribes against them. They were prevented from doing to by a detachment of troops of the Shanghai garrison, sent on Chang's orders. When they appealed to the Central CR Group in Peking (of which Chang and Yao were members) they were condemned as "ultra-leftists". This clash between the Left and the PLA was only a small foretaste of things to come.
An important editorial in Red Flag in February clarified the line of the CC further:
Leniency should be adopted in making decisions about cadres who have made even very serious mistakes, after they are criticized and struggled against....
Cadres who have committed mistakes should be given the opportunity to examine, criticize, and correct them. So long as they make a self-criticism, correct their mistakes and come over to the side of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, they can still be given appropriate leading posts. Many of them can even be drawn into the provisional organs of power....("Cadres Must be Treated Correctly", Transl. in On the Revolutionary Three-in-One Combination, FLP, Peking, 1968, p. 36).
A State Council directive of Jan. 23, 1967 ordered the PLA to intervene actively in the provinces to bring about the formation of Revolutionary Committees. The typical series of events that followed was: 1) revolutionary mass organizations would overthrow the leading cadres as supporters of the Liu line; 2) the PLA would prevent these cadres from offering any kind of armed resistance (through mass organizations that they controlled); 3) some of the leading cadres, often from the second-line of leadership, would denounce their former superiors, make phony self-criticisms and organize mass groups to support themselves; 4) these Right mass organizations would come into sharp and protracted struggle with the Left which wanted to overthrow all the bourgeois cadres, not just a handful; 5) when this struggle passed over, as it generally did, to armed struggle, the PLA would intervene, on orders from the CC and CR Group, to "overcome the contradictions among the people" and bring everybody, including the new group of "Maoist" cadres, into a "three-way-alliance". If the Left persisted in refusing to work with the "red" bourgeoisie, then it was attacked and disarmed by the PLA.
Some examples of the end-result of the process:
In the cavernous Peking Gymnasium, a former diplomat named Yao Teng-shan last month was unceremoniously dragged before a gallery of 4,000 approving spectators, then forced to bow down in humble obeisance while his hands and arms were twisted behind his back. The leader of a Red Guard unit during the frenetic Cultural Revolution, which all but paralyzed China between 1966 and 1969, Yao was accused of mounting a raid on the Chinese foreign ministry, burning down the British chancellery, and plotting a personal assault on Premier Chou En Lai. Yao's reported sentence: ten years in prison.
When Yao's trial got under way, the Chinese made a special offer to see that the foreign diplomatic community in Peking was fully aware of the proceedings. Chou himself has pointedly mentioned the case in recent conversations with foreign visitors. The motive s obvious: China's current leaders are sparing of no effort to disassociate themselves from the ideological frenzy that threatened China with total chaos and mystified the watching world for much of the 1960s. Though its press and radio will still crackle with anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet vitriol, Peking is in the midst of a prodigious effort to demonstrate that China is once again in the hands of responsible moderates.-- Time Magazine
Since the end of the GPCR in late 1968, Chinese bosses have been frantically crushing the leadership and dispersing the rank-and-file of the great Leftist movement which almost threw them on the garbage heap. They fear the high level of socialist consciousness reached by masses of Chinese workers and peasants. who will someday rise up to take power back for the working class.
In Heliungkiang, the co-chairmen of the Rev. Comm. were P'an Fu-sheng, first secretary of the former Provincial Party Committee, and Want Chia-tao, commander of the Military Region; in Shangtung, the chairman was Wang Hsiao-yu, ex-deputy mayor of the province's largest city. In Tsinghai the chairman was Liu Hsien ch'uan, commander and party secretary of the Military District. In Szechuan, the chairman was Chang Kuo-hua, First Commissar of Chengtu Military Region and the commander of the Tibet operations of the PLA. In Kansu, Hu Chi-tsung, secretary of the former Provincial Party Committee, became a deputy-chairman.
It was this overall movement that the Left later came to call the "February Adverse Current of Capitalist Restoration" or the "Evil Wind of March". The sharpest struggle was in the city of Canton. There the Leftist organizations were so strong that the CC had to place the province under direct military rule. Huang Yung-sheng (presently Minister of Defense) was sent to Canton to take command. The Leftist Red Flag faction attacked the military command several times during the following months, seizing arms, records, etc. and agitating for the removal of Huang. The armed struggle in Canton continued into mid-1968 before the resistance of the Left had finally been suppressed.
Between February and August 1967 the Left forces became more and more conscious and began to focus on the persons and institutions they held responsible for the failure of the leading cadre to "step aside". They directed their fire at Chou En-lai and the Vice-Premiers he was sheltering. Chen I and his Foreign Ministry and the PLA. Red Guards in Peking held several mass rallies denouncing Li Hisen-nien and Nieh Jung-chen, both high-ranking PLA generals who had turned to economic affairs. (The latter was in charge of the nuclear development program.) On each occasion Chou personally intervened to rescue his fellow bureaucrats. In July, 1967, Lin Chieh, editor of Red Flag (he was purged in August) published an editorial calling for the "dragging out of a small handful of capitalist-roaders in the Army". Even though this formulation was compromising (a "small handful") it was still too much for Mao and Lin Piao who insisted that the members of the CR Group who had connections with the radicals he purged. Chiang Chi'ing (Madam Mao), who had brought these men onto the Group in the first place, was prevailed upon to denounce her proteges in a speech to a meeting of representatives from Anhwei on Sept. 5:
....Comrades, I am not in favor of armed struggle and you must not think that I like it, because I'm for 'peaceful struggle, not armed struggle'....Armed struggle always hurts some people and damages state property.
At present, let us take Peking as an example. There is a bad thing, and I call it a bad thing because it is a counter-revolutionary organization, called the "May 16" corps. Numerically it is not a large organization, and superficially the majority of its members are young people, who are actually hoodwinked. The minority consists bourgeois elements....who make use of the ideological instability of the young people....The "May 16" assumes an "ultra-Leftist" appearance; it centers its opposition on the Premier (Chou).
Now we come to the second question: the army. Sometimes earlier, there was this wrong slogan: Seize a 'small handful in the Army'. As a result, 'a small handful in the Army' was seized everywhere and even the weapons of our regular troops were seized.
Comrades, come to think of it: if our field Army were thrown into confusion and if trouble occurred, could we tolerate such a situation?....The slogan is wrong. Because the Party, the government and the Army are all under the leadership of the Party. We can only talk about dragging out the handful of Party capitalist roaders in authority and nothing else....Even if some comrades in our Army committed serious errors, they need not be dealt with in this way.
I have talked with the young fighters of Peking about this question. Last year you went out to kindle the fire of the revolution and exchange revolutionary experience. But by going out again now, you will only do a disservice. You said that you were unable to drag out the small handful in the Army and that you needed our help in doing this. In some places, this has been done. This is a wrong assessment of the situation, and the result of the fact that you have fallen into a trap set by others.
We must not paint a dark picture of the PLA, for they are our boys and we must protect their honor. (Here she reads out the CC's Sept. 5 Order Forbidding Seizure of Arms....from the PLA, which instructed the Army to respond with force to attempted seizures.) Do you know what has happened? Military materials allotted for the support of Vietnam have been seized, and the ammunition. Those were ammunitions for striking the American imperialists!
....Some people also seized foreign ships. In Peking a strange thing has happened: some people wen tot he foreign embassies to make troubles and the office of the British Charge d'Affaires was burned down. We, of course, are determined to hit the American imperialists and reactionaries. But we must not make trouble at foreign embassies, and we must not go aboard foreign ships. It would be childish for good people to do so; and when bad people do so, they want to ruin the reputation of the country.
During August a sharp struggle took place around the Foreign Ministry. Struggle sessions had been taking place against Chen I since June and had forced Chinese foreign policy slightly Leftward. Statements appeared focusing on armed revolutionary struggle against Ne Win in Burma and Sihanouk in Cambodia. In August Leftists, led by Yao Teng-shan, last Chinese representative in Indonesia, seized the Foreign Ministry. The British mission was sacked and burned, rebellion in Hong Kong was encouraged, foreign ships were boarded and cargo seized and editorials began to oppose the Vietnamese negotiations. But this period ended rapidly when Mao personally intervened to "save" Chen I and began to repair the damage the Left had caused to China's "diplomatic position".
After September the formation of revolutionary committees continued in more provinces. But the Left had also grown stronger in several provinces and continued to resist the continuation of bourgeois rule under this new guise. In Hunan, "Sheng-wu-lien" held out until April before being crushed and disbanded by the PLA. The most protracted struggle took place, however, in Kwangsi, the province bordering on North Vietnam. Here, the Kwangsi "April 22 Rebel Grand Army" had been engaged in seizing arms bound for Vietnam and in preventing the formation of a stable revolutionary committee. A leaflet of June 1968 reveals how the cadres on the preparatory group for the revolutionary committees armed the members of conservative organizations to attack "April 22". As a result of the battle, says the leaflet:
....more than 2,000 buildings were reduced to rubble in Wuchow, more than 4,000 inhabitants rendered homeless, hundreds of rebel fighters and revolutionary masses arrested, creating a serious situation in which die-hard conservatives and capitalist-roaders tried to reverse previous correct decisions on them. (Transl. in SCMP, no. 42113, p. 4).
Leaders of "April 22" and its rivals, along with Army leaders, were called to Peking in July for a meeting to settle the conflict. There, April 22, like the Leftists of Peking, Shanghai and Hunan, found out too late which side Chairman Mao was really on. At the meeting, "April 22" was condemned, the Army was ordered to protect the railway lines to Vietnam (many of which had been closed for months by Leftist railway workers) and the composition of the preparatory group was approved. (The CC Notices on the Kwangsi situation are translated in URS, Vol. 53, Nos. 1 and 2; the minutes of the above meeting in URS, Vol. 53, No. 9).
By autumn of 1968 the Left had been defeated everywhere and the new power structure was consolidated. A portion of the cadres had been purged, although many were and will be re-educated and rehabilitated, but the great bulk of the cadres who had carried through the bourgeois policies of 1960-66 remained in power. The role of the military officers had increased, as can be seen in the composition of the new 9th CC, announced at the 9th CC Party Congress in April 1969. Of the 279 members, 123 are military cadres, 76 are leading political cadres and 80 are former members of mass organizations loyal to the Right. The continuity of political leadership is shown by the fact that eight of all 11 members of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau of the 8th Central Committee (elected in 1956) are full members of the new 9th CC. Twenty-three members of the new CC had been criticized and repudiated in mass struggles during the GPCR. The Cultural Revolution, as an attempt by the proletariat to take power back from the bourgeois revisionists, has failed and the Right is in firm control of the CCP.
Why did it fail? The basic reason is insufficient mass support and an important factor in that was misconception about the role of Mao Tse-tung. Repeatedly, the Left forces, or at least some part of them, continued to hope that Mao would come over to their side and agree to lead a new Marxist-Leninist party to attack the entire bourgeois class. Because they waited upon his moves and looked to his initiative, the Left constantly found itself unorganized and insufficiently prepared for the sharp attacks made upon it by the Army, with Mao's approval. Behind the weakness lies the long history of the personal cult of Mao, which culminated in the quasi-religious glorification of him during the GPCR. This played and especially bit part within the Army, where Lin Piao had been leading a "learn from Chairman Mao" campaign since 1962-63. Their reluctance to admit (or even conceive) that Chairman Mao might be wrong in his evaluation of the situation must have led many Leftists to accept, partially, a Centrist stance. This failure to break with Maoism, ideologically and organizationally, led to their defeat. Moreover, the bourgeoisie had used the period 1960-66 to conduct an intense ideological campaign against Leftist thought which must have weakened the ideological consciousness of the masses to the point where only a minority, though a very large one, was willing to follow the Left into battle.
Since the end of 1968, the Leftist students and workers have been sent away from the centers of power as part of the "hsia-fang" movement of sending young people to live and work among the peasants in remote and difficult regions. In itself, there is nothing wrong with students going to learn from peasants; but, at this particular time and in this political context, the main aspect of "hsia-fang" is to fragment the Left and remove it from contact with the urban proletariat.
None of the Leftward ideological or economic trends of the GPCR can last. Material incentives are reappearing as the emphasis shifts overwhelmingly in publications and propaganda as the emphasis shifts to technical innovations (see any recent Peking Review). The Draft Regulations for Rural People's Communes of 1961-62 have never been changed; in fact, the CC, throughout the GPCR, emphasized that they would be around for at least 30 years. With the Right in firm political control, these trends will continue.
TRANSLATION SERIES
CB -- Current Background, U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong
ECMM -- Extracts From China Mainland Magazines, Hong Kong
SCMP -- Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong
CNS -- China News Summary, Taiwan
URS -- Union Research Service, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong
CHINESE PRESS
Red Flag (Hung ch'i or Honqui) -- bi-weekly theoretical magazine of the CCP
Renmin Ribao (or Jen-min Jih-pao) -- People's Daily, daily organ of the CC of the CCP
New China News Agency (NCNA) English-language news service of the Chinese government
OTHER SOURCES OF STATISTICAL DATA
Barnett, A.C., Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China
Schurmann, H.F., Ideology and Organization in Communist China
Chao Kuo-chun, Economic Planning and Organization in Mainland China, Vol. 2
Ever since the founding of our Party, PLP has put forward communist revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the working class--led by a communist party--seizing state power.
There have been many changes in our line over the years. While the line has constantly moved to the Left, we have found ourselves applying far too much of our time and thinking to building militant reform struggle rather than revolution. The roots of this contradictory development will be traced shortly, but it should be stated now that unless we fit the reform struggle into revolutionary politics and not vice-versa, no matter what we say, we will become a revisionist party, that is, a party that accommodates itself to--and works within the framework of--the capitalist system.
Pursuing reform or revolution involves two totally different tasks. Reform builds the system (tries to make it work better); revolution destroys it. Therefore, the theory and action of trying to win immediate reform demands can never, in and of itself, lead to a revolution. By definition, it is not designed to do that.
We participate in reform struggles in order to get the opportunity to put forward communist ideas and goals. These communist ideas cannot be drawn from the reform struggle itself. Workers do not come to Marxist-Leninist conclusions merely from working on the assembly line. These ideas must come from outside the reform struggle and are directly opposed to reformist goals or working within and building capitalism. Communist ideas have always been brought to workers from outside the reform struggle itself, from Marx to Stalin to the present day.
The Party's role, therefore, is to make a revolution that destroys the system, not to make reforms and build it. The Party leads people in reform struggle to the goal of a better union or of rank-and-file power. Building the Party is primary, not building the union, although a by-product of building the Party, of building for a revolution, can be, and often is, a better union.
Obviously we have improved in trying to put forward revolution rather than reform, compared to years ago. Yet as the line moves to the Left, our practice tends to trail this movement, tends to move more in the direction of primarily fighting militantly in the union to throw out the sellouts, to run for elections, to go into a strike with the main idea of "winning the strike," or building militant picket lines, etc. And correspondingly, we judge "victory" or "defeat" based on whether or not we achieve these reform goals. We tend far less to think in terms of how well Challenge-Desafio was sold, how many subscriptions were bought, how much anti-racist struggle was organized, how much workers were pointed in the direction of seeing the necessity to take state power, how many workers and others were recruited to the Party on the understanding of the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Our main goal in going into virtually every strike has been building the strike and a militant, democratic union, not building the Party and revolutionary ideas.
Thus, we tend to spread the illusion--and are victims of it ourselves--that to build a militant reform struggle, a democratic union or strike is to be Left (revolutionary). But militant reform struggle does not lead to revolution. It didn't in the 1930's when communists organized 5,000,000 workers into the CIO; it didn't in the 1960's in the civil rights movement and the ghetto rebellions; and it didn't during the anti-Vietnam war movement which involved millions in militant action against U.S. imperialist war. Even insurrectionary armed struggle does not spontaneously lead to communist class consciousness and the establishment of socialism.
Reform and Revolution
Reform, militant or otherwise, is not revolution. The movement for reform and revolution are two parallel movements. Fighting to reform the system will not lead to its overthrow, to revolution. In the sense that fighting strictly, or even mainly, to reform--patch up--the system spreads illusions that capitalism can be reformed. In this sense, reform politics are completely divorced from revolutionary politics. In this sense, fighting for reforms will never lead to revolution. Of course, if communists fight in, and even lead, the reform struggle with the idea of tying that struggle to revolutionary ideas, of showing how merely fighting for reforms is a dead end, that it will never change our lives for the better because capitalism will always take back any gains in another form--if we do that in the reform struggle, we will be concentrating on the main function of a communist: winning workers directly to revolutionary ideology, to joining the party, to fighting for state power for the working class.
Yet, for the most part, we have ended up concentrating on trying to lead the reform struggle to victory under capitalism. We haven't participated in the reform struggle as one tactic in the revolutionary process. Most of the time it has become our all-consuming passion, with the tacking on--virtually as an afterthought--the necessity to destroy, not reform, the system, to make a revolution. Because of that, we rarely go into a reform struggle with the main instrument with which the working class will make a revolution. Therefore, the implied conclusion is that somehow a revolutionary struggle will grow out of militant reform battles. It won't. (See Lenin: What Is To Be Done, Chapter III, Section A).
Revolution and Reform:
Two Sides of a Contradiction
To better understand how and why we in PLP have allowed reformism to dominate our actions, we should look at revolution and reform more dialectically, as two sides of a contradiction. In every contradiction there is a unity of opposites. In this instance, we would agree that, on the one hand, we can't just shout revolution at workers and expect one to happen. We must participate in the reform struggle. On the other hand, we also agree that we can't simply participate in reform struggle limiting ourselves to reform goals; we must raise the need for revolution, the need for the working class to take state power, and therefore the need to build a party. So here, in the necessity to fight for revolution while we also work in the reform movement, there is a unity of opposites.
Yet, in every contradiction there is a primary aspect and a secondary aspect. The primary aspect determines the essence of a thing. For instance, in bourgeois or capitalist society, the main contradiction is between two classes, the bosses and the workers. But the primary aspect of that contradiction is that the bosses hold state power and control all production and distribution of all value created by the workers. It is this primary aspect that determines this society to be a bourgeois or capitalist society.
Similarly, as regards building a revolutionary movement: although there are two aspects to this --reform and revolution--one is primary and will determine the essence of what we are building. Too often we view both aspects as equal, and that therefore if we "do both" (the unity indicated above), we will achieve our goal of revolution. This belies material reality. When our anti-communist enemies accuse us of not really being interested in the immediate reform ("you just want to use the reform struggle for your `ulterior motive' of building your party")! they are actually saying that revolution and reform are contradictory. We have been trained to resolve that contradiction in a reformist way, by saying, "No, the two aspects are compatible; in fact, if we have a strong revolutionary Party we are more likely to win the reform."
Yes, while revolution and reform do--in one sense--go hand-in-hand, they are also contradictory. One, if pursued to its inherent logical conclusion, would destroy capitalism and build socialism; the other, if pursued to its inherent logical conclusion, maintains capitalism. If we must do both, revolution and reform, which is primary in our work? Again, the primary aspect determines the essence of what our Party is building, a revolutionary movement or a reformist movement.
This essence came out sharply in the old Communist Party during the late 1940's. When the ruling class mounted a ferocious anti-communist offensive, they forced all union officials by law (the fascist Taft-Hartley law) to sign non-communist affidavits if they were to remain as union officials. The C.P. leaders of unions virtually all decided to resign from the party, sign the affidavits and continue as union officials, on the "theory" that they must sacrifice politics to "save the union" ("but in our hearts we're still communists"). We'd characterize this as an abject sellout of principle. But when we're faced with essentially the same choice, although on a lower level, we act to prove ourselves in the reform struggle as real militants, "win the respect of the workers as fighters" (for reform), and then introduce our revolutionary politics, later. We therefore build a good base for reformism, and when the struggle gets sharp (in a strike, etc.), it is our friends (not our anti-communist enemies) who say to us, "don't sell C-D" "don't raise your Party", etc. In life, by concentrating on reform work in a reformist way, we have made reform the principal aspect of the contradiction. The working class has recognized this and acted accordingly. And, just as happened with the old C.P., we will end up with a revisionist, sellout party if we pursue this path to its ultimate conclusion.
We cannot win workers to communist ideology if we come off to them, in practice as "better reformers," as promisers of reform victory.
First, if we do win an immediate reform gain without the main idea of tying reform struggle to the necessity to make a revolution--to take state power--then it will only reinforce the idea among the rank and file participating in the reform struggle that you can win under capitalism--therefore, why do you need a communist revolution?
Secondly, whatever gain might be won will always be reversed by the capitalist class because it has state power and can always take back the gain in another form. Thirdly, with communists in leadership the bosses might deliberately take a harder line and refuse to grant anything just to "prove" to workers they can do better without communist leadership. And they have the power and resources in this period to outlast workers, if they deem it better for them in the long run.
Finally, we will not be able to lead a revolution for state power based on "first" winning power in the unions through militant reform struggle and "then" launching the struggle for state power. First of all, the ruling class will never let revolutionary communists get to the top of the labor movement, and possibly not even to head a big local in steel, auto etc.; they will pull out all necessary stops, including plenty of force and violence to prevent it. Therefore, to prepare workers for that inevitable ruling class reaction, we would have to raise the need to seize state power right from the beginning of building our base with a group of workers.
Here in the U.S. we often follow a reformist line in opposing the revisionists. We usually center our attack around how they sabotage the reform struggle. This is not the essence of our ideological differences with them; this is not necessarily how they are leading the workers into the bosses' arms. In fact, at times the revisionists themselves criticize the union leaders; some are militant and even build a base.
Here again: Oppose the revisionists on revolutionary grounds, not reform ones; show that they put forward sharing power with the "good" bosses, that they believe the ruling class will give up its rule peacefully, while revolutionaries understand that there are no "good" bosses (only bad ones with different tactics on how to exploit workers); that no ruling class ever gave up its power peacefully, and that therefore we must destroy what is essentially a dictatorship of the bosses and replace it with a dictatorship of the working class, of the proletariat; furthermore, that the revisionists are nationalists and in practice oppose the time honored internationalist slogan of "workers of the world unite!" It is on these and similar grounds that we should oppose the revisionists, not on who does better in the reform struggle.
Recruit to Revolution,
Not to a Reformist Line
Even recruiting to the Party is not necessarily a measure of whether or not we are pursuing a correct, revolutionary course since we can--and do--easily recruit workers and others on a reformist basis. Two million workers belong to the Italian C.P.; they have been recruited on the basis that the "communists" will bring them more under capitalism. Recruiting by itself doesn't mean building the Party. Recruiting on a revolutionary political line means building the Party.
The further danger of recruiting people on a militant reform line is that once the ruling class succeeds in reversing the gains won through the militant reform, once the first dip in the reform struggle comes along, this new recruit winds up leaving the Party. They do not have the staying power of revolutionary ideas and commitment to a long-range, protracted revolutionary struggle for the seizure of power. But, if we have already recruited people on a reform basis, we shouldn't now ask them to leave; we should attempt to consolidate them on the basis of revolutionary ideas and struggle.
All this does NOT mean we get out of the reform struggle. It does not mean we don't go to union meetings, that we don't run for union election, etc. It DOES mean that we pursue these activities and others in the reform struggle with the eye to building the party, with the goal of how do we use the union--as one aspect of the fight for revolution--to recruit to the Party and to the idea of the working class seizure of state power. We advocate, participate and even initiate struggle in the reform movement, but within the context of building for a revolution (which means building the Party). It is necessary not just to win reforms (which, by itself builds capitalist ideology, that you can reform the system), but to move masses to revolution.
We are using the reform struggle as a tactic in building a revolutionary movement that will not stop at the useless and impossible aim of reforming capitalism but will enable the working class and its allies to use the party to make a revolution. Communists want workers to use their strength as a class to overthrow their oppressors, and that can only be accomplished by building a revolutionary party--which they must join--and has that as its only goal.
The fact is that our Party has made its biggest advances when we have raised our revolutionary politics front and center as our main activity. This was true in raising the anti-Vietnam war movement to an anti-imperialist level. It was certainly true in organizing and carrying out our May Day action in Boston in 1975. It was then and around other May Days that the largest number of workers have seen the need to join the Party and build for a revolution, not simple stick to reforms. If we just put forward our revolutionary politics for a few weeks before May Day, the workers view us as militant reformers the rest of the year and then it is harder to understand the major political issues raised around May Day--the fight for Communism, internationalism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc.
Putting revolution primary and reform struggle secondary means building for something like May Day all year round. It means building a communist base who we can go to about participating in such an important Party activity. Otherwise May Day will get smaller and smaller.
Our Paper Spreads Our Ideas
If winning workers to revolution is primary, then nowhere are these ideas spread more widely than through the pages of Challenge-Desafio. Increasing the sale of, and subscriptions to, C-D, is not just some numbers game but part and parcel of the fight to win thousands of workers and others to the Party's ideas. It should lead us to many new recruits, workers thirsting for the real solutions to their problems It can provoke discussions about revolutionary ideas among thousands and tens of thousands, if they are given the opportunity by us to read the paper regularly.
One reason we often view the reform struggle as primary is because we believe the revolutionary struggle is either too distant or impossible. Often we tend to see the objective situation in a limited and static sense. For example, some of us do not believe the ruling class is in a state of accelerated decline. Therefore, it is very hard for us to accept the Party's line on war and fascism. Sometimes we are frustrated because the class struggle appears to be quiet. It seems that the working class will always submit to the dictates of the ruling class. Consequently, if our thinking is dominated by the fact that the bosses are on top, and that this is permanent reality, then our attention must turn from a revolution to reform.
If we believe reality to be a passive working class that won't fight back, then we will abandon a revolutionary perspective. At "best," we will stay in the reform struggle. And, if we don't accept the Party line about war and fascism, don't understand that the only way to defeat these capitalist developments is by revolution, we will never see the urgency of building our Party.
These weaknesses occur in all of us because we don't have an historical basis and historical information about the inevitability of change and the inevitability of the revolutionary process. Particularly unfortunate is the fact that we don't draw the proper conclusion from recent important political events. For example, while it's true that the anti-Vietnam war movement and the black rebellions were not revolutionary, the fact is that both these developments shook the ruling class to its heels.
These were two major upheavals in our short lifetime. both shook the ruling class badly. But the fact is that these upheavals did happen! The other reality is that without a revolutionary party in the leadership of these movements they will peter out.
We should encourage insurrection; every upheaval should see our party grow, leading to faster and continuous struggle in which we and the working class move to the left and to revolution. Strikes, or even general strikes--both of which are goals we seek--are not the quintessence of the struggle. We must learn how to direct these struggles into open rebellion against the ruling class, challenging them for state power. More and more workers must be won to the outlook of state power.
If our revolutionary outlook were staunch, then our revolutionary will would grow.
Our problem, as stated, is that our revolutionary outlook has been limited in the first place. But our illusions in reformism have persisted or even grown. So what often seems to be a weakening of revolutionary will, is in fact our loss of reformist will. This loss CAN and MUST be replaced by revolutionary consciousness. Historical examples, as well as more recent ones should give us overwhelming confidence that the workers can ultimately play their revolutionary role.
Can We Fight in a
Revolutionary Way?
The question of fighting in the reform movement in a revolutionary way--for revolutionary ideas--rather than in a reformist way (that maintains and even builds the system and its ideology), is no academic question. In fact it goes right to the heart of why we're fighting for socialism and on what basis we recruit someone to that fight and to the Party.
If we fight in the reform movement in a reformist way, and tag on the necessity to fight for communism as the way to win the reforms we can't win under capitalism, w e will be planting the seeds of the reversal of Communism once we were to win it. If the reason we fight for Communism is only to win material gains, then what would happen if workers were won to the Party solely on these grounds and did make a revolution? Once the working class has destroyed the capitalists and their ability to reap surplus value (profit) from the labor power of the working class, it does not necessarily mean that each individual worker under Socialism would get the full value of his/her labor power in his/her paycheck, to do with what they will. Where, then, would the social value come from to build whatever workers need in common--hospitals, dams to prevent floods or more factories and machinery to produce whatever the working class decides it needs? Still further, where would the value come from to help revolutionaries elsewhere in the world to take state power, to overthrow the ruling class that not only oppresses them but also has as its aim to destroy Communism where it has already been achieved?
The fact is, under Communism, with the working class in control of the state, it would decide collectively how to apportion the value it produces. It might not mean that every reform demand fought for under capitalism would be met right away, because other social and political needs might be more pressing. But if Socialism were won mainly on the basis of material incentives, rather than the ideological level of preserving and spreading the revolution to make it worldwide, then working class rule would eventually be destroyed, as has happened in the Soviet Union and China.
First, if all Socialism meant was more goods in more hands, we would have had it in the U.S., since the most goods in the hands of the most people exists right here. Secondly, "goulash communism" means forsaking revolutionaries elsewhere, since you're committed to producing the most for yourself. This creates the basis for your own destruction, since it leads to (1) more powerful bosses outside the Communist state being allowed to exist and aim their guns at you; (2) the drive to produce for the individual rather than for the social good of all; and (3) the opposite of proletarian internationalism, imperialist expansion, where the Soviet revisionist leadership expands its tentacles around the world on the grounds of feathering its own material nest and power.
Still further, winning workers to Socialism based mainly on material incentives (fulfilling the economic reforms not realizable under capilalism), leaves aside the whole superstructure of culture, relations between people, the question of family life, of what values will govern the society--communist or bourgeois values. It leaves aside the whole question of politics. Lenin said, "The economy is primary, but in the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat, politics must take absolute priority over economy.
"To give first importance to politics does not mean to replace the economy with politics and to neglect the economy, allegedly for the sake of politics, but means that each economic problem and the whole development of the economy must be seen through political eyes and be carried out in the direction defined by the proletarian politics..."
What we are mainly fighting for in the reform battles under capitalism--material gain or building a revolutionary party with a revolutionary ideology--will determine on what basis we recruit to the Party, on why we're fighting for Socialism, and ultimately on whether ideological incentives will overrun, preserve and spread that Socialism or whether material incentives will plant the seeds of its destruction and the restoration of capitalism based on capitalist ideas.
Examples of Reformist Line
in Our Practice
In the recent NYC hospital strike (Local 1199), the plan was to build the Party (recruit) and contrast the "demand" of arbitration with the necessity to win through violence, raising the whole communist concept of the need to seize state power
Now, there was improvement in this strike. PLP leaflets did come out putting forward revolutionary ideas as primary. Some workers were recruited to the Party. However, the Party leadership spent entirely too much time giving leadership to the reform struggle (exposing the sellout, organizing stronger picket lines, etc.) and far less time to plans for the two goals mentioned above. Therefore, too little political discussion took place in the clubs. Thus, the larger fraction meetings achieved during the strike became little more than left-wing caucuses. Thus, recruiting would tend to be on a reform, "we're the good guys" WAM-type basis.
In the 38-day San Francisco city workers strike the Party leadership planned a focus on three points: (1) racism; (2) who controls the city government; and (3) exposing the union leaders as sellouts. The idea was to build the Party around these points.
In practice, fighting racism and linking the strike to the broad political point of how capitalism uses racism to stay afloat (and therefore, why it can only be smashed with a revolution) became a very secondary thing. The question of who controls the city government--basically a question of state power--was nonexistent. This left the exposure of the sellout union leaders as the main point and led to the Party forces trying to become--and sometimes achieving--the tactical leadership of the strike. By not teaching the lesson of the capitalist government--in this particular case, the actual boss--smashing the working class with its state power, and by concentrating on the union sellout issue, even though we led hundreds in militant struggle, the net result was that no city workers were won to the Party.
Still another example is the recent strike by AFSCME Local 1006 in Chicago against racist layoffs and led by the Party. Two Party members were elected to the 1006 executive board, the recording secretary of the local and the chief shop steward. In addition, the editor of the local union paper is a PLP member. Three Party goals should have been: (1) since the strike was a Party-led action against racist layoffs (120 minority workers were axed), a good issue, to broaden this out to oppose the Nazi racist attacks and general ruling class offensive in the city of Chicago; (2) defeat the revisionists ideologically in the union; and (3) recruit to the Party on the above basis.
(1) No fight was made to expand the strike to oppose the broader manifestations of racism, thereby failing to politicize many in a mass way, to understand the relation of the strike to Mayor Daley and the whole ruling class, etc. The strike was restricted to the fight inside the union against layoffs, (2) We allowed the revisionists to run us over ideologically. We backed off selling C-D as "divisive" (it was done, but weakly), when we should have thrown the revisionists out of the union and explained why, (3) When we met with the strike leaders we discussed mainly how to build the picket lines, not how to build the Party.
All this happened after conducting a long and positive fight in 1006 to actually go on strike, and against layoffs. When it happened and with Party members in leadership, it appears we felt impelled to "win" the strike to show how good the Party members were ("better reformers"), rather than really winning by recruiting to the Party based on revolutionary ideas, at the same time as we participate in a militant strike, using the latter opportunity to make the points we had planned to.
Finally the government/boss fired 300 strikers who were protesting these racist layoffs. Then the AFSCME International sellout Jerry Wurf came down, put the local in receivership, declared the strike over, and connived with the bosses to split the strikers, maintaining the firing of 33 (PLPers and other militants).
The communists who, in attempting to carry out the political fight against racism and thereby organized the strike, were virtually all fired, without, so far, having recruited any workers to the Party out of this struggle. There is no PLP fraction there. Therefore, not only was the revolutionary movement not built, but the bosses, having accomplished their most important aim--lessening communist influence--can now go about driving the workers down still further, with far less communist leadership to contend with.
The entire line of putting reform before revolution has been reflected in our leaflets and C-D articles. We have spent most of the leaflet discussing the ins and outs of the reform struggle, giving good advice on how to militantly overturn the union sellouts' tactics, and ending up with "PLP fights for communism and workers power; for more information, call us."
While this may sound too crude, it is essentially what most of us have done. And this is the way our activities have been described in C-D articles. We do that instead of starting out with revolutionary politics, why we are involved in this reform struggle, in what way does it show the need for overthrowing capitalism, in what way does it show capitalism as the cause of the problem, etc., and then spending some time on tactics, growing out of this communist analysis which would imply sharper class struggle and an understanding to act against capitalism.
How did all this happen? Is it wrong to be active in the union, to run for union leadership, to be militant, to immerse one's self in the working class at the point of production, etc.? Definitely not, but certainly we shouldn't do it in the one-sided, reform-over-revolution way we've done it. The reformist errors described did not result from Party members not carrying out the Party line. It was the Party leadership who allowed the line to develop in a one-sided way. The fact is the Party membership followed the example set by the leadership. When the articles appeared in C-D in the fashion described, members could only conclude that this was desirable and followed suit. When the leadership concentrated on the reform struggle, making it primary in practice, the membership followed suit, "carrying out the line."
Now, based on a review of our practice and where it has gotten us, we are trying to correct these mistakes and develop the line in such a way that it isn't practiced one-sidedly, so that the advances made each step of the way are not undercut. Advancing our theory and practice is a protracted process, not an all-or-nothing affair. It is a painstaking struggle to constantly test it, evaluate the results, make necessary changes and then test it again, always using the mooring of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the necessity for the working class to seize state power, and the need for a communist party to lead that goal.
At this point it might be helpful to examine the development of our line, especially in the labor movement.
Move Towards the
Working Class
When the PLM (Progressive Labor Movement) was first formed in 1962, it was based on the fact that the working class was the key class historically in making a revolution and that it needed a communist party to lead to the smashing of bourgeois state power and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. This was the answer to the old C.P.'s total abandonment of the fight for Socialism. The PLM period (1962-1965) re-asserted the public role of communists ("out in the open, on the streets"), laying the basis for the formation of a party. There was plenty of "reporting" on the role of workers and class struggle but absolutely no communist base-building (there were very few Party members who were workers; at the founding convention of PLP we had one "trade union club" with four members out of 200 people at the convention).
From `65 and the establishment of PLP to around `68, we attempted to move members to work and into the unions, mostly to try to establish a base within the working class at the point of production and secondarily to get some stability. Since most of our members were students or ex-students, these were the people who "entered" the working class to carry out the line.
The main emphasis was to "get our feet wet" in what Lenin referred as the "muck and mire" of trade unionism. We were going to try to build a rank-and-file movement, caucuses, a left-center coalition, learn trade union and strike tactics and organize struggle so "Marxist-Leninist conclusions could come out of the struggle." For students and ex-students to stick in the working class--given many romantic notions of workers--and therefore to avoid adventurism, we opted for opportunism and downplaying the open Party role at the expense of avoiding sectarianism (and getting fired immediately). This meant little putting forward of the Party in the here and now. Most members were not known as PLers by their co-workers.
Developing the Idea
of Base-Building
Although the Party was buried for the most part because of this, one important advance in this period was the development of the basebuilding concept which became the main speech at the 1968 party convention. While this was the height of the period of the ghetto rebellions and the anti-war movement, there was very little relation between our activities in those two movements and our work in the labor movement, partly because of the lack of a communist base among workers.
As we began to see that putting students in the "front lines" wouldn't work and that they either left the Party or they buried themselves at work (and left the Party behind), we pulled many of them out of the industrial working class and put them in situations more related to their backgrounds, some still in unions, others in situations where they could more naturally win their peers to a pro-working class stance.
This period, from `69 to `71, was characterized by the more mass putting forward of the Party, especially through the mass sale of CD. Members were encouraged to sell the paper in front of their plants, to tell workers about the Party right at the beginning, etc. Sales of the monthly C-D reached 100,000 in the summer of 1970. Sellers' collectives of Party and non-Party were formed. With the start of the recession 1970, Workers Councils and Unemployment Councils were formed to try to win workers directly to the Party, although done essentially away from the point of production.
In ` 71, with the advent of a big wave of wildcat strikes and general working-class unrest, we suddenly realized we were outside this movement. Members organizing sellers collectives, Unemployment Councils, selling the paper outside plants, etc., were not even attending union meetings and participating in the main mass organization of the working class. They were therefore unable to put forward politics in that struggle. So `71-72 marked a return to unions, slates, caucuses, union activity (both by members in unions in which ex-students were naturally accepted on the job, and by those industrial workers recruited out of the Councils' work), but this time on the basis of telling co-workers about the Party and the intention to recruit "out of the struggle."
In the beginning of `72, the Workers Action Movement (WAM) was formed to organize a mass-based Left organization around a major issue--30 for 40. To WAM we would win the most advanced workers who we would then recruit to the Party. Party members would be open in WAM. It would unite the working class, engage in strike support, and fight racism. But the intention was for it to be a single-issue organization, to re-develop the Left inside the labor movement. Actually, WAM developed as a militant, class-solidarity group, with an everything-but-the-dictatorship-of-the-proletariat program. This led to the idea it was "unnecessary to join the Party because it is no different than WAM" and the Party was generally buried in WAM activities (reform work), although some workers were recruited to the Party through WAM. Yet, it was generally on a militant WAM line, not on a revolutionary line.
Fractions, Caucuses and
a Mass Party
The period from Dec. `74 to the present was marked by a drive for a mass Party, to recruit those who were hidden from the Party by WAM, etc. Party membership jumped. WAM was dissolved, having outlived any usefulness it might have had, to be replaced by communist fractions (a line which began in Aug. `75). The idea was, and is, to win workers ready to function directly under the leadership and line of the Party, and from there to recruit them. Still ready to join caucuses, we now distinguish between them and fractions--the caucus is not set up to build the Party, although workers could and should be recruited to the Party or fraction out of caucus work.
Fractions were formed on the basis of "linking reform to revolution," seeing that the working class won't get Marxism-Leninism simply by working on the job, nor simply from class struggle at the point of production. The fraction, and the Party members in it, must run the whole gamut of political ideas and events, on and away from the job, since (1) a communist outlook goes far beyond the point of production, and (2) the battle for state power is one that occurs away from the factories, although occupying factories could be one aspect of a revolution. The ability to "take over" production is really dependent upon having state power and outlawing private property. As long as the ruling class has state power, it can use it to prevent workers' control over production.
However, while putting forward communist fractions and the above ideas, we have still managed to organize fractions that are essentially reformist in nature. That is in "linking reform to revolution," we still use reform struggle as "the basis" of winning workers to the Party, which also means they can be won to the Party on a militant reform line, not on a revolutionary line. We are now coming to the conclusion that fighting for reforms without the main content being to tie the fight to the communist idea of overthrowing the system (i.e., fighting in the mass movement in a reformist way), is contradictory to the fight for revolution. Winning workers to see the need to take state power, and therefore to join and build the Party to lead to that goal, does not grow out of the simple fight for reforms. Therefore, it is only capitalism that can be built by fighting in the reform movement in a reformist way.
Yet we can see from tracing our history in this very cursory fashion, that there was both a good side and a weak side--a revolutionary side and a reform side--to our work. There was always a concentration on the working class as the revolutionary class, and, after `68, an attempt to win workers directly to the Party. Within that we developed the concept of building a communist base in the working class. We always put forward the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the necessity of the working class to seize power and smash the bourgeois state. We always put forward the need to fight racism as necessary to unite the working class to a point where it could move for state power. This central anti-racist thread, along with the analysis of the decline of U.S. imperialism, has laid the basis for the development of the line on fascism.
Each advance in the line produced something positive which we still incorporate into our current work: the working class is the revolutionary class; do communist work in the unions, lead class struggle at the point of production; build a personal/political communist base among workers; tell workers about the Party; put forward the Party in a mass way; mass sale of C-D; boldly put forward the Party at plant gates; intensify work in the unions on the basis of talking about the party and recruiting to it; putting forward 30 for 40 and anti-racism to the whole working class; uniting the working class through these issues; fractions, not caucuses, as Party units; winning workers to communist ideas beyond just the momentary boss-worker relationship; seeing that revolution will occur away from (although sometimes including) the factories.
The Road to Revolution
We published Road to Revolution I, a reassertion of the dictatorship of the proletariat after its abandonment by most of the world communist movement at that time. In Road to Revolution II we corrected errors on the question of nationalism, seeing that this is a ruling class ideology and cannot lead to socialism but leads to the maintenance of capitalism. In Road to Revolution III we attacked the two-stage theory of revolution, declaring that workers, peasants and others can be won directly to fighting for Socialism.
However, our practice has tended to tail this progression in our line. Part of what we have been doing is a reflection of winning workers on a two-stage basis--first to militant reform and then to revolution. We have rejected this in theory. We must reject it in practice. The fact is that when we win workers to militant reform first, it can and does just as easily turn into its opposite and away from revolution and joining PLP.
This happened because (1) of many early subjective weaknesses; (2) when it comes to a choice of pursuing a revolutionary path or a reform road, a reform fight will always meet with a lesser resistance from the ruling class; therefore, without revolutionary politics being foremost in our minds, we are most likely to pursue a reformist road; and (3) we haven't understood the Leninist thesis that the reform struggle is just one tactic in the revolutionary process. Therefore, we haven't entered the reform struggle with a communist understanding, with the primary goal of building the Party, but rather from the point of view that the working class is the revolutionary class and that "therefore" out of the class struggle will grow Marxism-Leninism.
Our practice has taught us that this is simply not true. So somewhat inherent in the way we have developed the various changes and advances in our line over the years --and there was always a positive and more advanced concept in each successive change, growing out of practice--there has also been a one-sidedness that allowed reformism to override revolution. It is this weakness that must be reversed. We can no longer have the idea, present in many past trade union programs, that we will take over the unions and from that vantage point launch a fight for state power. The ruling class will opt for violent struggle to save their system long before we "take over" the unions.
Therefore, we must, right from the beginning, win workers to the concept of state power, not to the idea that they will win through rank-and-file power first and revolution later. Sure, we should and must be active in the unions, run for office, participate in the fight for rank-and file power against the sellouts. But only from the point of view of fitting that struggle into one for revolution, not from the point of view that this reform of the unions precedes the fight for revolution.
The concept of making the primary fight one of fighting for revolution, and therefore of building the Party, and the fight for reforms secondary should not view recruiting to the Party in a narrow or limited way. Winning someone to join the Party is not simply meeting some numerical quota, and after we've won 51% of the working class, we'll simply "have Socialism." Winning someone to join the Party around a revolutionary line means winning that person to go back into the reform movement, into the mass movement, participate in the class struggle in a way that sharpens the fight against the ruling class as a class, tie the reform struggle to capitalism and why and how it must be overthrown, and in that way recruit still more workers to the Party. Winning someone to join the Party is not merely an intellectual exercise; it is winning them to be active in leading and initiating class struggle around a revolutionary line, rather than just being a militant fighter for reforms.
Our Communist Line
in Practice
In the recent NYC Local 420 hospital strike, a leaflet was distributed which put forward the Party's revolutionary line and explained how capitalism has caused the strikers' problems, therefore why a Party and Socialism was needed. An expanded Party meeting was called on the first day of the strike and 16 non-Party workers came. It was announced at the start of the meeting that, while it was important to discuss strike tactics, it was more important to discuss the overall ravages of the system, of racism, etc., and why it was necessary to build the Party in this strike.
The sharpness of the revolutionary line during the August 28 Detroit auto march helped recruit five workers to the Party. Many workers who have been around the Party for some time were recruited simply by asking them in a serious way to join. They had been ready for some time but had never been asked or followed up seriously.
The Party's leadership of the wildcat strike at NYC's Montefiore Hospital involved anti-racism (uniting white professionals with black and Latin non-professionals), pointing out the class nature of the system, and pointing out the necessity to join the Party and build for a revolution as the only way out. Four workers joined who participated in the struggle. Now a shop paper is being distributed there among Local 1199 members entitled, "We Tried Arbitration; Look What We Got-- Revolution is the Only Solution."
The bosses in one shop posted an order requiring workers to submit to lunchbox inspections "because supplies were being stolen." Black workers were singled out for special harassment. The Party put out a leaflet asking "Who is stealing from whom?" and went on to explain the robbery of surplus value by the bosses off the workers' labor, and show how Socialism will stop the biggest thievery of all, tying the racist nature of the attack into this explanation.
There have been similar attempts elsewhere at fitting the reform struggle into the revolutionary goal. Some of this has been more reflected in the kinds of articles now being written in C-D.
These are good beginnings. As we attempt to change our approach, we will no doubt make, mistakes. But we must make decisive changes in the work. One way to do it is the following:
Instead of beginning by becoming active in any reform struggle that is occurring in our area of work, begin with studying the problems in an industry (or elsewhere) from a communist point of view: what are the main reflections of capitalism in that area (unemployment? racism? high accident rate? etc.). Then develop an explanation of how these problems result from capitalism, and therefore why we need socialism and how socialism would solve those problems. The idea is to explain why the problems exist in such a way that it would impel workers to act in a way to destroy the system, not to merely oppose the sellouts and fight for rank-and-file power. Acting in the direction of destroying the system means joining a fraction or the Party, spreading revolutionary ideas, recruiting others to the fraction and the Party, as well as participating in the reform struggle to get the opportunity to do the above.
Leaflets, C-D articles, and other written material should start with the concepts of revolution, not dwell on reform. This means that the political goals set forward, for instance, in the plans as outlined previously in the NYC Hospital strike, the S.F. city workers strike, the AFSCME 1006 strike, should be the bulk of the leaflet or article, with a much lesser amount devoted to the ins and outs of the reform struggle, and then mainly as they fit into the revolutionary struggle. In other words, we shouldn't merely reverse the present content, putting the present last sentence or paragraph about PLP and revolution at the beginning and then just proceed with our usual concentration on reform. We must really think out how the main problems in the struggle reflect capitalism and therefore win workers to the necessity to get rid of capitalism, not merely change the union.
Finally, if we are elected to union office, we should: (1) tie every grievance to capitalism, which should make us a fighting grievance person (do not feed the illusion that a communist, or communist-led union, can make things better under capitalism; use the grievance to win workers closer to the idea of destroying capitalism and therefore joining the Party or Party fraction); (2) use the union office to conduct political discussion, at union meetings, in union committees, at shop steward meetings, etc.; (3) use the union office to win workers to join the Party.
If using our union position to build the Party in this way leads to a sharp struggle and even ouster from the position, this would be a victory if it meant that we had recruited workers to the Party, to seeing the need to destroy capitalism and take state power. That is the barometer of winning or losing, not the votes in the election or the ability to hang onto the office.
Comrades and friends: a future of revolution was never brighter. The objective situation is worsening; the bosses' economy is headed for another slump. This will mean new attacks on the working class and increased imperialist meddling abroad, pointing to war and fascism. Against all this the working class can take the offensive, if led by a communist party that follows a line of putting revolution first, that bursts the chains of capitalist reformist ideology. This is our historic task; let's get to it!
DEEPING ROOTS
CRITICISM AND SELF-CRITICISM
The seed of revolution has been sown again in our land, and our Party can feel some sense of achievement in the part we have taken in this planting. We are still young and small but we have made a strong start. We have done more than scratch the shiny surface of the U.S. ruling class; we have begun to rip away its mask, to expose its ugliness--and to get under its skin.
It's not for nothing the ruling class has decided to make our Party its number one target in the U.S. In a relatively few months, we have set up a national Communist party with a wise and firm foundation of friends, readers, supporters and members among working people, black and white, as well as among the students, in the forefront of today's battles.
Also, we have begun to overcome the main internal weaknesses which had been holding us back. First and foremost we have corrected certain sectarian policies which had isolated us from too many people and organizations in the growing people's movement against the war, slum conditions, high prices, wage- squeezing and other fat-profit Government policies. We know now that in our early stages we under emphasized united front work, neglected the labor movement, and expected too much too soon. Since our founding convention a year ago we have begun to combine with large numbers of people and to take united action with many groups, while maintaining and advancing our Marxist-Leninist principles and actually expanding our advocacy of socialist revolution.
To some extent our early sectarianism was inevitable as we fought to avoid the right-opportunist errors of the old Communist Party which had followed the "three secrets" policy: keep the Party a secret (except from the FBI), keep the activities a secret (even from Party members), and keep revolution and socialism a secret (from the masses of people).
Our members had to fight hard to put forward publicly the principles of socialist revolution. We had to let people know what communism really means, that yes there is a way finally to solve our problems-socialism; and that a Party exists which is not afraid to fight for that solution. We had to and still must struggle to make the idea of revolution popular.
It's not surprising, then, that in our early activities members tended to go overboard and ignore or even reject people and groups who were not yet ready to join us . This early sectarianism hurt us, and it's a tribute to our correct overall political line, and to the energetic, youthful spirit of our members, that we were able to attract so many young radicals, in spite of this weakness.
Sectarianism and isolation remain problems for us today, but they are not primarily problems of policy. On the whole we have corrected our policy, and our significant influence in the current anti imperialist upsurge reflects this change.
At the same time, we have begun to conquer the lack of seriousness which once thrived in our ranks. Here, the enemy has been most helpful. The arrests, subpoenas and physical attacks on us have made every member think twice about why he is sticking with this Party, and understand that the revolution is not to be achieved quickly, but through a lifetime of struggle, continuing, in new forms, even after the working class takes power. Some have chosen to leave, of course, but those who remain are stronger for it.
Here, too, our early policy was wrong, dominated by liberalism and carelessness in recruiting new members. We often placed quantity above quality. Perhaps this, too, was inevitable at the outset. Also, we didn't always sit down and explain to people what they were getting themselves into when they joined a Communist party, what the risks are, the long-range commitment that is a necessary part of the revolutionary ideology. We even had cases where young people with virtually no understanding of what was happening were brought into a club and made voting members.
We have learned from these errors, and changed our membership policy. In general, our members and leaders have been forced to begin thinking about long-term strategy both for their own lives and the life and growth of the Party.
As a result, we can already see an increase in both the quantity and quality of our work, our membership, and our Marxist-Leninist study. Last summer's cadre school was a big step up this hill. Naturally, there remain a few who still have their heads in the clouds, who are still playing at revolution, but we can rely on the ruling class to thump them down to earth.
These successes are only the beginning, and it is easy enough to say that none of the changes has yet gone far enough. But an honest evaluation of our recent growth must emphasize our success and achievement. Our Party has stood like a young sapling in a windstorm of howling attacks, sometimes swaying a little but holding firm and deepening its roots as it grows.
OUR MAIN OBSTACLE TODAY
We cannot of course, just sit and admire ourselves in the mirror of achievement. As the situation sharpens we must ask ourselves, will we be prepared? As we expand our circle of friends and relations, will we be able to avoid the opportunist "Hamlin" approach of trailing after every reformist pie-eyed piper in town? And will we at the same time avoid sectarian isolation? Will we continue to struggle as we unite with other people and groups? Will we know how to struggle? Are we perfect or can we improve our work?
If we ask this question and ask it again and again every day in every way then we are halfway improved already. If we do not ask the question, then we will surely become smug and complacent and flabby, and we might as well join Gus Hall and Norman Thomas.
To improve our work means, first, to look for the main weakness or obstacle to our progress. We should not look far. Those who run to Palomar to scan the skies in search of dangers may see many interesting phenomena but they will miss the main point. "It is not in our stars, but in ourselves..." that the main contradiction, and the main obstacle to our continued success, lies. The main cause of failure--like the main cause of success-- is contained within any revolutionary party or movement, not outside it. Those, like the old C.P., who blame the ruling class for their failure are only diverting attention from their own weaknesses or betrayals. Of course, every party must reckon with the real conditions of life around it, but the party's internal strength or weakness will determine how well it reckons.
Our Party's main obstacle is the influence and ideology of bourgeois society within our ranks. Our most decisive struggle today is between revolutionary and bourgeois ideology, and particularly between revolutionary morality and bourgeois individualism, between complete dedication to the working class and middle-class self-interest, which is the moral and material basis of modern revisionism.
The existence of bourgeois ideas, attitudes and habits within our ranks is hardly astonishing. At this early stage, our Party, like most new-born revolutionary parties, has a large percentage of intellectuals and members of middle-class background. Moreover, every revolutionary party has internal struggle reflecting the class struggle in the society around it. And the society around us in this case causes some pretty weird reflections.
The U.S. capitalist class is not only the richest, most powerful ruling class in history, it is also the most corrupt, most brutal, most degenerate and most egotistic; and the ruling class tries to impose its own morality on the whole of society. It's not just "getting and spending" that is too much with us. Books, newspapers, comics, teachers, philosophers, politicians, psychiatrists, movies, and especially television all give subtle daily indoctrination in the basic elements of capitalist, and fascist, morality: Might-makes-right (the tough guy is the good guy) and Me-before-every-one-else ("Don't trust nobody").
From our first breath we breathe this stuff. How could we possibly be completely free from it? The history of the left in the U.S. shows one group after another surrendering to this bourgeois self-interest, first slowly, then completely abandoning the difficult struggle against the ruling class and ending up in the comfort corner of class collaboration.
Yet it need not always be so. The bourgeois ideology in our ranks can be a good thing, too. If we recognize and know how to deal with it, we can grow stronger as a result of having purged it away. This experience can be a valuable lesson for the future. When the working class takes power, bourgeois influences do not automatically disappear, as we can see by looking at the countries ruled by revisionist parties. If internal contradictions are mishandled in a socialist country the result may be disastrous, as we can see by looking at these same countries.
Once we recognize that bourgeois influences are inevitable in our ranks, then the whole question becomes how do these influences crop up, and how should we handle them. If we fail to handle correctly the problem of bourgeois ideology, then the Party itself, and particularly the leadership, must accept responsibility for the consequences. We cannot blame it on society.
The ideological struggle is the primary struggle. Its outcome, in the long run, determines the political line and the organizational form. This struggle includes understanding and developing the ideology of the working class as well as battling against bourgeois ideology.
At the same time, we must know how to conduct this struggle. Here, it is particularly important to distinguish between antagonistic and non-antagonistic struggle; we want to wipe out antagonistic bourgeois ideas and habits, not the individuals who display, often unknowingly and usually without antagonism, those ideas and habits.
But before discussing how to deal with the problem, let us look more closely at the problem itself.
BOURGEOIS INDIVIDUALISM
The corrupt influence of capitalist morality crops up in many ways. The contradiction between this influence and our Party's collective, revolutionary spirit and goals takes many forms.
Sometimes there will be an open ideological dispute between two lines. A few of our members wanted to support Johnson against Goldwater in the last elections, arguing that Goldwater would expand the war, bomb north Vietnam, draft hundreds of thousands of U.S. boys, and other such things. In the course of discussions this position was clearly exposed as an opportunist abandoning of the working people's interest. Later Johnson helped make it even clearer.
That was a case where one line was revisionist and the other was Marxist-Leninist. That is the best form of contradiction for our Party. It is open and clear cut. The debate is political and the revisionist or other incorrect position is exposed and eventually rejected. Such debates should be welcomed and carried to the end. At this stage in history, the struggle against revisionism is the main struggle within the revolutionary movement.
Thanks mainly to the consistently negative example of the U.S. revisionists and social democrats, our Party has not had too much difficulty with these policy disputes. However, we must be continuously alert to bring such disputes out in the open when they arise.
We intend to deal mainly with those aspects of this contradiction which are more concealed; with the struggle against bourgeois habits and ideas, which are often little understood by those who harbor them. Here, the two main conflicts are between bourgeois individualism and revolutionary dedication, and between pragmatism and Marxist-Leninist analysis and planning.
Bourgeois individualism is a fancy term for selfishness. That is, capitalist selfishness, selfishness for personal gain, prestige, power, comfort or material goods-- usually at the expense of others. People with this approach have an amazing variety of rationalizations.
"The heads of such people are stuffed with the ideology of the exploiting classes. They believe that 'Every man is for himself' 'Man is a selfish animal' and 'No one in the world is genuinely unselfish unless he is a simpleton or an idiot.' They even use such exploiting class rubbish to justify their own selfishness and individualism." (Liu Shao-chi, XI, How to Be A Good Communist, Feb. 1946 edition. p. 58)
The conflict or contradiction within our Party, and -often within an individual member, is between the individualist tendency, which is the authentic Golden Rule of capitalism, and a dedication to the working class and the vast majority of the world's people, a dedication that makes socialist revolution and the achievement of communism more important than personal gain. It might be more accurate to say that through this dedication our selves become one with our class, and personal gain is achieved only through a gain for the entire class.
In other words, how much do we want this thing, this revolution? That's what it all comes down to. Is it more important to us than ourselves, our personal comfort, prestige, money, or life? Are we willing to remold ourselves into integral parts of a revolutionary party, to subordinate and eventually transform the old self into the new self which exists only through our Party and our unending fight for revolutionary change?
At this point a cry of protest will no doubt arise from many a radical heart. "No," they will exclaim, "we cannot live only through the Party! That is denying our humanity! Our individual essence! Our goal of full and free and creative expression for each! We will sacrifice our time, our energy, our money, but never our minds, never our hearts! "
Some may say these things having been sincerely repelled by the unfeeling bureaucracy of the old CP. And it is crucial that we avoid any repetition of that Gus Hall-itis. But it is intriguing that those who argue so long and loud about feeling and thinking often do amazing little of either.
It is self-evident to anyone who dares to look that we do not want an unfeeling, unthinking party. Such a party could not last two days as a revolutionary force. A party whose members don't feel pain and suffering could hardly burn with a desire to wipe out the rats and slumlords who are eating away at the flesh and blood of our ghetto children. A party whose members do not care for their fellow men could hardly care whether or not coal miners can afford to send their children to hospitals. A party whose members cannot love the people cannot hate the ruling class. A party which does not know trust and confidence in humanity could never build a society based on that trust and confidence. And as for thinking, the entire science of Marxism-Leninism requires thinking, a science which enables us to understand--only through hard thinking--the rules of reality and change, to develop new thoughts on how to make life better for the vast majority of people, and to fight effectively the long war against those who fear ideas. Without creative, individual thinking, there is no Marxism-Leninism. Automatons will never make a revolution, and any automatons within our ranks are useless at best.
The question is: What is the aim of feeling and thinking? For whom and to what end? Are we grumbling about going to a meeting because we would rather sit home and watch TV, or because it may be keeping us from selling newspapers to working people in our community? Do we worry when making a public speech or writing an article about our prestige, how we will look, or about how people will respond to the ideas we express? When deciding for or against a demonstration do we consider the best interests of the Party or are we more concerned with staying out of jail?
In other words, don't stop thinking and feeling, but change the purpose for which we think and feel if the purpose is wrong. Use our minds and hearts--as well as our time and energy--for the working class. The statement, "I'll give my time and energy for the Party but not my heart" reveals a person whose time and energy are as empty as his emotions. It is like the artist who says, "I will gladly support the movement, but when it comes to painting, that I reserve for myself." The movement gains little from this support, and even less does the world gain from his painting.
LACK OF SERIOUSNESS
As we said, significant progress has been made since our founding convention. Yet, despite the ruling class attacks on us, some members still think they're playing games. They think they can call "time out" whenever they want. They are as sloppy in their work as in their dress and personal habits. They live in a dream world. They just can't quite understand or believe that our Party is really out to make a revolution, and that making a revolution takes a lifetime, which means as long as we are alive, and then some. You can't really blame these people too much. After all, the U.S. Left has been non revolutionary for so long that revolution is a brand new thought to most newcomers.
The lack of seriousness first crops up in a lot of "little" day-to-day ways: The student PLer who sleeps late instead of getting out on the campus early to talk with more people; the member of a neighborhood club who never thinks of writing a story for our newspaper on PL or other community activities; the "organizer" who never stays after a meeting to talk informally because he's always rushing, no matter how late at night, to meet his latest girlfriend; those who just never seem to sell any PL literature, but have seen all the latest movies; those in study groups who read assignments as if they were carrying out the hardest job, or don't bother to read at all.
These habits and dozens of others--lazy, degenerate attitudes--are simply self-indulgence. They grow out of a society which makes work a burden and loafing a goal. But they are directly related, as is fear, to the lack of desire for the revolution and lack of understanding of, and commitment to, the working class. Some members who come from middle-class comfort seem to seek a safe little living room to crawl back into from time to time, just as water seeks its own level.
True, revolutionary struggle is often taxing, and everybody needs enough rest to maintain adequate physical and mental health. But racism is a strain on the black people in our country, napalm bombs are taxing to the Vietnamese, and trying to feed a family when you don't have a job can be downright exhausting. The ruling class permits its enemies few vacations.
Let's look closely at the real conditions of this world we tend to live in so complacently. Let us remind ourselves of the napalmed children of Vietnam and the Congo. But that may be somewhat distant, although distance should not be a measure of importance. Let us take ourselves through the ghetto communities of our big cities where we have begun some work or the Kentucky miner's homes, or the Mississippi croppers, or the Puerto Rican "migrant serfs" of New Jersey, or their brother migrants in the Salinas Valley; the rat bites, the TB, the hungry bellies and the soulful eyes, the living death that constitutes the casualty list of the class struggle. Let us make every member understand that war is not a sometime thing.
The leaders of our Party must constantly set an example by hard work, commitment, and willingness to sacrifice. At the same time, we should call attention to Party groups and rank-and-file members whose consistent activities and courage can inspire us all.
Here we should not seek out those who are simply "devoted" to the Party as a blind man is devoted to his seeing-eye dog. When we praise dedication we should praise dedication to revolution, to the working people of our country, and therefore to the Party, as the leading part of but always part of that revolution and that people. No blind men here! Each of us dedicates his eyes to all the rest, and so each of us can see better.
To be dedicated, of course, does not mean to be dead. In striving to overcome carelessness we must avoid the deathly grimness which pervades those few pseudo radical groups which have virtually declared laughter counter-revolutionary. The laughter of our Party is healthy and a sign of great basic strength. In general, individuals who take themselves too seriously, besides being over-stuffed with their own importance, are no fun to be with. Most people laugh even through hardship; if we are people, we'll laugh, too. Unfortunately, a few of our people don't yet understand that we are also revolutionaries, which means that underlying our laughter must be a basic resoluteness. In due time, of course, the enemy will teach these people. But it may be a costly lesson for all of us if we wait till then to learn.
ISOLATION
The most serious immediate problem facing our Party is the isolation of too many members from non-Party people, especially working people. This problem persists despite changes away from some early sectarian policies and despite the fact that a significant number of Party members have begun to establish important roots for themselves, particularly in the labor movement. Too many members still have no real friends outside the Party. A few members still shun getting a job. This is not a policy problem today, but a problem of ideology in every one of us.
Some members seem to think that developing friendships with new people is some sort of burden. On certain evenings they'll force themselves out of a sense of duty to visit non-Party contacts, and some won't even do that much. But every free moment they get they'll drop in for a relaxing bull session, cup of coffee, and rest with one of the in-group or "real friends" who are usually in the Party.
This elitist snobbery reflects fear and lack of resoluteness. After all, it takes an extra effort to make a new friend in the neighborhood, in school, or on the job. It may even mean going out of the way, crossing the street to say hello to a neighbor, inviting co-workers over for supper or organizing a party. And why strain ourselves to visit new people's homes when we have such a comfortable "home" here in the social-political clique which, in cases where it applies, we call our Party club?
Another side of this anti-social attitude is the member who has just read the above and said to himself most righteously, "I've got friends outside the party--lots of them!" but who somehow never discusses political questions with any of these friends. He patronizes these non-Party friends by systematically, though not always consciously, excluding them from the supposedly most important part of his life--his commitment to revolution. Not that they have to agree politically, but this patronizing member never even discusses politics with his friends. The result is they are not genuine friends, and they don't develop politically even if they should want to.
No one is arguing here that every friendship and tie outside the Party should be purely or even mainly political. Not at all. The member who can't discuss anything but politics is going to have a rough time when the World Series rolls around. A few of our members still seem unable to say anything but, "Will you come to the demonstration?" when they meet people in the street. But anyone who divides his political comrades from his friends, who keeps one set of ideas for one and another for the other and never the twain shall even overlap, is just as useless as the person with no friends outside the Party.
The whole question of mass work requires an analytical article on its own. But it is basically an ideological question. What do we really want? If we want to make a revolution in this country, we have to win new people and work with people even when we won't win them. We cannot do it alone. Alone, we can make ourselves as snug, and useless, as the cue ball in a corner pocket. In our written work, too, we still tend to be too narrow. Clichés come quick, and some members enjoy attacking everybody and anybody who doesn't agree with us 110 per cent, and everybody is attacked with equal venom. A few members still flinch at the thought of working with other, less "pure" organizations. Of course, polemics such as the recent exchange with Studies on the Left are very useful and should be conducted. But in general, our writers and editors should consider carefully how much space is spent on criticizing--and what is the tone of the criticism--various weak and/or negative tendencies. Let us fire most of our shots, and our most explosive ammunition, at the main enemy--U.S. imperialism and its front men, modern revisionism.
EMPLOYEE MENTALITY
This attitude says, "I will do what I'm asked to do and no more. I will follow orders. I will question nothing. I will not think. I will not criticize. And of my sacred, inner self, I will give nothing." Often, if criticized, members with this attitude will simply withdraw. Basically, this attitude resists change because to change would mean to give of that sacred, inner self which is held above and beyond the Party and the working class. Members with this attitude almost always try to select or somehow manage to get jobs which require the least responsibility. When they are not doing "Party work," they don't think about making revolutionary changes in anything. They are "off the job" until the next meeting or assignment.
If they ever have a new idea it scares the hell out of them, and they quickly smother it as unbefitting a "good" Party member. They are revolutionaries in a rut, which is an impossible contradiction. Sooner or later, usually sooner, the revolutionary must destroy the rut or the rut will destroy the revolutionary, no matter how regularly he attends Party meetings. Even when they work efficiently and devotedly, such members work dully and without initiative. "Initiative is for the leadership." Presumably if the leadership disappeared tomorrow, these members would stop political work because they wouldn't know what to do. Isn't that just what happened in the fifties with so many Communist Party members?
Paradoxically, such people often harbor resentments against one or another of those they consider to be their "employers," usually some among the leadership. In fact, it is sometimes hard to figure out what stubborn streak of personality keeps such people in the Party. Yet if they could only see that it's not so horrible to try something and fail, that failure is in fact a necessary prerequisite for every success, these members usually have great political potential and sometimes even brilliant minds buried beneath their employee mentality.
COMBAT LIBERALISM
How shall we react when our weaknesses are pointed out? Unfortunately, it is easy to pick out weaknesses which obviously apply to others and shrug off or ignore our own. That attitude, of course, reflects the very individualism of which all these weaknesses we have mentioned are only different forms.
These weaknesses often reflect a lack of involvement in the daily struggles of the working people. At the same time, they always reflect a low level of revolutionary ideology. To the extent that individualism dominates an individual, to that extent Marxism-Leninism is subordinated. The weakness, in other words, consists of both the existence of bad traits and the non-existence of revolutionary ideology. We must understand this in order to struggle against these shortcomings. When we criticize, and when we suggest ways of improving, we must emphasize Marxist-Leninist study.
To the extent that any of the above mentioned tendencies exist in a member, to that extent personal concern and personal loyalty take the place of class concern and loyalty. But that is precisely the moral and material foundation of modern revisionism. "Don't fight the imperialists because you might get killed." So we can see that bourgeois individualism, if it is unchecked, if it is not consciously opposed in our ranks will lead to revisionism. The struggle against it therefore, must be sharp, and it must be ideological. This can't be said too many times. We stand for active ideological struggle because it is the weapon for insuring unity within the Party and the revolutionary organizations in the interests of our fight. Every Communist and every revolutionary should take up this weapon. But liberalism rejects ideological struggle and stands for unprincipled peace, thus giving rise to a decadent, philistine attitude and bringing about political degeneration in certain units and individuals in the Party and the revolutionary organizations. (Mao Tse-tung, Combat Liberalism Vol. II, Selected Works, December 1965 edition, p. 31)
We have often been too liberal in the past. We have tended to avoid sharp criticism. We didn't want to hurt feelings, or get someone angry at us. True, there is a place for tact in criticism. But tact is one thing, liberalism--avoiding ideological debate--is something else.
Unless our Party consciously takes up the job of remolding and involves every member on all levels, then simply writing about weaknesses will do little good. Of course, we all have weaknesses. And to say that is to say that we all need to deepen our ideological understanding and revolutionary commitment. But while true, it is also untrue to say, "well, we're all guilty, and we should all improve." If that is all we say, then it's a dodge. Some members are more influenced by bourgeois ideology than others. Some have been more successful in struggling against it, while in some, bourgeois individualism is so pronounced it virtually negates the positive aspects of the members and threatens to disrupt the work of the Party in the particular unit. "Active ideological struggle" is not easy. It means painful and drawn-out transformations of individuals. It means criticizing friends. It means criticizing ourselves. It sometimes means being criticized by three or four or even ten people, and paying careful attention to what each one says. It means asking for criticism instead of avoiding it. It means honestly admitting fears. It means constantly studying the political, economic and philosophical concepts which make up the ideology of revolution, and then thinking about them and trying to apply them. It's not easy. Making a revolution isn't easy.
Good criticism means self-criticism. If one does not consciously seek out his own weaknesses and attempt to improve, one cannot give consistent constructive help to others. The approach to criticism by a member of a club or a leadership body should begin with self-criticism. Unfortunately, many of us have built-in defenses, retained by years of middle-class rationalization.
One member who is particularly guilty of selfish, anti collective attitudes read an early draft of this article and responded by saying, first, "It's good." And then, almost as an afterthought, "I disagree about selfishness being caused by bourgeois society," and continued along the lines that "man is a selfish animal" and the whole pattern described by Liu Shao-chi (cited above) as "exploiting class rubbish to justify individualism." Naturally, this member diligently avoided self-criticism and change.
Criticism and self-criticism constitute the main process of inner-Party struggle to resolve the contradiction between revolutionary and bourgeois ideology within our ranks.
How shall we criticize our comrades? Here, the word comrade is used not just in the formalistic sense of Party member, which is, by the way, a definition quite alien to most people in our country, but in the truest sense-- friend, class brother and fellow-revolutionary. As we said above, most of our comrades who display tendencies of bourgeois individualism do so without bad intention. Their ideology, their attitudes, are enemies. They, as people, are not. Therefore, our criticism must be aimed at changing the comrade, at eliminating his wrong ideas and attitudes, not at driving him away. Our criticism must be aimed at reaching unity--unity based on better understanding of Marxism-Leninism, but unity.
That is the key. Both the comrade offering the criticism and the one receiving it should begin with a clear desire for unity. If either lacks this desire, if either is out to knock the other down or preserve and defend his own position, the criticism may well be wasted. Still, it's important to try. Even if the criticism is not received or given constructively, the discussion may in time lead to an honest re-evaluation with positive results.
There will always be a few who cannot, will not, improve, who refuse to change, who sink deeper into their own selfishness, who break with the Party. But we must make those as few as possible. Even in those cases, the correct handling of criticism may determine whether such persons leave the Party as enemies or as friends with whom we can continue working. We must work hard to improve every comrade. Let those determined to abandon the struggle make that decision for themselves. Sometimes the process of criticism and improvement may take a long time, during which the outcome of the struggle is in doubt. In such cases, it's necessary to reserve final judgment on the comrade in question. But let us not be anxious to write anyone off.
Here, the revolutionary movement has a great need for sensitivity. With the enemy we must be ruthless, as they are with us. But with ourselves, our comrades, our potential comrades, our allies, we must be understanding. All of us are capable of real understanding and friendship, and all of us would like to share these qualities with our comrades.
In relations with our comrades we might keep in mind Keats' plea: "Men should bear with each other more. There lives not the man who cannot be cut up, aye hacked to pieces on his weakest side."
Let us not forget that criticism includes positive as well as negative evaluation. Praising a particular member or unit for worthwhile achievements can be a big factor in improving the whole Party. Those members and groups who usually stay in the background, who do consistent, unglamorous day to day work selling papers, sealing envelopes, talking to people in the community, should be especially singled out for recognition whenever possible. Such positive examples of dedication to the working class may help our members overcome weaknesses more than negative criticism. Inter-club visits should be arranged to help members learn from the best Party groups. Appreciation for positive work must be included in the overall process of criticism.
Criticism, like everything else, contains two opposing aspects. In this case, they are the giving of criticism and receiving of criticism. Both of these opposite positions are essential to the process of criticism or self-criticism, but in determining the outcome of the process one of these is decisive: in almost every case, the receiving of criticism, or the way in which criticism is accepted, determines the success or failure of criticism or self-criticism.
No matter how badly, angrily, or subjectively criticism may be given, if the person receiving the comments has a constructive self-critical and unity-seeking approach he will be able to listen carefully, and draw out the legitimate criticism--often unexpressed in words--from the emotion. On the other hand, no matter how constructively criticism may be presented, if the one being criticized has a bad attitude, does not want unity and does not want to change, the criticism will be useless. Of course, the way in which criticism is given may affect the attitude of the receiver--a little human understanding and self-criticism will make it much easier for others to accept the criticism you offer; but in the final analysis it is that attitude of the receiver which is decisive.
Therefore, let us consider some of the most common wrong ways of receiving criticism, all of which reflect bourgeois individualism.
Some members pay little or no attention to criticism from anyone who happens to be below them on the organizational ladder. They feel it will compromise their prestige and authority. In reality, of course, it is just the opposite. By ignoring honest criticism they lose--and rightly so--both prestige or authority. When leaders have this attitude towards rank-and-file criticism they are bad leaders or even misleaders; if they maintain this attitude they have no business in leadership positions. There is no such thing as rank in the realm of criticism.
Some members will seize on the wrong manner of their critic to evade the content of the criticism; they take advantage of the weakness or inexperience of their critics, and immediately turn upon them and accuse them of "subjectivism" and other such terrible things. Sometimes people raise criticism in the heat of a situation and they don't put it forward in the best way. Of course, this usually turns people off. But even when criticism is not given in the best way, we should try to hear the criticism, evaluate its merits, and then later discuss with the person the manner in which it was given.
Some members adopt the approach of "retaliation" to assuage the wrong they think has been done them. They will listen to criticism only if the person giving it includes an equal amount of self-criticism. The sharper the criticism of them, the sharper they plan to make their retaliation. They are usually so obsessed with measuring the "equality" of the exchange that they pay only the most superficial attention to the content of the criticism. If they are denied the right to retaliate they consider it an undemocratic plot against them. This attitude, of course makes a mockery of the critical process. It is especially a danger during formal criticism meetings.
Then there are the sulkers. They consider it a grave tragedy to have a weakness uncovered and criticized, and they usually adopt a very grim look and go off in a corner and brood for a few days or weeks or even months . They don't understand that the purpose of criticism is to improve the Party through improving its members, and it's not a game of hide-and-seek where you hide your own weaknesses and seek those of others. Sulkers, for all their sulking, usually do little improving. No one can ever be quite sure whether they're trying to change themselves or just to find better hiding places for their flaws in the future.
Then there are the wrigglers and squirmers, the "lawyers" who will try to turn honest criticism into courtroom maneuvers. They will challenge some minor point in the criticism in order to obscure the essence of it: "I never used exactly those words!" They will make their statements as general, and as vague, as possible. They will claim they didn't intend to do what in fact they did. And in general they will talk about anything and everything except the concrete point of criticism which is raised. They are so desperate to salvage themselves that they often actually convince themselves they are being maligned and sometimes even that a conspiracy exists against them. They are like the six-year-old boy who is criticized for throwing a stone at his little brother. "It wasn't a stone, it was just a piece of dirt. Besides, I didn't mean to hit him, I just wanted to scare him. Besides, I didn't throw it at him, I just wanted to see if I could throw it that far." That may be a normal childish response. But how often have we found it in our own members!
Of course, everyone should defend his views as long as he honestly believes them, but the key point is that the aim of this defense--as well as the aim of the views-- must be to improve the work of the Party and the working class.
Criticism will only work if everyone has confidence in the group; if the aim of the criticism and self-criticism is to help the group. In such a situation each person will honestly admit all weaknesses and errors, even those not apparent, not try to protect himself by legalistic maneuvers or obscuring his ideas so no one will be able to tell what he really meant. Who should be so afraid of criticism? Whom are you afraid of? Your comrades? If you are so afraid of your comrades that you will go to such lengths to avoid being honest with them, and yourself, then how will you react to the enemy? The likelihood is you will react like a leaf reacts to a hurricane. On the other hand, confidence in each other and in the group will give us each the strength of our entire Party and enable us to withstand any enemy storms.
What form should criticism and self-criticism take within our Party? Here, flexibility must be the key. The form must be subordinate to the content and the spirit of the criticism. Many forms are useful.
Formal criticism meetings, or what Mao Tse-tung calls a "rectification campaign," in which the entire Party holds unit meetings to deal with a particular weakness such as bourgeois individualism, offer many advantages. First, when such meetings are announced in advance, people will spend time thinking critically about each other, about themselves, and about the ideological weakness. This is especially important when we are not--as too many of us are not--in the habit of thinking critically. Second, when the entire Party launches a "rectification campaign," members will concentrate attention and suggestions on overcoming the main weakness or obstacle to the Party's progress at a given moment. This may avoid scatter criticism, in which everything, big and little, important and unimportant, is discussed at once, and which can often be more confusing than helpful. Third, formal sessions will encourage those members who are more shy to speak out and express their views, which are often extremely valuable. In the process those more withdrawn people may begin to emerge, get more confidence in themselves, and take on more responsibility.
Of course there are dangers in formal criticism sessions. The thing can be abused. We demand too much from people too soon. Even when we try to improve, and even when we make some headway, we tend to slip back, and need constant help from our comrades. Remolding a human being first molded by 20 or 30 years of U.S. capitalism is a long process. The most we can ask is that everyone sincerely try to slowly improve.
Then, too, criticism sessions can be overdone and institutionalized into empty forms. People can begin to think of Tuesday night as Criticism Night, and beat their breasts for a couple of hours, often with incisive criticism and self-criticism, and then go home and forget about it. The Sunday morning sermon with left-wing clichés! Frankly, a good hell-and-brimstone preacher is more fun.
Finally, formal sessions may sometimes embarrass a particular person who is criticized, and make it more difficult for him to accept criticism or to criticize himself. Such attitudes are wrong and we should struggle against them. But we should understand them, and be sensitive to them. Sometimes a private informal chat or series of chats between two or three members, or between some of the leadership and a particular member produce better results than formal meetings.
Still, on the whole, a rectification campaign would be most useful for us at this time, if it is conducted constructively and with common sense. Many types of criticism meetings are possible. Sometimes each member may take turns criticizing himself and the others; or the discussion may center on one particular member; or everyone may evaluate a particular event and each member's role in it; or a particular weakness which is prevalent in the group; or a leading member may be criticized by everyone, at least as the first step.
Whatever the forms, our Party and every member of our Party should recognize the need now for criticism and self-criticism within our ranks, especially aimed at bourgeois individualism.
We must study and learn how to conduct what has come to be known as "inner-Party struggle." In the process, we must concentrate on the basic cause of weaknesses and avoid personal squabbles and mechanical criticism. We have to find ways to keep the discussions as much as possible on an ideological level, and encourage members to express and explain their policy differences whenever possible. The aim of these discussions must not be to "knock" a particular person or to remove anyone from a particular post, although occasionally such action may be necessary. As we said before, the aim of all our criticism and self-criticism must be a new unity of the Party, a unity based on more and deeper political understanding, and a firmer commitment to revolution.
Through all these weaknesses in every aspect, the overriding danger is revisionism: abandoning the international working class, substituting reform for revolution, trying to negotiate the class struggle until you negotiate yourself over to the other side. This is the enemy of the working people of the world, and those who spout this line are as dangerous as their buddies, the Washington war-makers. We must expose them and attack them at every turn, and constantly guard against this ideology within our midst.
We might just mention here the personal inner feelings involved in remolding oneself. It seems paradoxical because most of us cling so desperately to our individualism. Yet no one enjoys fighting the whole world all by himself. And anyone who has gone through discussions where he was criticized, where he recognized his weaknesses, and then improved himself, even partly, knows an exhilarating feeling of freedom--freedom from his internal self-aggravation and fear--and a new self-confidence and confidence in his comrades and in the collective composed of all of them. In that feeling we may get just a glimpse of the man of the future, the communist man, we are working to create.
No criticism, no matter how carefully presented and constructively phrased, should be expected to bring about significant changes in anyone who is isolated from political activity. Any club or group which spends so much time in criticism sessions that it never leaves the meeting room should be sharply criticized. Participation in the struggles of working people, students, farmers and others for a better life is essential in remolding our members.
Within this environment, if we can develop correct criticism in our Party we will see that our errors and weaknesses are not just bad things, but, in fact, can be transformed into good things. We will learn that without mistakes there can be no progress, and discover how to turn weakness into strength.
LACK OF PLANNING
Planlessness and pragmatism are inherent in the every-man-for-himself capitalist economy. And what leads in economics follows suit in politics and even in military action.
In practice, of course, the ruling class does its best to plan ahead, and we must not underestimate their ability to scheme. But successful planning is against their inhuman nature. So they plan for years to wage a remote-control war in Asia without involving U.S. land troops, and they wake up one morning with a quarter of a million soldiers sinking in the quicksand of aggression in Vietnam. This doesn't mean they are irrational or crazy, just that their original plan couldn't work and they were forced to make new plans--which also can't work. Even in the conduct of their military operations they find themselves, for all their computer-brains, with such chaotic situations as too many ships in one place and not enough ships in another.
Traditionally, the U.S. working class and its leaders have been just as pragmatic as our enemies--if not more so. "But there is no time," we constantly declare in excusing ourselves. "There is so much to do." And so we rush from meeting to meeting and picket line to picket line, wearing ourselves out like the proverbial headless chicken and using just about as many brains.
In our "personal lives," of course, we are capable of great planning, no matter how busy we are. Individuals develop the most intricate schemes for "getting ahead." A student will know exactly which courses he needs to take over a period of years, and which teachers are the "best" in order to achieve whatever degree he has decided upon in order then to get whatever job he is aiming at. On the job, a worker can tell you just what has to be done to achieve a promotion. And housewives are constantly preparing, and applying, the most careful plans not only to get by on inadequate incomes, but often even to save a little bit for hard times. Yet we say we are too busy to plan for our class.
The result is we run the risk of drifting along from day to day following the easiest path, which is usually the wrong path. We don't see problems or dangers which lie ahead, or if we see them we do nothing about them. In the past, faced with unforeseen developments, so-called working class parties have swung back and forth between adventurism and retreat. If the police suddenly attack a demonstration, for example, the demonstrators without a plan either fight wildly, causing needless injuries and extra arrests, or simply run away, dragging their tails behind them. Even if a plan is made for a given demonstration, r o plan is made to follow it up, to consolidate the gains, to raise the protest to a higher level, etc. More often we hear, "Well, let's see how it works out and then we'll decide what to do next."
Our Party's founding convention took a big step towards meeting this problem and provided our members with the beginnings of a realistic long-range outlook for the development of the revolutionary movement in our country. But it was only a start.
Pragmatism in our ranks is mainly an ideological problem and cannot be overcome at one meeting or by one report. We fail to plan because essentially we don't believe in planning. Also, it seems easier not to plan, and those who suffer from laziness will do the least planning. We do not really understand the necessity for planning. We thoughtlessly adopt the bourgeois approach that only God can make a plan.
It's like a football team coming out of a huddle without a play. "Just snap the ball back and we'll see what happens," says the quarterback. What happens is that you can't gain much ground with the other team piled up on top of you.
There are three main ways to overcome this lack of planning in our ranks:
MARXIST-LENINIST STUDY
To plan for change without understanding dialectical materialism, the science of change, is like planning a trip to the moon without understanding rocketry, or even basic physics.
Every single member of our party--no matter what his position--needs to study Marxism-Leninism consistently. A few have already done a great deal of reading of Marxist works. Too often, however, these few do not relate what they have read to real life. One former member used to act as if Marxism-Leninism were a series of magic words which need only to be repeated enough times to solve the problems of the world. Therefore, he would repeat the words as often as possible, usually quoting the exact formulation--and only the exact formulation--written in "The Book," and showing polite toleration for those younger people who didn't know the "Word." The result is he actually discouraged honest study and created a cynical attitude among some people towards Marxism-Leninism, which became identified with his clichés. Not all those who have studied Marxism behave in this way, of course; some can give and have given valuable assistance to our younger members.
The main obstacle to overcome in organizing the study of Marxism-Leninism is the lazy and basically contemptuous attitude towards study--all study-- which is one of the few things most of us learned in high school or college. "What will it get me?" is the unexpressed question behind most members' resistance to study. One way to deal with this problem might be to start handing out cash prizes to those who read the most pages per hour. If we run out of cash, we could offer free goulash. But perhaps we can find a better way.
Numerous good techniques are available to "enliven" the study of Marxism, and nothing's wrong--everything's right--with trying to make study as provocative and lively as possible. Such creative forms as special schools, films and debates can and should be used. Classes or study groups can he organized in which each student writes an essay on his experience in reading a particular Marxist-Leninist work, his reactions, his understanding, his questions. The subject of how to study Marxism-Leninism merits a separate article; it should deal with, among other things, our positive and negative experiences, including cadre schools.
Whatever methods are added, there is no substitute for reading basic Marxist-Leninist works including the writings of Mao Tse-tung. Here, our members should give special emphasis to studying contradictions, the kernel of change, and understanding the two aspects-- emerging and declining--of every phenomenon, and the struggle between them.
STUDY OF CONDITIONS IN OUR COUNTRY
The encyclopedia of errors committed by well-intentioned students of Marxism who mechanically tried to apply strategy and tactics based solely on experiences of revolutionaries in other countries fills many volumes. Mao Tse-tung writes again and again of the need to study "living ideas," real-life conditions in each country. In the U.S. we have an advantage because the ruling class has already organized a vast research network and publishes endless statistics, many of which are extremely valuable. These must be studied systematically. Of course, no government statistics should be accepted blindly.
In any case, no book research, no matter how thorough, can be useful unless it's combined with study through-experience, examining conditions with our own eyes. This means living with the people, workers, students, farmers, and everyone we want to influence. We must be a part of the people, not just at meetings but on the job, on the campus, and on the farm. If we don't live with the people we can't learn from the people. And if we can't learn from the people we can't teach anybody.
We should try to study one or two typical samples of a phenomenon and then generalize from them. For example, if we want to learn how big cities in our country operate, we might pick Baltimore and Denver, or any two we think are typical, and study their economies, their politics, the racketeers who run the local business interests, their connections to the national syndicates and big political bosses, monopoly interests, composition of working class, main immediate problems, wage scales, unemployment, etc., and then see if we can draw general conclusions about all or most big cities, and how to conduct the revolutionary struggle there.
Of course, no one should use "study" as an excuse for inactivity. Our day-to-day political work must be a source of and a test for our studies, as well as the reason for which we study. Study without political work is like a menu without food.
The study of concrete conditions has two main aims: to know ourselves, our class and our allies and the contradictions within us; and to know the enemy and the enemy's contradictions. If this article serves any purpose, it may help us to understand ourselves a little better. However, we have been sorely lacking so far in thorough-going studies of the enemy. In his military writings, Mao Tse-tung says that in learning the laws of war "what has to be learned and known includes the state of affairs on the enemy side and that on our side, both of which should be regarded as the object of study." (Selected Military Writings, p. 86.) Whether during a relatively peaceful period, such as the present, or otherwise, what we are studying--or should be studying--are the laws of war, class war. Understanding and taking advantage of the contradictions in the enemy is essential if we intend to plan ahead.
SYSTEMATIC SUMMARIZING AND EVALUATION OF EXPERIENCES
In our short history, we have already lived through several struggles. We have made mistakes. That is not so important. The question is, have we learned from the mistakes? Do we summarize our experiences, good and bad, our work in the South or in ghetto communities for example, and attempt to draw lessons for future work? Do we analyze our publications? Sometimes we do. But not enough. Our Party must make time for regular and systematic evaluations. Otherwise, even Marxist-Leninist theory and a study of concrete conditions in our country will not help us win. Only practice can put our programs to the true test, only the reactions of the working people and intellectuals around us.
Summarize our experience, evaluate, draw lessons, make new plans, carry them out, summarize, evaluate: on and on. But when we say summarize our experience this must be mainly experience among non-Party working people. And here we cannot be like that fat-headed politician whose only contact with the masses is looking down from a platform at a street corner meeting.
It's worth repeating several times: every Party member must have close friends outside the Party. And if a person is a friend, naturally we will share ideas on what is important to us, politics as well as baseball. Without this base at the job, the school, in the community or on the farm, no meaningful evaluation of our policies is possible. The "mass line" is the basis of effective planning. We must consciously plan to plan. We must assign ourselves time to summarize and evaluate. If the day-today rush of "business" appears too hectic to permit such meetings, then certain leading members or bodies should take a period of time together away from the big city's hustle-bustle in some area where they can spend as long as necessary--even up to a week or two or three --to summarize, evaluate, study and draw up new plans. The Party's daily functioning can continue for a while without the physical presence of these individuals (it will even give some of the newer people valuable experience in self-reliance), but the Party's long-range functioning will flounder without such sessions from time to time.
In planning, the leadership should pay careful attention to individual assignments. However, planning can not be seen as the responsibility of the leadership alone, any more than thinking. Every member should give careful thought to the Party's perspectives, take part in summarizing and evaluating experiences, and insist on a thorough understanding of his own assignment. No member should wake up in the morning and wonder what he's going to do that day. Every member should have a daily plan, which in turn is part of a weekly and monthly and one-year and five-year and ten-year perspective; each individual plan should be part of a club plan and the club plan part of an overall Party strategy.
Here it should be useful to organize the perspective by stages, setting clear-cut minimum goals for each stage, and devoting most attention to what is determined to be the major objective of each stage. For example, if the objective of one stage is to build a base in a community, we should analyze the neighborhood forces, their relative strength, stability and class outlook, then set some simple concrete goals for working with the forces we seek to develop.
Naturally, we can't make a blueprint for every minute of the day or predict exactly what will happen in the next ten weeks, let alone ten years. Our plans must be realistic and flexible. More important, we must be flexible in carrying them out, changing them when necessary, adapting to new situations, raising questions and proposing new plans. Above all, we must never plan away our boldness and enthusiasm; we must never reject initiative because "it's not in the plan." On the contrary, we must always have the initiative, launch new projects, and stay one jump (at least one) ahead of the ruling class. But none of this negates the need for planning. Revolutions don't appear magically any more than skyscrapers do.
SOME OBJECTIONS
Some members reading this may complain that the points raised, while not completely worthless, are inappropriate at best and perhaps even harmful. They may raise a number of objections.
First, they may say, this is not the time to get so introspective, to turn so much of our attention inward. We've made great strides recently; the tide of struggle is rising; the class war is sharpening; the people are on the move. If we devote all of our attention to ourselves, we will miss the boat.
The last point is obviously true. But no one proposes that we devote all our attention to ourselves--or even most of it. This is not basically a plea for more time, for a new quantity of agenda--space to be spent on self-improvement, although that should be one result. It is an argument for more consciousness, for a new quality of understanding of ourselves in order to improve our work. And it is precisely because we are currently moving forward that we must worry about our weaknesses. When we suffer defeats and failures, everyone will be sitting soberly with head in hands trying to figure out what went wrong and what to do next. That will be the time to emphasize our strengths, to fight against pessimism and defeatism. But now, when we are "rolling along," we may tend to overlook or minimize serious weaknesses, to overestimate our strength and underestimate the enemy. Everybody knows what happened to the hare in his race with the tortoise.
Let no one underestimate the effects of bourgeois ideology. What may begin with a few private dachas in a Moscow suburb very quickly becomes the restoration of Russian capitalism, complete with unemployment and official anti-semitism. Who would have imagined that the land of Lenin would one day let itself be represented by slick vodka ads in Madison Avenue magazines paraphrasing Ian Fleming's CIA story with the slogan "From Russia With Ice"? In the same way, Gus Hall's private Westchester dacha is part and parcel of the whole shameful policy under which a once-communist party mobilizes its feeble forces to help elect the most blatantly reactionary President in U.S. history.
If bourgeois ideology is permitted to get a foothold, if it is not constantly opposed in our ranks, it can spread as quickly as cancer with just as deadly results. Of course, we must keep struggling on the front lines of demonstrations, strikes, and mass movements, but we must keep improving ourselves, too.
Second, some will say these remarks are too negative. If we have all those faults we ought to give up! Here, there is a real weakness in this article. It doesn't deal with all the positive qualities which our membership and our leadership possess. It doesn't detail all the tremendous gains we have made in the past few years, and especially since the founding of our Party. By leaving those things out, it presents a one-sided picture, or it would present such a picture to those who don't know the whole story.
All right, the article is guilty of one-sidedness. But if we recognize that--and we who know the full story of our Party's development surely we don't need to read self-praise to know that we have done fairly well--then we can approach the questions raised here with a constructive attitude. It is patently ridiculous to say that if 'we have all those faults we ought to give up.' If we have those faults and we don't try to overcome them then we ought to give up. In other words, if we give up we ought to give up.
Third, some will argue that all this may be true, but there is a war on and a danger of a much bigger war at any moment. It's a crisis! An emergency! When bombs are dropping is hardly the moment to consider bourgeois individualism! If bombs are exploding around you as you are reading this, please be sure you have good shelter before going any further.
If bombs are not exploding where you are then surely it can't be much of an unusual crisis. Even where U.S. bombs have been dropping every day for years--in Vietnam--the people don't stop their work, their studying, their discussions, their criticism, or their evaluations. That is one of their great strengths.
Our organization has been in a state of crisis every day of every week of its short life. And if we are true to our revolutionary principles we should expect crisis upon crisis for the rest of our lives. By that standard, we would never get to consider bourgeois individualism. This argument is precisely the kind of lack of planning referred to above.
Actually, the sharper the crisis the better from one point of view. People are forced to face their weakness in time of emergency. Some, the weakest, will retreat from the revolution, a few will betray it. Many who have managed to conceal or ignore their inner doubts and fears will be forced to grapple with them, and some will overcome them. For those, strikes, arrests, battles, wars add steel to the makeup. There is no room for revisionism at such moments. There are only two sides and it is life or death; when you come out to fight you leave your goulash behind. The essence of the class struggle emerges to the surface.
In such a situation, the conditions of battle will do more than this or a dozen better written pieces could ever do to improve the quality of the work of those who survive. Nonetheless, if we don't prepare before the battle, most won't survive. It's as simple as that.
CAN WE SUCCEED?
By this time, not so many people as a few years ago feel the revolutionary struggle in the U.S. is hopeless. Our people have begun to show their potential. Our Party has never doubted that we can succeed. But it won't be easy. Those who think it's a snap are going to wake up one day and find themselves snapped flat on their backs We are fighting a rich and powerful enemy; this enemy is not going to permit a peaceful change; this enemy cannot win in the long run, but it can kill a lot of people in the meantime. We cannot succeed alone. We must join forces with every possible ally among the working people, black and white, students and intellectuals, farmers, and small businessmen--in other words, the overwhelming majority of our population. This cannot be done overnight, but this must be our goal. It is a necessary prerequisite for revolution. This means united fronts, united work, alliances both temporary and long range, using the contradictions in the ruling class, distinguishing the main enemy from secondary enemies, and concentrating all forces possible against that enemy. means we must utilize many organizational forms for mass action. In a ghetto area, for example in addition to a PLP club, we might have a Tenants' Union, a part-time nursery school run by a committee of mothers and older sisters, cultural workshops, a health and welfare action committee, a youth defense league, etc. This in no way means that we abandon our independent communist position, our ideological leadership of the revolutionary movement. Everything in this article presupposes the continuing of our basic line, our socialist education and our open advocacy of socialist revolution as the only solution to the problems which plague our people. We are simply saying that to win we must eventually find ways to unite the above-mentioned potentially progressive elements behind the working class. At the same time, to succeed we must ally ourselves with the world revolutionary forces, especially in Latin America, Asia and Africa.
Even with this, we won't succeed automatically. Better than the question "Can we succeed?" would be "Do we dare to succeed?" Do we really want to make a revolution? Are we willing to go all the way? That question underlies all the other points in this piece.
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For Communist Economics and Communist Power Under the Proletarian Dictatorship
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- 17 August 2023 1095 hits
For Communist
Three questions seem to define the essence of Road to Revolution IV. It is not surprising that those three questions have been the most controversial.
- Can we move to communist economic relations immediately following the seizure of power by the working class? By communist economic relations I mean "from each according to his ability, to each according to need."
- Will the Party be the ultimate holder of power during the dictatorship of the proletariat? What do we mean be "democratic centralism?"
Should such a system of communist economic relations, while still maintaining a dictatorship of the proletariat, a state with law, armies, etc., be called "socialist" or "communist" or something else?
WHEN CAN COMMUNIST ECONOMIC RELATIONS BE ESTABLISHED? WHEN SHOULD THEY?
. The main argument against moving immediately to communist economic relations is that we supposedly could not win enough members of the working class to support such a system. The argument has been raised that it is idealist and anti-materialist to assume that workers will support communist relations when it has not yet been proved to them, by virtue of having a long period of state ownership of the means of production with differences in living standards still being maintained within the society.
An important point to remember is that giving more to one group of people necessarily means that another group of people will get less. The policy of "to each according to work" would mean that those who are unable to work would not enjoy as high a standard of living as those who are able to work harder. Handicapped people would presumably not have the same standard of living as engineers. Racial minorities generally have worse health under capitalism and would continue to suffer the effects of that capitalist oppression after a revolution. Adopting a policy of "to each according to work" would end up maintaining racial discrimination. It would also discriminate in favor of the physically strong and those who, for one reason or another, are able to contribute what others, at least at that point, might not be able to.
Some people might say that we are destroying the aspirations of those who want to "better themselves" by working a little harder and getting a little more. But that is just a new, revisionist version of the same old capitalist argument against communism -- that it doesn't allow the individual to express himself or herself. This argument poses as pro-human, pro-people, but in fact it is reactionary garbage. After a revolution, do any of us want to look some section of the working class directly in the face and explain why they are living at a lower standard of living than another group within the society?
Besides, for some time after a revolution we would concentrate our efforts on destroying the capitalists all over the rest of the world. We want to win the working class of the U.S. to ally with the working class of the rest of the world. We do not want to win the working class of the U .S. to an attitude of "we got ours" or to the idea, that immediate material gains are what revolution is all about. Pushing that idea is just pushing nationalism, and that will inevitably take the form of some kind of racism against other workers. We must win U.S. workers to see that it is in their interest to help other workers overthrow their bosses, and that, otherwise, workers' rule in the U .S. will be overthrown. To permit inequality violates internationalism.
Many people might agree with the goal of equality, but still say that the rest of the working class can't be won to it, that it is idealist to think that people can be won by "moral" arguments.
There is a false debate going on, using the terms "material" incentives, versus "moral or political" incentives. The correct way to discuss this is "communist, collective, material, moral and political incentives" versus "capitalist, selfish, individualistic material incentives." We are not against improving the material lives of the working class. We are not pushing some nonsense religion. Those who argue that our appeal for communist incentives and against selfish-material incentives is an idealist, anti-materialist demand should know that they are making a phony argument. We are simply saying that it is wrong, it is deceptive, and it reinforces capitalism, to promise all kinds of immediate goodies to people.
We know that the power of the working class can create a world far more incredible, fantastic, magnificent, than all the science-fiction writers in the world could dream up together. This world will unlock the vast power of the human brain to create a world where the lifespan will be increased and other material changes will take place. But that is very different from promising people a color TV, or even steak, shortly after the revolution. Besides, capitalism breeds war, disease, etc. Eliminating those horrors on the way to a new world is, unquestionably, a very strong material incentive.
We are for communism because it works better. This is a very materialist argument. We will have better human relations, we will have a better material life, a better science, etc. under a communist system. We understand this materialist argument. Why do some people persist in thinking that other people cannot be won to this materialist argument?
This brings up a whole series of questions relating to the question "How are people won to communism?" and, in a broader sense, "What causes social change?" There is clearly a contradiction within Marx's and Engels' writing on this question.
Lenin had a contradictory line on nationalism, and we in PLP made the decision to adopt the "internationalist/dictatorship of the proletariat" side of the contradiction, rather than the "sometimes nationalist struggles can weaken imperialism" side. We feel that the side we have chosen is more consistent with the essence of Marx's and Engels' writings, but in any case that it is the principled position to take. Those revisionists who take Lenin's writings as the Bible, to be quoted word for word, were angry with us -- it was funny to watch them go through mental gymnastics trying to deal with the obvious contradictions within Lenin's line.
Well, Marx had contradictions within his work, too. It is thoroughly "Marxist" -- that is to say, scientific -- to acknowledge that Marx had contradictions. Road to Revolution IV does make a clean break with an aspect of Marx's line. There is no way to soft-pedal this difference. We are saying flat out that we disagree with some of Marx's writings.
One contradiction in Marx's writings centers on the question of how consciousness develops, the relationship of productive forces to consciousness. This has been discussed at length in several Party bulletins and issues of PL Magazine, but it is still a fundamental question that ties directly into Road to Revolution IV. One side of the contradiction says that "communism will win because it works better; it is the best system for organizing human society, and people can be won to that understanding.
The other side' of the contradiction emphasizes the stages, of human society, and implies that each succeeding stage inevitably had to follow the previous stage of history. Each later stage of history was able to unlock more productive forces and the subordinate class was able to ally itself with the kind of system that would allow the productive forces to develop and produce more things for people, Consistent with this second side of the contradiction is the notion, very common in radical theory that "socialism will produce so many good things for so many people that the working class, and indeed, all of society, will see that collectivism works better than private ownership for producing things, and therefore there will be no reason to steal or to exploit because everyone will have everything that they need and there would be no reason to restore capitalism."
Each revolutionary class throughout history was, supposedly, won to its revolutionary position by seeing how the revolution could produce more things, a better world, for itself than the previous system. In this view, this is true for the working class as well, in its drive for communism.
IS COMMUNISM BETTER BECAUSE IT PRODUCES MORE?
The second argument, which I'll call the "abundance" argument, has a certain amount of truth to it, but if taken too narrowly, it is simply wrong. Each successive system may have worked better than the system it replaced, but communism works better than any of them! The abundance argument has at least two basic problems:
- Who is to say what "abundance" really is? Many working-class people in the U.8. probably live at a higher standard of living than Marx might have predicted -- better health care, longer life span, shorter workday, indoor plumbing, electricity, cars: etc. Of course, a nuclear war can erase all that, but even if nuclear war were not imminent we would say that the U.8. working class needs a communist revolution. All of those material things constitute "abundance" on one level, yet we know that it is not enough, because we know of the potential for a better world. We also know that most of the world doesn't even have a fraction of what many U.S. workers have. But even if the whole world lived at this relatively "abundant" level, we would still be fighting to smash the system. The "abundance" by itself does not, and cannot, eliminate selfishness and class divisions.
- The other side of the coin is that there is always the possibility for more, and for better lives. There will always be some surplus to fight over if people believe that fighting for themselves selfishly is the key to success. In an immediate sense there are always limits. Even if technology produced a world where most people lived to be 200 years old with little illness, we would fight to overthrow that system if there were a group within that society exploiting and suppressing the productive, creative potential of another class within that world. There will never be "enough." There is always better and always more that can be achieved.
So the idea that achieving a certain high material level of society will automatically eliminate class antagonisms and contradictions is simply not true. Relative deprivation, not deprivation alone, is the driving force in the class struggle. Seeing the difference between the potential and the immediate will inspire humankind to try to better control nature for centuries after communism is achieved. The way that selfishness stands in the way of this is what wins people to accept communism. Some vaguely defined notion of "abundance" to be achieved by a rearrangement of society is not sufficient. No matter how high the level of society, some people will continue to steal from other people unless the communist way of life is understood by the members of society to be the best way, and fought for and ingrained in the culture and daily lives of that society. Goodies won't eliminate greed.
In fact, even the scenarios of "abundance" are incorrect projections of the possibilities under capitalism, because capitalists must seek maximum profits, which means the maximum level of exploitation of the working class that they can get away with. Therefore, the whole idea of a capitalist society where "everyone has enough" (whether by the standards of Marx's time or of today) but some people have more than enough is impossible.
People will be won to communism, then, not by the promise of a specific set of personal material gains, but rather by an understanding that capitalism always breeds horrors such as war, and that communism holds the potential for a future of better physical, mental, and emotional health, a future of unlimited scientific development for the betterment of all people -- including, probably, most people alive today. But even if it takes longer, we'll fight because we know that we will win someday; the alterative is to be a part of this filth or a helpless victim of it.
Communism, as broadly defined by Marx, is the best way to organize the world, and has always been the best way to organize the world.
This is not saying that the world could have moved to Marxist communism in 800 A.D. The ideology, the scientific understanding that this was the best way to run the world, had not been developed among enough people, But even then it would have been the best way to run the world if it could have been done. Are we saying that the world could have moved from what Marx called "primitive communism" to the kind of world communism that we want? No, because consciousness had not developed sufficiently. Each successive political-economic system -- slavery, feudalism, capitalism -- unlocked more and more science, enabling more and more people to see the contradiction between the way that society was being run and the way society could be run.
The great progressive historical function of capitalism was to make it possible for enough people to finally understand the scientific truth that communism works best. In particular, capitalism was especially useful in weakening the hold of religion,
Communism is the best way to organize the world. It has always been the best way to organize the world. |
superstition and fatalism as an anti-scientific set of ideology that prevented people from seeing the scientific truth that communism works best. But it was not the level of productive forces in themselves that created the social change.
Consider the following case. If a group of teenagers were dropped off on an uninhabited island with nothing but stone tools, what would be the best, most humane, most productive political-economic system to: set up? The answer is communism! Would anyone say that they should first go through a period of slavery, then small farms and nomadic wandering and then later feudalism, and then capitalism and monopoly capitalism before they could realize that a system of "from each according to ability, to each according to need" is the system that would give the best life to the group members and allow the society to move forward? Of course not! Communism would obviously be the best system to set up.
Primitive communism was not Marxist communism. It was saturated with unscientific perceptions about how the world worked. It was not the "low level of the material life" that made primitive communism unable to develop directly into Marxist communism -- it was the lack of consciousness, There was gravity before scientists gave it a name; there was fire before people learned how to make fire; and two people working together could produce more and better goods for both of them even before they understood it. And communism is, and was, the best, most humane, most efficient, most productive way to set up the world -- whether or not enough people understood that, and were willing to fight for it to make it come true.
Is this a denial of Marx's basic notion that capitalism was once historically progressive? No. It is true that capitalism was historically progressive because it smashed feudalism, especially the feudal myths and superstitions that were believed by many, and which stood in the way of seeing the raw exploitation that was going on, or of seeing the tremendous power of socially-organized labor. Capitalism, especially industrial capitalism, used the collective talents of the laboring classes in a qualitatively more profound and obvious way than any previous system, hence revealing the truth about collective approaches to production better and to more people. But even in a world without electricity, railroads, automobiles and large factories, communism would still be the best system to set up. The key question is one of consciousness -- "what would it take for people to understand this truth'?"
It is not even certain that capitalism was even "historically progressive" after 1848. The Communist Manifesto smashed through the lies and myths and laid the basis for the massive workers' movements that followed. Since then, and even today, probably 80 to 90 percent of all the people in the world have been grappling with the concepts of socialism and communism in a generally favorable way: trying to understand if it can work, and how, etc. Even in our daily lives, we see many examples of "to each according to need" being practiced by working-class people. When someone holds the door open for you, they don't usually say, "Well, you owe me one." Soldiers fight and die, workers go off to work and ruin their health at miserable jobs for their families, parents work their butts off trying to raise their kids properly, neighbors babysit in a crisis -- all this, not expecting to be paid back, but rather for some notion that people working together produces a better world. Sure, there are many counter-examples, but the fact is that a communist way of living is not so totally unnatural or against the grain of everyday life as the cynics argue.
Well, if it is true that communism would be best, we should say it! Period. Why settle for inequality, which absolutely will open the door to first just differences and then real classes, and eventually war, etc.? After a cancer is cut out of a body, would the doctor decide to reimplant just a bit of cancer on the theory that the body might have gotten used to the cancer and would not be prepared for the shock of a cancer-free life? Capitalism is that cancer.
In summary, moving directly to communist economic relations is allied with one aspect of Marx's theory, but is in clear contradiction to another part. We are holding to the line of communism, but we are rejecting the notion, which Marx sometimes stated, that "abundance" would somehow create a world where stealing would cease to be because everyone would have all they need. Hell, the rich capitalists have the most abundance, and they are the biggest crooks of all -- they never get enough!
The key to holding onto the egalitarian communist society is to win enough people to understand and be willing to fight for the principle that our lives would be much worse if society were based on inequality. This will mean that we will have to make fantastic changes in the area of culture, as well as economics. Capitalist culture screws people up. A man might not like to wash dishes, but enjoy cleaning and sharpening tools, for example. An autoworker might hate the job, but enjoy working on his or her own car. A student might hate writing a paper for school, but enjoy writing a letter to Challenge! What makes us like what we like and hate what we hate is only partly based on physical/material issues. Nobody likes pain, but most people actually enjoy activity that can be physically strenuous -- if we are not alienated from that labor. Alienation does not have to do with something being unpleasant; it has to do with thinking that our effort, our activity, is not going for something that we feel is worthwhile. It might seem useless, or worse yet, it might seem that someone is taking our labor or time away from us and we, or people we love and care about are getting no benefit from it. Sometimes we wrongly feel alienated from something we should put more effort into, such as thinking that a certain political activity is "not really worth it" because "nothing will come of it" when really that activity, especially building strong personal-political ties with fellow workers, students and neighbors, is extremely important in the long run.
Capitalism defines us mainly as workers, but capitalism would like us to see ourselves mainly as consumers, in competition with other workers for goods. We are supposed to feel pride, self-esteem, in what we own and how much we consume -- to feel good if we have a newer car or bigger house than our neighbor. We are supposed to look at other workers as a means, as objects to manipulate in order to get what we want. Taken to the extreme, this produces thieves, rapists and killers who feel good about hurting other people. All capitalists, big and small, say they are against this, but they foster these basic cultural and philosophical ideas that lay the basis for these extremes. All of them do the same thing -- use workers as means, as objects to exploit for profit.
We have to reject all this garbage, and we have to win the working class to look upon all this as total garbage. Of course we want a better material life for people. But why feel pride if the bosses sucker you into wanting to own, or consume or look or act according to phony standards they set up precisely to blind us? A person with a very expensive car is not "freer;" running around with many women does not make a man "free" -- they are both prisoners, compulsively trying to overcome their insecurity, alienation, by trying to be "in." Who needs this crap? ,
We can, and will, win ourselves, and the working class, to a communist line. This line would not look with envy on someone
Inequality will open the door first to differences, and then classes, and finally to defeat. |
who gets a luxury of some sort. On the contrary, just as in war-ravaged China and Russia, people would way, "who the hell is he or she to have all this extra when others are suffering?" The section of the working class that would not be the beneficiaries of inequality would be the source of power to prevent any group from getting more than the rest. We will rely on that section of the working class to prevent inequality from taking hold.
Eliminating the wage system will be very important. It would be impossible to create the system described above, especially the culture, if a wage system were maintained. A wage system would still necessarily have to maintain inequality. Furthermore, while it would still be possible to steal and exploit under a non-money system, the existence of money makes it much easier to steal, exploit, charge interest, etc., and it makes it much easier to hide this robbery .All living creatures are consumers; what makes us human is our productivity. People want to be productive in a non-alienated way. Communism will offer this to the human race, and I believe that the human race can, and will, choose this over the false promises inequality and selfishness offer, which always lead to exploitation, war and misery for the overwhelming majority.
SHOULD THE PARTY BE THE ULTIMATE HOLDER OF POWER?
The second major point that some people raised in opposition to Road to Revolution (lV) had to do with what form the dictatorship of the proletariat will take. Road to Revolution IV asserts boldly that the Party would be the ultimate organizational expression of working class power, in addition to its primary role as political and ideological leader. This worried some people who felt that power concentrated in the hands of the party would automatically create a situation such as happened in the USSR, where the party became a new ruling class. Question\ included:
- How will the party deal with dissent?
- Will the party allow "freedom of expression" for people who disagree with the party?
- How will the working class protect itself from the party if the party becomes corrupt? .
- If the party commands a standing army, will it be easier for a corrupt party to suppress the working class?
- Who will have the final say?
The heart of the question is whether the party should make the basic decisions that run society, or whether some other group should make those decisions. To clear away the smoke, the real issue is the issue of "democratic centralism:" How do we guarantee that we can have centralism -- the will of the working class being carried out by all members -- while preventing a corrupt group from using centralism in an anti-working class way? Will a group of non-party people be allowed to have ultimate power over the decisions of the party if there is a disagreement? If there is no disagreement, then this issue is never going to come to a head. But if there is disagreement, should the party be allowed to use the threat of force in order to have its decisions carried out?
There is a false argument often used in discussing the role of centralism. Some people argue that the value of centralism is in its efficiency, but that this efficiency must be balanced off against some form of protection for the majority -- hence "democratic" centralism. "Democratic centralism" is seen as a "unity of opposites" – a combination of democracy and centralism where each of them is used to prevent the other from going to the extreme. "Too much democracy would not be efficient, but too much centralism would lead to suppression of the rights of the people." This whole line of thinking is completely wrong!
It pretends to be dialectical, but is actually, in Lenin's words, "eclectic" -- another way of saying that it tries to solve a basic problem of struggle not by seeing how different forces interact and transform each other but rather by simply borrowing a little from one, a little from the other, and coming up with something that is not really accurate at all. Let us break down the two words -- "democratic" and "centralism" -- and see what is meant, or should be, by those terms.
The word "democratic" used in the context of "democratic centralism" is used in different ways. One meaning is that there should be full discussion of a proposal before a decision is made. Another meaning is that decisions should be made in the interests of the working class, and in a way that not only will benefit the working class, but also train more and more working-class people to contribute to the running of the society. A third meaning sometimes given to "democratic" is that there should be some sort of formal institutionalized process, usually some sort of voting, that should be done before a decision is finally made.
The word "centralist" means that after a decision is made, everyone should work to carry it out, whether or not they agreed with the decision. Furthermore, within the context of the party, it means that discussion and disagreement are allowed, but that it must be done in an open way, not in a secret way. Members cannot form private groups that hold private, closed meetings to discuss how to undermine a decision. Disagreements should be discussed only in the context .of party meetings. Otherwise, the member is saying that his highest loyalty is not to the party, but to a small group of associates.
I personally do not like the term democratic" here. I think that it means too many things to too many different people. I prefer the term "communist centralism" because that gives a political-economic content to centralism -- it means that all centralism is for the purpose of building a society free of privilege and exploitation, based on "from each according to his ability, to each according to need." and developing the consciousness of the people to be able to implement that. In any case, the first definition of "democratic" given above doesn't help clear the air at all. Everybody should agree with the idea that there should be full discussion as much as possible before a decision is made, so the first definition does not reveal the differences that people have on democratic centralism and how society should be run.
The second meaning is the one that I prefer. Decisions should be made that are to the benefit of the working class of the world, and that will encourage and develop greater and greater numbers of workers to take more of an active interest and participation in helping make the decisions. However, everybody who claims to be a communist, certainly all party members, would probably agree with this as well, so this definition also does not help reveal the differences.
The third meaning, that there should be some sort of voting process that is absolutely binding, and that has the final say, is where the controversy comes forward the sharpest. Road to Revolution IV says explicitly that the leadership, the party, wants to encourage direct working-class transformation of the society and direct working-class leadership of the society, but that, when push comes to shove, in an ultimate sense, the power of the society should rest in the hands of the party, rather than in the hands of a non-party group, or some sort of coalition between the party and non-communist forces.
Those who disagreed with the Road to Revolution IV formulation said that democracy is supposed to give the most freedom to the greatest number, and that the party would be going against democracy if the party carried out some policy without a vote of the masses or against the will of a vote of the masses. Other give a second, related, argument, that says the masses will need some sort of official institutional protection against the party, some sort of institutional system of checks and balances against the party becoming corrupt, since corrupt parties are what rule the USSR, etc., today, and that voting-type procedures are a way to keep a small group of people from using power in a corrupt way.
ARE DEMOCRACY AND VOTING REALLY 'DEMOCRATIC'?
The issue really boils down to: "What if there is a contradiction between the second definition of democracy (decisions made to further communism -- to each according to need, etc.) and the third definition of democracy (some sort of shared power arrangement)?" Some people have said that in that case, the party should back down, give people the opportunity to learn, to make their own mistakes if necessary, even if it might harm themselves somewhat, because the "democratic procedure" is more important than the actual outcome or decision." This sounds very nice, but what if the supposed will of those people involved in that shared power-type situation will result in serious damage to some other sections of the working class? Is the party supposed to abide by some sort of decision that might result in the oppression of some other group of workers?
A fundamental problem with these "shared power/voting, etc." formulations is that they allow for very undemocratic, anti-communist or anti-working-class oppression against some segment of the working-class, and they provide a "democratic" cover to justify it. Specifically, if the students on a campus vote to allow the CIA to recruit on campus, would that be democratic? Of course not! The oppressed working classes of El Salvador, Iran, Africa, etc. didn't get to vote! Suppose the working class, under a dictatorship of the proletariat, decides to support the oppression of workers in another country, or to disagree with a party decision to put off raising the standard of living at home in order to help the working class in another country, based on selfish or nationalist ideas. Would it be "democratic" for the party to go along with that nationalist-selfish wish? Who gets to vote? Would we let religious nuts vote -- people who may not have committed a crime like the KKK, but are clearly wrong, and thinking in a dangerous way? Would KKKers vote? If not, then who makes the decision? If the party decides who will vote, then it still boils down to the same thing.
The heart of the question: Should the Party make the basic decisions, or should some other group make them? |
How will the masses understand the issues? Through the media? Who will run the media? Would these people really have the most power, and could they become a corrupt group if they have the power to describe and define the issues and/or the "candidates?" Who would you trust? Who could you trust?
The problem with "shared power/democratic procedures, etc." as the guarantee against small group power-corruption is that it is no guarantee against that sort of corruption. The main problem with anti-centralism is not that it is "inefficient, but democratic." The problem with it is that it is not particularly democratic. If the party does not assert power, and control power for the purpose of building a society based on "from each according to ability, to each according to need," communism, an end to oppression, war, and privilege, which will result in the most freedom (and the most "things") for virtually everyone, then some other group will assert power for some other purpose, namely special privilege, capitalist oppression, etc. All class society is a dictatorship. If communists, fighting for communism and all that that means, do not hold power in an ultimate sense, after all the steps are taken to ensure mass discussion, then some other group will seize power! They will certainly not play by those formalistic "fake-democratic" rules, or they will distort those rules. In any case, the class struggle will still rage, and there is no reason for the communists to refrain from fighting to win.
"Centralism" is not the opposite of "democracy" (used in the second sense of pro-communism, most freedom for the working class, etc.) One does not "balance" the other. On the contrary, without centralism, there is no such thing as "democracy! "Would it be democratic to let one town hold up the water supply to another, if the voters agree to? Of course not! The working class of the world, not some small fraction, should be the decider; and yes, the party should make those decisions in
The real contradiction in democratic centralism is between individualism and collectivism. |
the interests of the working class of the world. Otherwise, the other so-called democratic procedures simply allow some small group to assert their will over the need of all. There's nothing democratic about that!
The real contradiction in democratic centralism is not between democracy and centralism. It is between individualism, or special-group loyalty, and collectivism, or what is good for the working class as a whole.
The job of the communist party -- PLP -- is to grasp what is good for the working class as a whole and then to make certain that it is carried out. The party can only do that by winning millions of workers to communist ideas. If the party fails to do this, in the long run it will not understand what is in the interest of the world's working class. It will become a "special group" itself. But during the process of winning the world's workers to communism, the party's duty is to make sure no policies are put into effect which go against the interests of the working class no matter what kind of pseudo-democratic procedures were used to arrive at those policies.
This brings up the question "Well, who appointed the PLP to speak for the working class of the world? How do you know that you are right?" Well, we're certainly going to make some mistakes, but what's the alternative? To go around thinking that we're wrong? To run slowly towards the exit of a burning building because we are not quite sure that it is the right exit? To encourage what Lenin called "spontaneity," which means just letting people do "what comes naturally?" As Lenin pointed out, virtually nothing comes "naturally" except breathing; the idea of letting people "do what comes naturally" simply means letting all the other influences in their lives, developed by capitalism and capitalist culture, make up their minds. Some people who worry about "cramming communism down people's throats" don't realize that the bosses are cramming capitalism down people's throats. Our only hope is to win masses to fight voluntarily for communism. Doing that would be a prerequisite for revolution, anyhow. But should those who oppose it be allowed to exercise a dictatorship over those who are pro-communist? There's nothing wrong with those who understand the necessity for communism banding together, forming an organization to fight, with their lives, for communism. Certainly, there is a danger in claiming to speak for the working class of the world -- but that danger is not avoided by refusing to give strong leadership. In fact, the danger is compounded.
COMMUNIST CENTRALISM OR CAPITALIST CENTRALISM
There are such things as anti-communist forms of centralism, of course. All forms of centralism that do not aim at carrying out a policy in the interest of the world's working class are really capitalist. But all of the authoritarian relations in capitalist society are centralist. In fact, only in the Party do we experience real democracy, though small groups of workers often act in democratic ways among themselves.
It is true that proclaiming ourselves "spokespeople or leaders of the world working-class movement" can be used to justify special privileges. That is why the first part of this essay emphasized that the mass, public commitment to communism is the best guarantee against this sort of corruption taking place. We must be on absolute guard against corruption in the party; we must win the party rank and file, and the working class in general, to be super-sensitive and vigorous in fighting this danger of corruption. Also, we must win the most dedicated and committed workers by the millions to be the members and leaders of the party. But weakening the party is not the way to do this.
Centralism is the expression of the most freedom for the most people, if you believe that communism is the hope of the future, and freedom is defined by the quality and quantity of social relations. Using that definition of democracy, centralism is the best, the only, expression of democracy. Opposing communist centralism will simply lead to capitalist centralism. The choice is not chaos or centralism -- it is communist centralism or capitalist centralism.
There is nothing "humanistic" about asserting individual freedom in contrast to communism, or to centralism. Marx correctly pointed out that we all will have the most freedom, and live the best lives, if we dare to interlock our lives with those of other people. People are not a burden; they are a source for finding better and better solutions to the world's problems. Functioning in a collective way, accepting the discipline of the party that is fighting for communism, fighting for and practicing centralism -- these are not denials of our freedom. Our humanity comes from our ability to shape and control our destinies, and this we can best do by functioning collectively. This is what communism brings, and this is what centralism -- which is thoroughly consistent with communism -- means.
If we are fighting in the interests of the working class of the world, then centralism -- communist centralism -- is the organizational expression of the best form of human relations, and is the best organizational form for the party and for society. If the party is not fighting in the interests of the working class of the world, then this question is not important; then the important question is how to either straighten out the party or to smash it. Weak control is no protector against corruption.
So why should we lie and pretend that we are for some sort of shared power, when we, as everyone else, would resort to violence if we thought that enemies might come to power? Let's say it loud and clear: Centralism is not a "necessary evil;" it is the best expression of the most freedom for the working class of the world, and it is the best form of human relations -- making an agreement and sticking: to it.
THE QUESTION OF THE ARMY
This ties into questions that have been raised about the idea of a standing army after the revolution. A professional army has been an important tool for revisionists to control and then to use against the working class. The only ultimate protection against this is the political understanding of the masses, including the masses of soldiers. Until capitalism is destroyed throughout the world, the working class, living under the dictatorship of the proletariat, must be armed (except, of course, for right-wingers and known enemies) and organized into local militias. We will also need a professional army, people who are trained fighters, who can handle sophisticated weaponry, and are prepared to go to the assistance of the militias or to the aid of workers elsewhere. The bosses and: their agents will attempt comebacks, and workers will still be fighting for revolution in other areas. With the Red Army, as with every other aspect of post-revolutionary life, the best check against corruption is ideological training and commitment. Additionally, we might consider not having the forts out on prairies and in the woods the way the U.S. bosses do, to try to isolate the soldiers from the rest of the working class. But to say that we should not have some people whose job it is to be well-trained professional soldiers in a world where capitalists will be trying to destroy our struggle for communism would be to set ourselves up for defeat.
How long will the dictatorship of the proletariat last before it finally "withers away?" I don't know. Perhaps more than 200 years and less than a million. No one knows, and no one can really even begin to imagine what life will be like after a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand years of communist economic relations. We need to avoid predictions where we have no basis for them; all we can say is that it will be a long period.
ECONOMIC SYSTEM |
POLITICAL SYSTEM |
|
SOCIALISM |
Wages system; wages given ‘according to work’; inequality accepted although this will supposedly disappear with ‘abundance’ for all | Dictatorship of proletariat led by party; still need laws, armies, jails, to prevent capitalists from rebuilding capitalism |
COMMUNISM |
Wage system abolished and replaced by communist distribution – ‘From each according to ability, to each according to need’ – egalitarianism |
No more state; all human relations voluntary. All disagreements settled without having to use force because everyone wants to preserve communism as the best way of life. |
WHY WE FIGHT FOR COMMUNISM, NOT FOR SOCIALISM
During the discussion of Road to Revolution IV among the party and friends, many raised the question of whether communism was the right name for the system we want to set up right after the revolution, because it's not quite the same as what Marx meant by the word. On the other hand, it is also not what was usually meant by socialism. In classical Marxist- Leninist writing, the terms "socialism" and "communism" usually had the meanings shown in the chart above.
Road to Revolution IV says that we want to build a society based on a combination of the two elements shown in heavier type above. Those who wanted to call it "socialism" to describe this point out that if we call it "communism" that would not be accurate because we would still have "a dictatorship of the proletariat; supposedly this definition would be contrary to what Marx and Lenin meant and would lead to confusion.
On the other hand, those who favored using the word "communism" pointed out that what we are talking about is qualitatively different from what has "been called "socialism." We are making a sharp, clear break with a basic aspect of Marxist-Leninist practice, and much of Marxist-Leninist writing, although, as we pointed out earlier, there is much in Lenin, and especially in Marx, that is consistent with what we are saying in Road to Revolution IV.
The reason for using a particular term is to have a certain effect on the world, and not because sound has any intrinsic meaning. We should use words in order to convey the clearest meaning. Use of the word "socialist" would not be as clear as "communist" in making it understood that we want to set up communist economic relations based on need. When you want to make a point very sharply, especially a break from an established way of thinking, it can certainly be useful to use different terms.
Actually, Engels wrote that when he and Marx were writing the Manifesto, they explicitly chose to use the word "communist" rather than call it the "Socialist Manifesto" because even though they were talking about replacing capitalism with socialism, the word "socialist" was being used by so many phonies and nuts that it was important to find some way to clearly differentiate their line from those of the others who were calling themselves "socialists." The Bolsheviks changed the name of their party from "social-democratic" to communist in 1918 for the same reason.
As far as mixing people up because of the other definition of "communism" as being the society after the need for violence, jails, laws, etc. is over, I believe that those who read will understand pretty clearly that we are not making the idealist-anarchist mistake of believing that such a society could be set up immediately, The role of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Party in maintaining the system is unmistakable in our Manifesto.
Incidentally, there are many times when Marx, Engels, and Lenin used the term "communist" to describe a system that still had a dictatorship of the proletariat, although that was not their most common usage. One example is in The State and Revolution, one of the basic classics, that discusses the transformation of capitalism into dictatorship of the proletariat and the eventual "withering away of the state." Lenin has a whole section using the word "communism" interchangeably with a society that still has dictatorship of the proletariat. So, if Lenin was not so totally rigid in his use of the word "communism," I don't think it would be a mortal sin against dialectical materialism if we were to use the term communism as meaning a society with communist economic relations.
I favor the use of the word "communism." I think it is very important for us to convey the sharpness of our break with the old movement on the question of establishing communist economic relations immediately after seizing power. "Communism" may not be the most accurate term, but for our purposes it is far more accurate and clear than "socialism."
Of course, the most important questions now become "How do we live our lives now? What are the implications of Road to Revolution IV? And, How do we turn the potential of a new life for all workers into a reality?"
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Jailbreak! Dialectical Materialism: The Key To Freedom and Communism
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- 16 August 2023 866 hits
This pamphlet is based on the experience of leaders and members of the Progressive Labor Party over the last 50 years. It reflects the struggle to learn from but not repeat the mistakes of the old communist movement. It is a modest contribution to the ceaseless development of the science of dialectical materialism.
- You don't know it, but you're in jail!
- PHILOSOPHY AND BOSSES' DICTATORSHIP
- APPEARANCE AND ESSENCE
- PHILOSOPHY: THE STUDY OF SOMETHING REAL
- LAWS AND UNIVERSALITY
- IDEAS COME FROM THE REAL WORLD AND FROM PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE
- MATERIALISM vs. IDEALISM
- THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY CHANGE
- LIMITS
- POLITICAL PRACTICE BROADENS THE PARTY'S LIMITS
- NOTHING'S SIMPLE
- SAMENESS AND DIFFERENCE
- SOCIALISM LOST - COMMUNISM FOUND
- BOSSES' IDEAS AND ONE-SIDEDNESS
- BOILING WATER, FRYING THE BOSSES, AND THE UNITY OF OPPOSITES
- RESOLVE CONTRADICTIONS BY SHARPENING THEM
- THE INTERNAL IS PRIMARY
- CONTRADICTION IS EVERYWHERE, BUT FRIENDS AREN'T ENEMIES
- QUANTITY AND QUALITY
- TWO LAWS...WITH MORE TO COME
- THE THIRD LAW: NEGATION
- OUR PARTY IS LENIN'S CHILD
- FREEDOM: A CLASS QUESTION
You don't know it, but you're in jail!
Not a jail with bars, but another kind, in which our minds are imprisoned by capitalism. Capitalist ways of thinking surround us. The schools, the cultural outlets, like TV, the press, books, music, movies, you name it, bombards us with the wrong ideas. All ruling class media push anti-communism, racism, patriotism, male chauvinism (sexism), and a host of other rotten ideas. But as bad as it is, the toothpaste ad culture is not the worst. The worst is not so obvious.
Basically, the system trains us to think very little, superficially, or not at all. Capitalist training leads us to have a shallow view of things, to make one-sided, subjective, narrow judgments, and not to understand the essential nature of developments or processes. Therefore, the best of us make too many mistakes and don't necessarily learn from our mistakes or others'.
The drug culture and, of course, drugs themselves are more weapons in the rulers' arsenal in case we act to break the chains that bind us to capitalism. Even if we recognize the evils of capitalist society, we are often not prepared to fight it on a long-term or life-long basis.
Religion remains one of the rulers' primary weapons for controlling our minds. Taking advantage of people's desire to understand what society and life are all about, religion tells us we can control our own destiny through prayer and ritual. This mystical idea is the kernel of religion. Religion's role is to make sure that we respect the status quo. What is belief in the status quo? The ruling class holds power and should keep it. Basically, the bosses want us to accept our fate and not question it. Surely, they don't want us to do anything about it, like take matters into our own hands. The rulers and their Holy Men want us to console ourselves with the prospect of a better "hereafter."
PHILOSOPHY AND BOSSES' DICTATORSHIP
All ruling class philosophy, whether it be religion or anything else, works to maintain ruling class political power. Most college students who are forced to study philosophy in school think it's bullshit. Many students know that what they are taught in school under the heading of philosophy has little if any relation to the real world. The bosses don't want us to understand the real world.
They don't want us to realize that the wrong class is in power and should be destroyed along with its state apparatus. The last thing the rulers want is for us to understand that workers should hold power through the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. The bosses want us to believe that the misery of capitalist oppression is our own fault, that something is wrong with us and not with their system of profits and exploitation.
The rulers do everything they can to keep things as they are. Consequently, they work overtime to prevent workers from developing an objective outlook and seeing the real world. By "objective," we don't mean neutral. As the old song about striking coal miners, "Which Side Are You On?" says, there are no neutral ideas.
The ruling class opposes changes and resorts to mass terror in order to keep things their way if all their horseshit fails. Fascist terror is the logical consequence of capitalism. In the final analysis, the mailed fist is all the bosses have to offer. But they try to keep us hooked as long as possible on their philosophical drugs.
APPEARANCE AND ESSENCE
Over thousands of years, many people have learned the hard way that things aren't always as they seem. What is the first thing you see when you look at an object, a person, any process? You got it! You see the outer, the surface. Now the outer appearance of a thing is very important. However, if you stop at the outer, you haven't seen the whole. Most often, you haven't grasped the most important truth about a person or an object. So you must go further. Where? You know the answer. To the inner.
What do some people say? "You can't judge a book by its cover." Or occasionally, "I'm going to get to the bottom of this." Have you ever heard someone say: "I'm you going to see what makes that person tick"? Many of us have learned from hard experience that appearance is not total reality.
In the food industry, the packaging often costs more than what's in the package. Packaging is a multi-billion dollar industry. Now, it's nice to see a shiny new or used car. Naturally you want the car to be nice looking. But if you don't evaluate many things, like the springs, the shocks, and of course the engine, you probably won't end up with the car of your dreams.
Yet don't the movies and other cultural forms train us to view the superficial? In the past it wasn't unusual to hear the expression: "Clothes make the man." It's good to be neat and clean, conditions permitting. But the fashion industry has emerged into the relatively big time. Fashion is another step along the road of superficiality. The fact is that clothes don't make the person. What really makes people is not their looks but their ideology and the ways they apply it. So appearances have some importance. But we must learn to go from the outer to the inner. Don't take things on face value.
PHILOSOPHY: THE STUDY OF SOMETHING REAL
If capitalist philosophy is bad, what then is philosophy? We say capitalism trains us not to see the social basis of the real world, not to be objective. So a simple definition of philosophy from our point of view is the study of any process in its depth, its inner nature. This definition at least plucks philosophy out of the clouds and puts it in the real world. The study of any process. Now we are addressing real things. A process, ranging from shoemaking to making revolution, is real. That is what we want to examine. Not the superficial outer, but the inner, the basics.
If philosophy is this kind of study of any process, then what the hell is dialectical materialism? Do you put it on your cereal? You are in PLP. You're at work. You are eating lunch with friends. You have told some of them you believe in dialectical materialism. One of them -- the nasty one -- asks you, "What is dialectics?" Now you may be in trouble.
LAWS AND UNIVERSALITY
Let's see. By studying many processes, you begin to understand that certain things are common to all of them. Ultimately you begin to see that there are LAWS governing all developments. In your limited experiences, you have noticed that when you drop a ball it goes down, not up. We know this is the law of gravity. By studying many processes we can begin to understand that certain laws are UNIVERSAL to all processes. Universal is the magic word to know. It helps explain dialectical materialism. For example, is there any similarity between boiling water and making a revolution? What are the laws in each process? Later on in this booklet we will go into the laws and try to explain them. But before that we will cover a few more things.
IDEAS COME FROM THE REAL WORLD AND FROM PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE
A popular love song in the 1950s was called "I Get Ideas." We all get ideas. The question is how do we actually get them? Sometimes you hear people describe someone as the smartest person alive, a "genius." Usually this idea is followed by the explanation: "He/she was born that way." Occasionally we hear someone describe a person as "cerebral" (brainy). Or people exclaim: "What a head on his/her shoulders!"
You don't just dream up ideas. Obviously, you are not born with them. Genes or genetic traits don't produce ideas. Ideas come from practice, from the world around us. All our ideas come from our own experiences, our friends' and family's experiences, other workers' practice; from those who lived before and their books. A scientist can make a breakthrough, but the breakthrough by an individual effort comes as a result of tons of efforts, good and bad, by others in the field. You may be smart, but you can't do it on your own. So your ideas come not only from what goes on in your head. They mainly come from the real world, which exists independently of your own mind.
MATERIALISM vs. IDEALISM
While theory is important, very important, practice is primary. Theory is dependent on practice. Practice always precedes theory. You may have heard someone say: "You can't suck it out of your thumb." Practical experience takes place. It has to be evaluated. Lessons should be drawn from practice. Based on evaluation, theory then advances until further practice is done and evaluated, and so on.
The ruling class basically practices idealism. We don't mean in the moral sense. Obviously, generosity and selflessness are the last things on the bosses' minds. We mean idealism in the philosophical sense, the belief that the real world is determined primarily by ideas and the mind. Why are the rulers' idealists? To maintain things as they are. Often we are told: "Don't rock the boat." Or "This is the best of all possible worlds." The logic of all this capitalist claptrap is that you can't improve things, so why try? Depending on circumstances, reforms are put forward to make the system better. The bottom line is: don't try to make revolution, because it is futile. The demise of the old international communist system has given the rulers another tool in their idealist philosophy. Now they can say, and they do, that even if communist revolution is possible, it doesn't work anyway.
The ruling class is not materialist. Here again, we're not talking about moral materialism. No one is greedier or more selfish than the big bosses. We mean materialism in the philosophical sense, the belief that the real world exists independently of the mind, and that ideas ultimately depend on and come from reality outside the mind. The ruling class is idealist because it seeks to do the impossible. The rulers want to stop the wheel of history. Holding power is their goal, and they will tell us--and themselves--all sorts of lies to keep it.
THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY CHANGE
Despite the cynical rulers' notion that the more things change the more they stay the same, things do change. The bosses want us to believe that fighting for change is useless. But what is the fact? First there was communalism, or primitive communism. Then there was slave society. This gave way to feudalism, which was superseded by capitalism.
Then there was socialism, which was reversed, but which set the stage for communism, if we draw the correct lessons from socialism's failure. Society has made fundamental changes. So, of course, has technology. Things don't change? Let's see you live in a cave or take a covered wagon to California. All changes take place based on the cumulative practice of masses of people. Perhaps you would like things to move faster in a revolutionary direction. Who wouldn't? That is not the point. Often fundamental change takes a long time when viewed from an individual slant. That's why a long range perspective is crucial. We must be able to combine urgency with patience. But from such a perspective, we can see that the Russian Revolution, the most profound development of the twentieth century, occurred only 75 years ago. This is just a wink of history's eye. As they say, practice makes perfect. Previous changes of social systems have taken centuries, in some cases thousands of years. The opportunities for our Party for more vigorous practice and Party growth increase as the boss's system becomes increasingly sick and decadent.
LIMITS
"Well now, that's the limit." Have you ever heard someone say that to a naughty child? Or have you ever heard that idea expressed about someone who has done something beyond the norm? Years ago Bill Klem was the chief umpire of baseball. Klem drew the original line in the sand. When a player argued with Klem about a call and started to get porky, Klem drew a line in the dirt with his foot between himself and the angry player. If the player crossed the line, Klem threw him out. The player had gone beyond the limits.
So what? Lets take another example. If you weigh over 400 pounds, you will probably drop dead or at least get very sick. If you're an adult over six feet weighing 75 pounds, you will suffer the same fate as the heavy person. Too fat, too thin. The human body develops within strict limits. Did you ever hear of someone living to three hundred? Of course not. All human life is circumscribed by limits.
Not too long ago, only maximum speed limits were posted on highways. Over the years those concerned with highway safety realized, based on statistics, gleaned from practice (driving), that overly slow drivers were also dangerous. So too fast and too slow were the limits put on highway driving. What are the political limits within which our Party operates? Take a guess!
Our Party line is based in part on the revolutionary development of millions of workers. We think in terms of building a mass party. Presently, our Party has under a million members. Well, now you know our size. Suppose the next Central Committee meeting calls on every Party district to take to the streets, capture City Hall and thus seize political power. You don't like that one. Why? Because this would be suicidal, because we are too small, and our base is still very limited. An action like this could be characterized as left adventurism, even though in a general way this is one of our strategic goals. Tactics too far to the left of our base's size and quality would lead to our termination. To the end of our Party as a process.
Let's change the scenario. The Party really has millions of members and tens of millions in its base. The CC then calls on its members and base to go to the polls and elect Luis, the editor of Challenge-Desafio, as president. A bad idea. It would also end the process of our development as a revolutionary party. Parliamentary strategy would be too far to the right, beyond the limits, of a revolutionary party. Too left, too right are both dead ends for the Party. But these errors have brought about the demise of many revolutionary groups. Thus we oppose terrorism and we attack right opportunism.
POLITICAL PRACTICE BROADENS THE PARTY'S LIMITS
But do the limits stay the same? The limits of a small party are different from those of a large party. The Party now circulates about 10,000 Challenge-Desafios. This can't be the limit forever. It shouldn't be the limit even now. But let's say for argument's sake that this is the best we can do at present. However, continued Challenge-Desafio sales and Party growth will expand the current limits. Every time we carry out political work, our practice changes the limits of what we can do next, and consequently influences the limits of the entire Party. We have to be ever on the alert, scrutinizing, investigating circumstances internal and external to the Party, keep ourselves rooted in basics, so that we can take advantage of a situation and expand our limits. Sometimes the opportunity can be right under our noses. Often events off the job can be used to widen our work on and off the job in a revolutionary direction.
Usually imperialist war or nationalist war are among the biggest influences that can move our efforts forward. Sometimes we get unexpected opportunities. Take the O.J. Simpson trial. The emergence of the Mark Fuhrman tapes, proving him to be the fascist monster that he is, opened up political possibilities for us. We could show that Fuhrman isn't unusual, that capitalist police departments and cops are by nature racist killers. The rulers realized what had happened and moved fairly quickly to say that Fuhrman isn't the average cop. Even the LAPD police ran full page ads disassociating themselves from the fascist Fuhrman.
Did we move quickly, vigorously, and in unison to draw the lesson for the masses that, among others, the police are a significant force for the rulers? The police help the bosses hold power. While some people realize this, most don't, even if they hate the police. The cops represent an important part of the rulers' armed forces. They police are capitalism's shock troops. They confront the workers on a day to day basis. Anyway, did we expand our limits by taking advantage of the Fuhrman opportunity?
NOTHING'S SIMPLE
By now it may be a little clearer that all processes are complex. The political process is especially complex. Complexity is a universal feature of all developments. When I worked in a machine shop some years ago I operated a Blanchard Grinder. My workmates and I were required to use a micrometer. This measuring device helped us determine sizes invisible to the eye and too small to be measured by a ruler. Every job had a tolerance. The tolerances were always above or below the final size of the object being ground. So every job had its specific limits of "plus" or "minus." We were required to check many times the object we were grinding to see if it remained within the tolerance-limits assigned to the job. Usually, we were given a blueprint of the object with the tolerances noted.
To the naked eye each piece looked the same. But if the objects went beneath or beyond the limits, they would be thrown away. In other words, the process had to be terminated. But, gee, each piece looked exactly the same. The machine was the same. The initial pieces were the same. The grinding stone seemed the same. But things were not the same. Every time the grinding stones engaged the object, the stone wore down a bit. Every grind, in the most minute way, changed the size of the piece being ground. Those of you who have operated a punch press know that every time a die in the press bangs out another piece, it wears the die. If the job lasts long enough, you know that the die will eventually change in size, that the new piece will come out the wrong size.
SAMENESS AND DIFFERENCE
No two processes are exactly 100% the same. So what? What does this mean to you and me? You are in a PLP club. Everyone is somewhat committed to fighting for communist revolution. But we all know from experience that eventually some of the older members or even some of the newer members will drop out. So while all the members seem the same, in reality they are not. Sometimes too many battles will wear out a person. In some cases certain members will weaken in the course of various struggles, while similar experiences will strengthen other members.
In other cases, things don't move fast enough for some members. Occasionally a member will draw the conclusion that the reason for sluggishness in the class struggle is that the workers are bad, the bosses too strong, the Party weak or wrong. In other words there can be a myriad of reasons for a member to drop away.
You can never take anyone for granted. In saying this we want to point out that there is a thin line between reality and cynicism. We should always carefully and thoroughly evaluate the many aspects of any process we are involved in. And we should never draw one-sided conclusions.
SOCIALISM LOST - COMMUNISM FOUND
For example, when our Party published Road to Revolution IV, some members and friends said that the old international communist movement had always been rotten. One essential difference between RRIV and the old movement was that we advocated skipping the socialist stage and going directly to communism. Important? Sure! However, like the old movement, we advocated the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the need for mass armed struggle. We understood the crucial role of the working class and other key concepts of earlier Marxism-Leninism. While we are different in many important ways from the old movement, ours is not entirely different. We say our Party is primarily like the old movement. We have learned from previous experiences, as well as from our own, that communism should be the sole goal of the revolution.
No matter how you evaluate the relative development of sameness and difference, our Party is not totally changed from the old movement. We have tried to learn from the strengths of earlier communists and to discard their weaknesses. This knowledge comes from a combination of practice and evaluation. We don't want to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Things are usually neither all good nor all bad. Snap judgments typically lead to wrong, often dangerous conclusions.
BOSSES' IDEAS AND ONE-SIDEDNESS
The ruling class trains us, with some success, to be one-sided. One way of dividing and weakening the working class is to make differences among workers appear primary. For example, the bosses push the concept of race. This is one way they compartmentalize us. The racist bosses say: "Black is bad; black workers can never unite with white." "Immigrants (unless they are white) are robbing us blind." Thus, we should hate them all and go along with the rulers' attacks on the immigrants. More importantly, we are supposed to believe that immigrants, rather than the bosses, are our enemies.
And, of course men and women are so different that they have different outlooks, emotions, and values. The bosses use this lie to foster male chauvinism and to exploit women workers even more than men. Then the bosses try to convince women to view their exploitation in a non- class way, to view men, not the ruling class, as their main enemy. To the extent that workers and others go along with the rulers' racism and male chauvinism, capitalism rakes in huge profits. The bosses are laughing all the way to the bank as we are suckered in by their racism, nationalism, and male chauvinism.
Regardless of sex, color, and national origin, all workers are more alike than different. As far as their interests are concerned, all are objectively pitted against the boss. Only communism can fully and permanently end divisions within the working class and smash capitalist oppression!
"The Times They are A-Changing" was a popular song in the days of the movement against the Vietnam war. But the bosses don't want real change that would strengthen the working class. They say: "Don't rock the boat; don't make waves." They always throw these ideas at us so that we don't resist their oppression and make revolution. On the other hand, as we pointed out above, the rulers tell us that the more things change, the more they stay the same. By using this cynical notion, they are just coming at us from another side, but the goal--to prevent us from rocking the boat--is the same. All the rulers' philosophy is based on keeping power. Keeping things as they are means the rulers continue to hold power.
However, we all know, often from bitter experience, that things do change. Under capitalism they go from bad to worse. You think things are bad now? Well, they will get worse, much worse. This trend sums up workers' lives under capitalism.
But the bosses have some smarts. They know that many workers are fed up with capitalism or at least very much disgruntled with their daily lives. So then the capitalists say things will get better if only we allow them to dictate the change. In the last election, Bill Clinton ran as the apostle of change. All the bosses want is to keep power and maintain the status quo. They understand that sometimes they have to pander to our desire to see change for the better. Often they disagree with each other over the best tactics for doing this. Many of us have come to understand that these arguments between bosses' factions have to do only with how to make things better for the bosses and their class.
BOILING WATER, FRYING THE BOSSES, AND THE UNITY OF OPPOSITES
Well, let's go from these heavy ideas into the kitchen. You want to boil water. You put water in a pot and place the pot over a flame. The water boils. What we have here is the unity of opposites. Or the interpenetration of things. Obviously, the water boils after the heat has penetrated it. What's boiling water got to do with the Party and the class struggle? Plenty!
The workers and bosses are locked in class struggle. Objectively, this is a fight to the death, whether we recognize it or not. The workers can win only if they destroy the ruling class, its armed power, its state apparatus, its culture, its philosophy, and so on. How can we talk about unity within a fight to the death? Workers and bosses are not united on a philosophical or political basis. They're two opposing sides of the same battle. They are locked in battle. We talk about unity in this sense, and only in this sense.
The Party understands the objective nature of the class struggle and brings into this struggle the idea that revolution is necessary. The ideas of Marxism-Leninism do not fall from the sky, nor do they arise all by themselves from the class struggle. Workers never wake up one morning saying: "We need the dictatorship of the proletariat. We need to build a new state apparatus that serves our interests." Communists bring these ideas to the working class because we know that only the working class has the need and power to do away with capitalism. In this sense we are the fire under the water. The hotter we make it for the bosses, the sooner the revolution will prevail. The class struggle is a contradiction.
There are contradictions in every process. These contradictions make change. The rulers seek to suppress change, the making of waves, revolution. While there is some truth in a personal or coincidental way to the notion that opposites attract, the fact is that opposites, while united in struggle, create change or motion.
RESOLVE CONTRADICTIONS BY SHARPENING THEM
Thus, we can begin to understand that the way to resolve a class or antagonistic contradiction is to intensify it. Increasing the flame makes the water boil faster. Building the Party through increased class struggle leads to revolution.
But things are far more complex than they seem. For example, if we place flame under a rack, the rack will take far longer than the water to change in composition. You can snap a twig with your fingers, but you can't snap the branch of a tree bare-handed. You can break a wooden pencil with your fingers but you may not be able to break a pen that has the same pressure and thickness.
THE INTERNAL IS PRIMARY
While everything has contradictions, everything isn't the same. Some things are stronger than others. In other words, their internal make up is stronger than the external contradictions. Why did the pencil snap under pressure, while similar pressure didn't affect the pen? As Mao Zedong said, "Put a rock and an egg in the sun. In one case, you get a hot rock. In the other, a chick." We conclude that the internal contradiction is primary. At this stage of the struggle the ruling class is stronger than our Party. The bosses are currently dominating the working class. We could decide from this example that because the ruling class is too strong, we should give up. Some people do give up, and many more think about it, falling for the idea that you can't fight City Hall.
If you can't fight City Hall, then what are we doing? We are trying to make ourselves stronger so the bosses cannot defeat us or break us. While the external pressures from the ruling class are important, these attacks are not primary. The Party will go under only if it is too weak to withstand attacks. A recent look at history might convince you. The Soviet Union went under, but not mainly because of U.S. imperialism. The decline of the international communist movement and ultimately the total collapse of Soviet socialism can be traced primarily to ideological weaknesses. Soviet imperialism went down to defeat without ever taking a shot from the other side. For the first time in a history, a state peacefully gave up power and went off the stage of history with its tail between its legs.
Of course, there were pressures from the outside. But the demise of the Soviet Union was due essentially to weaknesses within the old communist movement and, ultimately, to contradictions within Soviet capitalism itself.
The question sometimes arises: can you eventually win when you appear to be in an overwhelmingly adverse position? Well, it was done in Czarist Russia, when a small group of communists and advanced workers overthrew a seemingly invincible enemy. It happened in China under similar circumstances. History has proved it can be done.
As Mao said, you must slight the enemy strategically but take him into full account tactically. You might say that our line reflects the real world because it coincides with the wheel of history. Societies do change, and when they are ripe for change, it cannot be prevented by the people in power. The rulers try to stop the advance of history and society. As we pointed out, this is the height of idealism.
CONTRADICTION IS EVERYWHERE, BUT FRIENDS AREN'T ENEMIES
One word of caution. Contradictions arise not only between opposing classes but also among friends. All contradictions have to be intensified in order to resolve them and move on to a new set of more advanced contradictions. However, different tactics must be used in struggling with friends and fighting an enemy. Different goals must be sought. In struggling with one another we want to reach a higher degree of unity. In fighting the bosses we seek the opposite. Determining these tactics is very difficult and complex. All contradictions are antagonistic. However, every contradiction isn't primary. Abandoning the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as a goal leads to a more intense contradiction than arguing over the choice of a street corner for a Party rally. There are differences and differences. A good deal of judgment must be used to determine the tactics for all internal struggle. In the final analysis, the collective decides what is right or wrong. Most of the time, the collective is correct. The old saying is right: two heads are usually better than one.
Capitalist society trains us to believe that what an individual thinks is always true and that "my" ideas are identical to the real world. In most cases the real world can best be seen by the many, not the one or the few. Individualism, in the capitalist sense, is negative.
Collective practice and time will eventually determine the best way of doing something. We must evaluate as we practice, and try to come up with the right path to follow.
One final note on contradiction. It used to be thought that inanimate objects had no life or contradictions of their own. The development of inorganic chemistry showed otherwise. Book collectors or libraries have learned that books and papers will disintegrate with age. So they preserve them by encasing them in glass. Paper is now being treated chemically to last longer.
Everything changes. Even a desk in an office has an inner life. The desk has its own molecular composition. The molecules constantly collide with one another. The desk is vulnerable to the atmosphere, which will also influence its deterioration. There are contradictions in everything, not just in some things. There are no exceptions. If we understood this law of motion, we would not only be able to do better political work. We would also be able to handle our so-called personal life better.
QUANTITY AND QUALITY
Suddenly it's spring! (Sounds like the title of another popular song.) Yesterday there wasn't a bud on the bush. Today the buds are all over. Some parents worry that their child is older than two and hasn't yet said a word. Instead of worrying, they should count their blessings. Then, miracle of miracles, the speechless two year-old suddenly starts spouting sentences. What about the parents who have been trying for months without much success to toilet train their two year-old? Then one day, the kid suddenly starts jumping on the potty. Have you heard the one about how young someone looked recently, and suddenly that person now looks very old?
Get the idea? Often we see only the big change but can't or don't see the small, cumulative change that appears to arrive full-blown, or least seems unaccountably larger. It's somewhat the same way in the Party and in making revolution. Just prior to the large anti-Vietnam War movement the media and pundits characterized college students as the "silent generation." Within a short time the "silent" ones were marching by the millions against the war. Unless you are very careful, you risk writing off millions of allies and potential members. If you make judgments based on superficial temporary evidence, you can easily miss chances to build the Party. Or, as many have done and continue to do, you may drop out of the Party because you make subjective, wrong estimates of what is possible.
Often we don't appreciate our own efforts or the efforts of the Party. Admittedly, international communist movement's demise has slowed down the class struggle everywhere. That's the real world! But we can't cry over spilt milk. We can only draw lessons from the collapse and apply these lessons, both positive and negative, to our own work. Giving up flies in the face of objective reality. Like all other processes, class struggle ebbs and flows. Persistent efforts around the line of Road to Revolution IV will sooner or later weaken and smash capitalism.
Sometimes you hear people are say: "So I sold another Challenge. So what?" Or you know this is what they're thinking. On the face of it, the thought's not unreasonable, especially if you have been mis-trained by capitalist ideas. But suppose every comrade and many friends sold one more C-D. This quantitative development might become a qualitative (important) step towards reaching the next crucial goal.
For the most part, our present recruitment efforts are too few, given the true potential for party growth. When we do recruit we still tend to do so by the ones and twos. But if we didn't recruit more of the ones and twos, we might not reach the stage at which mass recruitment could become possible. When you recruit someone, that development is probably qualitative for both you and the new member. However, it probably has just quantitative importance for the Party. On the other hand, if you evaluate your recruitment efforts, you will probably note that along the way, certain qualitative developments eventually led the person to join. In other words, there were turning points in your quantitative efforts.
TWO LAWS...WITH MORE TO COME
We have, very briefly, covered the first two laws of Dialectical Materialism. The first is contradiction, the unity of opposites; and the second is quantity into quality. This is only wetting your whistle. Be careful, don't get carried away. Things are not so simple. They become more complex. Every time a contradiction is resolved, further contradictions arise, or the nature of the contradiction changes. Every new member that the Party recruit expands the limits of what the Party can do.
New members for the Party intensify the contradictions between us and the ruling class. We want new members, but they bring their own contradictions into the Party with them. Like ourselves, their commitment must always be examined and strengthened. More members must lead to increased political struggle in the Party. We must combat their political weaknesses, and continue our efforts to overcome political weaknesses amongst the veteran members. We could go on, but as you can see the struggle for communist ideas constantly goes on within and outside the Party. As we said before, struggle with our friends can't be the same as struggle against our enemies.
Every time we do something positive as individual members or as a Party, we produce new quantity leading to new quality. Although the process of building communism isn't like a dog running around in circles chasing its own tail, it is endless, and we have to train ourselves to see it in this way. Fighting for communism can't be a short- term fad; it must be a lifelong pursuit. No important commitment--marriage, children, friends, the Party--can be for the short term. If our efforts are to succeed, they must be for the very long haul. Think of another old saying: "In for a dime, in for a dollar." Remember, in every process there are contradictions. Karl Marx said that the essence of life is struggle. Nothing happens by itself. The unity of opposites sets things in motion. Conflict with the class enemy can bring victorious revolution. A different type of conflict with those near and dear can bring positive development.
As we wrote above, people often say: "Don't throw out the baby with the bath water." People always learn the basic truth of these homilies by experience, sometimes the hard way. Our Party has learned many things from the efforts of past revolutionaries. We also learn from one another and from a great deal of experience in the class struggle. In other words, we learn virtually everything from other workers, dead or alive. The class struggle is our schoolroom and without being too corny, we can say that the working class are our teachers.
Each society learns from previous societies and uses this knowledge to improve upon them. Technology is one of the things carried forward and then advanced from one society to the next. We are already evaluating capitalist society. Was capitalism an advance from feudalism? If nothing else, capitalism created the working class. Capitalism brought together large groups of workers who had to learn to work together in a somewhat disciplined way. Above all, they learned with ups and downs that they had to figure out how to fight together in order to improve their circumstances. As in other processes, development is highly uneven. You can say this with a vengeance about capitalism.
This unevenness stands out like a sore thumb in the U.S., which is supposedly one of the most developed of all capitalist countries. A vast gulf divides the rich from the poor. However, in many parts of the world, capitalism has produced little forward development over the last two centuries. If you think there is poverty in the U.S., Japan, and the industrialized countries of Europe, just look at many places in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Hundreds of millions of workers lag behind the poor of U.S. and other imperialists. Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism, has impoverished much of the world.
THE THIRD LAW: NEGATION
Most technology developed under capitalism has some use. But it is still technology for profit. Communists will use technology not to benefit the few, the bosses, but rather to improve the living conditions of all workers.
Communists are not going to throw out the hammer, airplanes, telephones, etc. We will use them so that we can increase production and distribute it in an even way. We may throw out PCs and private automobiles but we will not eliminate computers or mechanized transportation. Capitalism produces to enrich the bosses, not for the needs of workers. Today, there more profits to be made by Windows 95 than by building homes for the workers all over the world who live in hovels or on the street.
Using what is beneficial in previous processes to bring forth and improve new ones and discarding what is outworn or harmful is called, "Negation." The bosses would love it if we said: "The lesson from previous revolutionary movements is that they were rotten; there is nothing good to be learned from them." Hence, the unrelenting barrage of lies about Stalin, 50 years after his death. Present bourgeois estimates of Stalin's crimes now exceed those of Hitler's. I think the current figure for the deaths the bosses attribute to Stalin's leadership is up to 90 million. Before long, it will be said by the rulers that Stalin killed all the Russians, as well as millions of others.
The rulers want to distort and obscure the important advances made under socialism. They don't want anyone else to travel that road. They want to conceal the most profound development of the 20th century, the Russian Revolution.
The rulers want to hide the positive lessons of the Revolution. The rulers don't attack Stalin to help us get it right the next time. Their slogan is: "Never again." Our goal is: go forward to the communist revolution, based on Marxism-Leninism. Thus, you might say, as a result of investigation and practice, that our Party, the PLP, is the negation of international communism. This is when an old process ends and a new one begins or is born out of the old process. We say: "Workers of the world, unite; abolish wage slavery!" We didn't invent this slogan or the ideas behind it. We got them studying Marxism-Leninism.
If you wanted to apply this law to this booklet, you would have to read, study, and apply the ideas presented. After evaluating the pamphlet, you would have the use the evaluation to write a better one. The only direction for communists to go is forward!
The three laws of Dialectics can help us. But they can't give us a blueprint. A brief look at the ruling class's views on death and the "hereafter" may help us understand the negation of the negation. A quote from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar comes to mind: "The evil that men do live after them. The good is often interred with their bones." We might say simply that people's deeds live after them. The rulers' religious men say: "Look, you are here for only 70 or 80 years, if you are lucky! So be a good person." When the preachers speak of being good, they don't just mean be nice to your spouse, children, or neighbors. "Goodness" to them is a class question. Being "good" means: don't rock the boat. "Goodness" means especially being nice to the ruling class. Don't fight them; accept your lot in life. You are only here a short time, but you are dead forever. That is the bosses' frightening specter.
To force us to be good to them, the rulers use their holy roller con artists to give us the dual outlook of heaven and hell. If you are good, you go to heaven and live a beautiful existence forever. If you are bad, that is, if you fight for communism or even less, you go to hell. Hell or purgatory is a horrible place that you occupy for eternity. So what is putting up with class oppression for a brief 70 or 80 years, when the alternative is either eternal joy or eternal horrors?
OUR PARTY IS LENIN'S CHILD
But what you do on earth is the only life you have. It can have a lasting impact on the future, as well as on the present. A striking example is Lenin. Lenin has been dead about 70 years. But his deeds, his vision, live on forever. Our Party could never have come into existence without Lenin.
Children represent one of the more common examples of the link between the present and the future. The future of life on earth isn't mystical. In large measure, it has to do with children. Children are the future. The hereafter endorsed by the rabbis, priests, preachers, etc. leads to maintaining hell on earth. Fighting for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat means fighting for the needs and aspirations of the working class, now and for the future. Communism is the future of all workers. The time to start fighting for it was yesterday!
FREEDOM: A CLASS QUESTION
Like the OJ trial, which seemed to go on forever, this pamphlet is nearing its end. At some point in dialectics' classes, the question often arises: what is freedom? In almost every case, with some variations, the answer is: doing what you want. One young person in a recent class said that freedom to her meant the absence of responsibility to anyone else. Doing what you want. The absence of responsibility. These ideas put you in jail, much like solitary confinement, and keep you there.
These common ideas are the ultimate expression of selfishness. Freedom, in fact, is acting on your class needs. It is the opposite of selfishness and individualism. Knowing what you and your class need are a big step to gaining freedom. Freedom is one thing for the bosses and something altogether different for workers and communists. The bosses know that they need us to keep producing profits and fighting wars for them. To the extent that we swallow their rotten ideas and remain passive in the face of their crimes, the bosses are free to go on ruling over us.
The working class needs communism. Without communism the workers are at the mercy of the greedy rulers and their profit system. So how do you get communism? The answer to that one is by building the Party, in this case, the PLP. The next step is fighting for communist revolution.